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ABSTRACT 





In October 2009, the Nigerian government signed a cease-fire and amnesty agreement to 
end a decade-long conflict with local militias in the Niger Delta agitating for greater 
political participation. Only one year later, as the new peace deal was celebrated as a 
success, the former conflict area became host to a lucrative and burgeoning illegal 
bunkering operation. These practices, diverting oil from the legal oil infrastructure to an 
alternate set of pipelines and refineries, implicated former militants, government soldiers 
and oil company managers alike. What linkages exist between the dissolution of a 
political armed social movement and the new rash of pipeline breaches? The events in the 
Niger Delta are often depicted as the outcome of contest to control oil rents by the state, 
transnational oil companies and indigenous population. However, this project explores 
the obverse and often overlooked dynamics undergirding eruptions of violence and 
protest: the ecology of economies, labor practices and practical relationships that have 
flourished around the oil infrastructure. Tracing the ways these complex social worlds are 
anchored in the material and institutional practices of production, rather than a contest for 
oil rents, the dissertation exposes how nodes of control in the Niger Delta are rendered 
increasingly porous, rather than defined by discrete actors and interests. Based on 21 
months of fieldwork in the Niger Delta, I argue that the lifeworlds entwined with the 
technological infrastructure help unsettle the dominant arguments about rent-dependant 
oil states and state violence. They point instead to how practices seeking to delimit the 
space of extraction and operator liability such as community development initiatives, 
community subcontracting agreements and safety and security policies have produced 
hidden perils and exclusions under the rubrics of inclusion, peace and collaboration. This 
argument is developed over the course of several ethnographically grounded chapters. 
The first offers a material history of how the oil infrastructure became literally and 
figuratively embedded within Nigeria’s social and political life. Successive chapters 
follow as production practices are reconfigured institutionally, materially and 
discursively around a set of rogue pipelines and illegal refineries in the wake of the 
amnesty. I explore the constellations of oil community development regimes and the 
promotion of Nigeria’s “new” democracy; the explosion of oil theft and the concept of 
the oil economy; and increasing securitization and subcontracting practices. The 
dissertation demonstrates how these shifting arrangements, seeking to manage spaces of 
extraction, also generate alternate imaginaries of power, sovereignty and economy and 
that they render possible interventions, such as large-scale oil bunkering systems, which 
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Introduction: The destruction and resurrection of Oporoza 
 
 
Oil creates the illusion of a completely changed life, life without work, life for free. Oil is 
a resource that anesthetizes thought, blurs vision, corrupts. People from poor 
countries go around thinking: God, if only we had oil! The concept of oil 
expresses perfectly the eternal human dream of wealth achieved through lucky 
accident, through a kiss of fortune and not by sweat, anguish, hard work. In this 
sense oil is a fairy tale, and like every fairy tale, a bit of a lie.   
    
--Ryzard Kapuscinsky, Shah of Shahs 
 
 
Even the good things in life eventually poison you. There are three kinds of sounds, two kinds of 
shadows, one gourd for every cracked head, and seven boreholes for those that climb too high. 
There is an acid in the feel of things there is a fire which does not burn, but which dissolves the 
flesh like common salt.  




When the soldiers arrived at Oporoza, the headquarters of Gbaramatu Kingdom, the 
celebration for the coronation of Godwin Bebenimibo, the new Pereship (kingship) 
holder for the Gbaramatu clan, was well underway. Residents, having received a warning 
only a few minutes before their arrival, had already begun to scatter. Those who missed 
the fleeing boats ran deep into the bush to hide themselves from the helicopter gunships, 
tripping over the gnarled roots of the mangrove trees, and stuffing bitter leaves in their 
mouths to dull their hunger. Although officially launched by the government to capture 
Tompolo, the wanted leader of the militant group for the Movement for the Emancipation 
of the Niger Delta (MEND), by the end of the day’s attack, residents, the militants and 
their leadership had vanished. The empty village stood in ruins. A military joint task 
force raided anything of value. Entire sections of the community were left scorched by 
fires and blasted with rounds of ammunition. 
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Three weeks later, MEND, in a letter to the press announced the launching of a 
reprisal attack, “Hurricane Piper Alley.” 1 Giving oil workers 72 hours to leave the area, 
the group descended on rows of pipelines, flow stations and assorted oil facilities 
operated by Chevron and Shell who had harbored the government soldiers in their vast 
infrastructure.2 Here too, destruction abounded. The “hurricane” left behind sets of busted 
flow lines, strings of burnt-out wellheads, and an eerie silence as numerous flow stations, 
processing plants and gas flares were left disabled and unmoving in the early seasonal 
rains.  
Often framed in terms of ethnic tensions, nation-state crisis and a global 
dependency on oil, conflicts in the Niger Delta have served as infamous examples of oil’s 
volatile, excremental powers played out in miniature at the gateway to the Atlantic. The 
siege of Oporoza and retaliatory “hurricane” moreover, began to serve as one its most 
mediatized examples. With the price of oil rocketing up beyond the $80 mark at the time, 
the events made headlines around the world. The Gbaramatu siege proved a stunning 
example of oil-related violence that had, over the past 60 years, led to multiple 
causalities, lists of human rights violations by the rent-dependant governments and 
worsening environmental pollution. At the same time, these events underscored the 
growing power of a decade-long armed counter-insurgency movement against those 
stated forces of exploitation and corruption, who in a campaign of infrastructural 
sabotage that had reduced output by 25%. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 These “oil war” code names were up graded and downgraded in a similar fashion to weather patterns. 
Therefore names like "Tropical Storm Vigilant,” provided a literal barometer that sent the same type of 
warnings that offshore rigs take care to be aware of. 
 
2 Their airstrip served as a staging ground for the aircrafts used during the bombardment of Oporoza 
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Yet, in October 2009, only five months following the siege, the Nigerian 
government and several militant groups agreed to an amnesty deal and ceasefire. 
Suddenly the years of antagonisms and tensions that had defined the relations between 
Niger Deltan communities, successive oil-based governments and the global oil 
extractive industry were subsumed within a process of renewal and cooperation. The raid 
at Oporoza and the counter-attacks on the infrastructure would thus mark both the apex of 
struggles between the state and its oil producing region, and its most decisive turning 
point.  
The amnesty program allowed for a formal ceasefire and was laden with a host of 
promises for residents of the oil-producing region that this peace would finally make way 
for the long-desired development, employment and management of finances. Evidence of 
the amnesty’s ‘success’ soon circulated, contractors, whose projects had been shelved for 
some years, deployed almost immediately to the creeks, armed with a new work force 
drawn from the community. New sets of community development money cleared the way 
for the commissioning of fresh pipelines and the refurbishment of burnt wellheads. 
Towns and villages leveled by government soldiers were also being rebuilt, with funds 
from the government treasury. So long the symbol and stronghold against the travesties 
that had befallen the region, within a relatively short period, Gbaramatu had transformed 
into an example of how co-operation between the state, community and transnational oil 
corporations could be successfully fostered.  
A completion of the interrupted Pereship service only a year later revealed how 
very quickly the previous space of destruction was being overlaid with a new order. In 
the place of invading soldiers, the governor who helped coordinate the attacks on 
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Oporoza now sent his aide to the festivities, who was received as an honored guest. Both 
Shell and Chevron, whose infrastructure had suffered during counter-attacks, now 
contributed funds to the event, providing extra fuel for the community generator, rice and 
cattle for the feasts. Meanwhile, the managers of various Nigerian oil service companies 
arrived throughout the weeklong event, feasting and spraying money3 for the drummers 
and the masquerade dancers.  
Yet while the discourse on mediation and development appeared to alter a heavily 
politicized movement into a group of tamed new workers and contractors, during this 
same span of time the number of pipeline disruptions grew higher than ever as 
participation in the illegal oil business soared. It is the reordering the infrastructure and 
the space around it in this period of “peace-making” that establishes the terrain for this 
dissertation. The dissertation studies an ecology of economies, practices and relationships 
flourishing in the space around Nigeria’s oil pipelines. While the focus of studies on the 
Delta have long seen conflict as its defining feature, there has been very little work trying 
to parse out the specific connections and everyday networks that have developed 
alongside clashes. Events like the destruction and rebuilding of the extraction zone 
around Oporoza illuminate the ways a volatile geography of petroleum extraction also 
hosts a myriad of intimacies and controls, desires, experiences. The premise of the 
dissertation is that these connections are as central to the forms of life and political 
imaginaries that have emerged around and within the space of production as the tensions 
that have erupted around them.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
3 A term for throwing money, mostly at celebratory functions. The performers are appreciated in a steady 
shower of bills that can then later be collected for their personal use at the end of the performance. 
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The study is based on 21 months of fieldwork in Nigeria’s oil producing Niger 
Delta. The thesis analyses questions on the interrelation between post-conflict mediation 
practices and the material, infrastructural life of economic assemblages as a means to 
explore transformations in a postcolonial state enmeshed in long-standing networks of oil 
extraction. The theme of the dissertation is the complex lifeworlds that are produced 
among the pipelines, extraction and processing plants of an oil-producing site. In this 
regard it constitutes an ethnography of groups of oil workers, company managers, 
activists, fisherwomen, traders and illegal oil pilferers whose lives and livelihoods 
revolve around long-entrenched extraction systems like the one in Gbaramatu. The 
dissertation seeks to bring attention to how the building, destroying and reconfiguring of 
the architecture of oil flows are part and parcel of personal relationships, aesthetic 
sensibilities, economic histories and political imaginaries. Thus the repressive destruction 
of villages, the awkward reconstitution of peace and burgeoning black market for oil 
become themselves part of an aspiration and imaginary for re-assembling and 
reconfiguring power in the oil fields and at the same time, they signal the limits to which 
such interventions and changes can be accomplished. 
 
 
Project Description:  
 
While ethnographic work on mineral mining industries has been attentive to the 
particular cultural, historical and hybrid forms of sociality that emerge in the intersection 
of industrialized work practices and remote communities (Taussig, 1980; Nash 1979; 
Powdermaker 1962; Moodie, 1992; Ferguson, 1999) such studies on the oil industry are 
notably absent. Despite being the celebrated protagonist of post-war industrialization and 
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“the great themes of the 20th century” (Yergin, 2001, 7), the everyday ways in which oil 
workers and residents navigate some of the world’s most lucrative and essential 
production infrastructure remain hidden. Meanwhile, studies of localized contests for 
control of the oil, like those occurring in the Niger Delta, tend to be framed exclusively as 
tripartite actors: state, transnational or local forces, battling for distinct interests. 
Examining the relationships, practices, spaces and economies connected with the 
Nigerian state’s massive oil infrastructure, my fieldwork research, by contrast, suggested 
the interests of actors and the boundaries they are said to inhabit are often quite slippery 
and porous. The focus of the research was largely dictated by the signs of the time. When 
I began the constellations of power and order in the Niger Delta were shifting. The 
attacks on Oporoza began the day my flight touched down in Nigeria. Inhabitants in the 
area fled to refugee sites in Warri and the government declared a state of emergency. 
Transnational oil workers were removed from their worksites amidst fears (and 
manifestations) of retaliation and settled into hotels far from the rigs, in Lagos or Abuja.  
The Amnesty deal put into effect only months later, however, reconfigured the 
political and physical landscape rather quickly. Projects that had been stalled or delayed 
since 2002, recovered their full swing. Oil workers returned as production came back 
online. Moreover, the political ground and policies of the country were shifting. The first 
president from the Niger Delta, Goodluck Jonathan, was swept into power in early 2010.4 
He renewed programs that promoted further deregulation of the petroleum sector and the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Following the death of Umaru Yar’Adua. Jonathan was Vice-President at the time. 
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privatization of the national assets—including the power sector and the national oil 
company, NNPC.5  
These changes reflected a wider effort to review and re-structure policies and 
agreements mediating between the industry, the state and the Niger Delta communities. 
The government promoted new forms of Nigerian entrepreneurship by actively working 
to enforce legislation such as the Local Content laws, which mandated increased 
indigenous participation in transnational companies and operations in the country. New 
parastatal initiatives awarded lucrative contracts to local Niger Delta contractors for 
development projects. Meanwhile, former militants were recruited and packed off for 
DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) camps and job skill training in 
Lagos, in Ghana and South Africa.  
These efforts purported to foster more legitimate inclusion and participation in the 
oil sector. However, at the same time, illegitimate oil production and trading networks in 
the areas targeted by the amnesty programs were only expanding. Investigating this 
paradoxical rise in pipeline-pilfering connections amidst the post-amnesty emphasis on 
renewal and repair drew attention to the central role played by the production architecture 
itself. Used both licitly and illicitly, the pipelines were often used and spoken about as a 
device for organizing people, politics and imaginaries in the delta area. As the material 
body through which different actors, histories and institutions converge, during my 
research the infrastructure acted as a lens that pulled focus to the volatile, sentient and 
constantly shifting landscape within the spaces around production. The importance of 
maintaining access to and control of the oil infrastructure to all parties was as fixed a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Many of the items on Jonathan’s agenda were not new, but had in fact begun under Obasanjo. However, 
during the brief period of Yar’adua’s tenure, with the events erupting in the Delta, these policies appeared 
to be put on hold.  
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notion after the amnesty as it was during the peak of the fighting. To this extent, the 
pipelines and flow lines also appeared as figures within which contradictory experiences 
of conflict and renewal, fears of exclusions and dreams of prosperity were congealed. 
Focusing on the histories of spaces forged by these technologies of extraction and the 
stories and practices associated with them, therefore offered an avenue for understanding 
and conveying the more complex social and political universes with which the Nigerian 
oil industry is bound up. 
 
 Beginning in May 2009, my fieldwork was based largely in Delta State.6 It 
centered on the social dimensions of the construction and connection of Chevron Nigeria 
Limited’s massive Escravos Gas to Liquid plant to the networks of oil and gas flows in 
the Warri-Escravos axis, and the simultaneous expansion of an illegal oil trade (known as 
bunkering) taking place in adjacent communities: the Ijaw kingdom of Gbaramatu and 
the Itsekiri Ugborodo community. Like many Niger Deltan residents, traders, legal and 
illegal oil workers, I often moved between villages, production sites and the city of 
Warri. However, my fieldwork can largely be seen as taking place in three major 
sections.  
The first six months were relatively concentrated in Warri itself where Chevron 
and Shell (at the time) established headquarters for their Western Delta projects. Warri is 
the site of what is largely considered the first outbreak of armed political fighting in the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
6 I had previously made preliminary research trips to the Niger Delta, Warri and its environs. The first was 
from June to August 2006 and the second June to August 2007. 
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Niger Delta since the Biafra civil war (1967-70). In 19977 and 2003, the city experienced 
two waves of what have become known as “the Warri Wars” or, more commonly, the 
first and second “Warri Crisis.” I spent time here discussing the amnesty with NGO 
leaders and government officials involved with establishing and promoting programs for 
former militants and community youth. I also visited Shell and Chevron housing and 
office complexes and met with rig and construction workers as well as with the 
management personnel for the corporations. Here the history of regional clashes were 
framed rather optimistically by managers who, in the wake of the amnesty, believed that 
the new deals with former militants would allow them to finally complete their delayed 
projects. The legal documents and statistical records, emails and internal reports which 
company employees and NGOs were generous enough to share with me, however, often 
painted a different portrait. They demonstrated how the language, metrics and policies 
that have emerged overtime between the state, corporations and oil producing 
communities had simply been reworked in tandem with the technical challenges faced by 
the industry.8  
 During the second part of my fieldwork I was fortunate to have the opportunity to 
follow and observe the Nigerian oil service company, Fenog, while they were working in 
the Escravos River area. Fenog was constructing multiple pipeline projects for both 
Chevron and NNPC across the area where the 2009 raids and counter-attacks took place. 
Transnational and state joint ventures rely heavily on contracted Nigerian oil service 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 This first Warri Crisis occurred under Abacha, and was a response to the movement of a local government 
headquarters from an Ijaw to an Itsetkiri area. However, it is largely seen to foreshadow the form of 
disputes that would occur in the Delta after the military government ended. See Leton, 2006. 
 
8 To add to this knowledge I also visited various consultants, academics, writers and activists in Lagos, Port 




companies and sub-contract labor for construction, repair and maintenance work. 
Following Fenog provided a view of the increasingly tangled web of arrangements 
underlying the oil engineering process. During the four months I spent embedded with 
Fenog I would make daily rounds on the company lunch boat, visit different areas where 
the pipeline was being mapped, welded and laid, and attended daily meetings and prayer 
services with workers. While receiving little attention in the literature on the Niger Delta, 
the complex lines of control and labor involved with production operate through a myriad 
of both acknowledged and obscured networks. It became clear that the arrangements 
around the production infrastructure often informed how wider political disputes are 
forged and addressed.    
The third part of my fieldwork took place in the Gbaramatu area after Fenog 
pulled out due to loss of funding. Having grown familiar with the community and the 
area I remained in the Escravos riverine for the remaining eleven months of my 
fieldwork. Here I began visiting oil installations and the communities where they were 
based—including the Itsekiri areas whose communities directly border Chevron’s new 
Gas to Liquid project and who remain locked in longstanding conflict with their Ijaw, 
Gbaramatu neighbors. Many residents that had fled the violence leading up to and 
following the May 2009 raid were now returning from temporary refuge sites. These 
residents, generally glad that the fighting had ended, expressed mixed and anxious 
opinions about the post-amnesty arrangements. 
Much of the uncertainty stemmed from the fact that in the wake of the amnesty 
questions of political legitimacy, production schedules and future access to oil money 
were increasingly imbricated in developments taking place around a burgeoning trade in 
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illegal oil, known as bunkering. The networks circulating and processing bunkered oil 
involved oil producing communities as well as state and transnational actors. Bunkering 
materially and symbolically cut across the technological, social, political and financial 
facets of the oil networks and production spaces in ways that were as mundane and 
bureaucratic as they were spectacular and violent, as critical to the local as they were to 
the national and international flows of money, services and goods. They connected 
disputed property claims, local fishing industries, the subcontracting system and new 
development initiatives.  
Ethnographically, bunkering seemed to offer up a total social fact. Yet, it is 
important that bunkering did not quite provide or manifest a shortcut to any universal 
value, in the sense that Durkheim posits. While acting on and within political, social and 
economic spheres of activity, bunking generated a space and practice that always 
remained awry, neither quite outside nor inside the regulatory regime of the state, the 
corporation or the community participating in it. While after the amnesty, discourses 
worked to harden the roles and categories of action and possibility for residents, 
companies and the government, these pipeline breaches instead pointed to how the Niger 
Delta operates as a collection of disjointed histories, practices and personal relationships.  
In the process of researching and writing this dissertation, it became clear that the 
production infrastructure was not only tied to histories of economic and political 
wrangling, but also provided a tangible and practical means of intervention, interference 
and negotiation. Among the great number of people and groups involved with oil 
production in Nigeria, the infrastructure was therefore a figure central to a particular 
imaginary of power. As controls and connections were designed and constructed and at 
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the same evaded and disconnected, therefore, discussions, debates and fantasies of re-
assembling its vast architectures often registered what was at stake in the new logics of 
“peace” taking shape in the Niger Delta.  
 
With this in mind, the following sections offer an introduction to the major 
themes that run through the chapters of the dissertation and a framework for thinking how 
these imaginaries of disassembly and reassembly have become rooted in the spaces 




After a five-month manhunt following the destruction of Oporoza, on October 4, 2009, 
Government Ekpemupolo, nom de guerre, Tompolo, became the last prominent Niger 
Delta militant leader to sign the government’s amnesty agreement. Tompolo had earned a 
reputation as a killer, a savior, a magician, and a ruthless businessman. As the most 
destructive and infamous local militant faction, his “freedom fighters” were strategically 
engaged in acts of seizure and sabotage. They cut production in Delta state by half while 
calling for “the liberation of a land occupied by an irresponsible foreign goliath.” Now, 
meeting with government officials in Oporoza, amid the rubble they made of his former 
headquarters, Tompolo and his fighters surrendered machine guns, rocket launchers and 
explosives. The defense minister Godwin Abbe assured them that jobs and technical 
trainings were on their way. According to local and foreign media correspondents when 
given the microphone, the menacing “warlord” uttered only the words, “All is well, all is 
well,” before bursting into tears.   
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While many accounts took note of Tompolo’s tears, what exactly those tears 
signified was open to dispute. Were they shed in mourning for the loss of militant 
controlled bunkering monies or the loss of a dream to finally bring justice and 
accountability to the creeks? More optimistic renderings even suggested they were tears 
of joy, grateful that the era of fighting, ambushes, reprisal attacks and massacre had come 
to an end and that the needs of the delta people could now be met. Regardless of the 
reason, evident in such musing was speculation over how to depict the relationship of the 
Nigerian state and its oil industry to its citizens following the amnesty.  
The eruption of armed conflict in the Niger Delta has often been read as 
emblematic of the larger challenges facing the state, still haunted by the ghosts of post-
colonial national formation. Since acquiring independence from the British in 1960, 
Nigeria has experienced a brutal civil war and six military coups. It has spent 29 out of its 
54 years as a nation-state under military rule. Following the death of its last dictator, Sani 
Abacha in 1998, the country returned to a democratic civilian government for the first 
time since 1983, founding the country’s fourth republic. However, since 1999, eruptions 
of armed political violence by culturally affiliated, organized groups of youth vigilantes 
have soared across the country.9 These events have largely been noted as taking place 
along predominantly ethnic and/or religions lines, and interpreted as a renewed contest 
for access to oil money (Omeje, 2006; Pratten, 2008, Don Pedro, 2005).  
Oil revenues constitute 80% of state’s budget. Since the federal government 
nationalized control of oil revenues after Biafra, State and Local Government funds are 
doled out from the center. The percentages awarded to fund budgetary needs largely 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 In addition to MEND the most infamous has been Boko Haram but there are also the O'odua Republic 
Front (ORF) and the Federation for Yoruba Culture and Consciousness (FYCC), the Bakassi Boys. 
. 
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depend on local population counts and divisions based on ethnic categories.10 Nigerian 
historian, Claude Ake, has suggested that the organization of the state locks identity-
based groups in a struggle to control oil rents. For Ake and other scholars therefore the 
project of building a democratic civil society has always contended primarily with 
fragmented allegiances (Ake 1997; Obi, 2011; Claude and Daloz, 1999). As he puts it, 
“the state disappears in a process of parceling…its place taken by communities and 
ethnic groups, nationalities and sub-nationalities” (Ake 1997: 306). The return to an 
electoral system has certainly only exacerbated these competitions. However, in 
considering the ways in which oil has shaped political life in Nigeria, the emphasis on the 
role rents play too often overshadows that of ongoing engagements taking place around 
the management of the industrial process itself.  
The tendency to privilege the role played by monetary circulations follows a 
wider trend for thinking about oil producing states. Producing roughly 2.5 bpd Nigeria 
has generally been identified as a Rentier State. Initially developed by Hossain Mahdavi 
in 1970 to think about extra-economic rents accruing in Iran under the Shah, Rentier 
State Theory has been picked up and applied endlessly by political scholars and 
economists to identify the apparent elective affinities between mono-economic resource 
dependency, weak state regulatory institutions and lack of national development in oil 
producing states (Beblawi, Auty, 1993; Karl, 1997; Ross, 1999 and 2001).11 Focusing on 
dynamics of accumulation and distribution of rents, and placing the onus largely on weak 
state structures, this genre of studies has spawned phrases like “the paradox of plenty” 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 For a fuller discussion see chapter 2 
 
11 Rentierism is not dissimilar to a host of other pathologies such as Dutch disease and Gillette syndrome, 
used for thinking about states thriving and withering in the boom/bust cycles of a single commodity. 
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(Karl, 1997) and “the resource curse” (Auty, 1993) implicating corruption and 
mismanagement. 
Nigeria appears to conform neatly to curse criteria. It consistently tops the charts 
of corruption and transparency watchdogs who note that anywhere from 3 to 100 billion 
dollars of oil revenues have gone missing since 1960. Yet, perhaps to expand Ryzard 
Kapucinsky’s insightful passage, it is possible to say that one must not only consider the 
fantasy of oil wealth but recognize a bit of fairy-tale telling that has been involved with 
reading the relationship of oil money to the state (after all, curses are common in fairy-
tales).  
Rentier State theory emerged to assess a particular historical moment: influxes of 
oil money accruing to governments in the Middle East with authoritarian governments. 
While certainly making some important contributions to a particular case, the continued 
application of Rentier theory to a variety of governing structures and political histories 
has often meant that what is involved with producing the oil is secondary (and rarely 
considered as critically linked) to the analysis of the circulation and use of oil rents. As 
Timothy Mitchell has suggested, this has resulted in entire countries acquiring the status 
of “cursed,” an affliction that seems to be a matter for “the government that depends on 
its income, not of the processes by which a wider world obtains the energy that drives its 
material and technical life” (Mitchell, 2011, 2). To this extent, Rentier Theory has proved 
convenient to certain interests. The seeming anathema between the oil producing states in 
the global south and democracy has allowed foreign consumer nations and transnational 
companies to distance themselves from the kinds of influence and interference they have 
historically had in those histories. By suggesting that the political weaknesses of their 
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host governments are to blame, they themselves are often exonerated from any 
accusations of abuse. 
Within Anthropology, scholarship on the petro-state has sought to challenge 
“accursed” political science literature on rentierism with historical ethnography. 
Appreciating the international character of oil markets both Andrew Apter and Fernando 
Coronil question how the large injections of global (extractive) capital and the rents they 
produce are socialized within the wider national body politic. Here the particular form of 
oil capitalism receives a more rigorous theorization. Rereading Marx’s commodity 
fetishism, both authors conclude that ground rent produces specific forms of fetishized 
value in which land and oil money are misrecognized as the source of value itself. Oil 
wealth thus seemingly appears in state coffers without a visible trace of sweat and 
transformed into a kind of state fetish. As Michael Watts has put it, “the state appears 
suspended above society—it is represented as the source of power since oil is power” 
(1994, 418). 
Accordingly, both authors identify a conflation that takes place between the 
commodity form and the national form, one that profoundly structures the relationship of 
citizen to state. For Coronil, oil produced Venezuela “as a ‘magnanimous sorcerer” 
(Coronil, 1997, 5). “Circulating through the body politic as money,” Coronil explains, 
“oil ceased to be identified as a material substance and became a synonym for 
money…just as oil came to be seen abstractly as money, the state became a general 
representative of a political community of shared ownership of the nation’s natural body” 
(Coronil, 1997, 390). 
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In Nigeria, Apter suggests that Nigerian national development under oil 
capitalism hinged on a particular fairytale following the nation’s civil war. As the conflict 
ended in 1971, the rising prices of oil by 1973 were used to underwrite the image of a 
more prosperous re-united state, where “Nigerian oil meant money and modernity” 
(Apter, 24-5). The president at the time, Yakubu Gowon, famously stated to a news 
journalist that the nation’s only foreseeable problems were not a matter of scarcity, but in 
the wake of enormous oil revenues, the problem was “how to spent it.” National 
prosperity was therefore to be established through the state’s powers of expenditure and 
manifested in great works under utopian plans like the Third National Development Plan 
(1975-80). Underwriting the soaring purchasing power of the naira, Apter concludes that 
oil itself rises to the status of general equivalent as oil “standardized the relative values in 
terms of which other commodities were bought and sold” (Apter, 2005, 35). Meanwhile, 
real value was being drained from the economy as “oil replaced labor as the basis of 
national development, producing a deficit of value and an excess of wealth, or a 
paradoxical profit as loss” (Apter, 2005, 201).   
Following circulations of cash and rumor, Apter and Coronil directly confront 
ways in which oil enmeshes the state within global financial systems at large and how 
these entwinements producing state power are likewise often obscured. This seems 
particularly salient in the Nigerian case when considering that oil’s exchange value has 
become inextricably linked to the tides and trends of neoliberal financial policies. In the 
1970’s, during the oil boom, 80% of the Nigerian government’s spending went towards 
foreign imports rather than towards investment in the great infrastructural development 
plans that had been announced (Ihovbere, 1998). With their currency buoyed by high oil 
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prices12 the country thus began to acquire vast trade deficits. When oil prices fell and 
reserves shrank in the 1980’s, the country was suddenly mired in debt and inflation and 
pressured into adopting damaging IMF’s Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) in 1986 
until 1991.  
Emphasizing the need to roll back the activities of the state and to allow the 
mechanisms of the self-regulating free market to reinvigorate ailing economies, the 
Structural Adjustment Program reforms in Nigeria encouraged deregulation, privatization 
and the floating of the national currency.13 As with other states that allowed their 
infrastructure to become part and parcel of these schemes, Structural Adjustment had a 
disastrous effect.14 The value of the naira collapsed, thousands of public sector employees 
lost their jobs and many labor unions were banned. The dream and plans for an era of 
great modernization to be ushered in under the promise of oil money, now turned to that 
pile of—to rely on yet another famous oil-based metaphor—the devil’s excrement. 
Whereas the state had heralded the building of roads, and sleek new government 
buildings Apter points out that now “The signs of rapid development in Nigeria often 
turned into traces of original intent, deconstructing, we might say, into material signifiers 
of waste, consumption, dissolution, and incompletion” in which the state’s touted hopes 
of oil-driven prosperity were symbolically defaced and revealed as hollow (Apter, 2005, 
213).   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Prices themselves skyrocketing in 1973 due to OPEC’s embargo in response to the US’s role in the Yom 
Kippur wars.  
 
13 Intended to only last two years, the program was extended until 1991 as it found that it would take longer 
than expected to make the reforms. The programs were supported through $450 million dollars trade policy 
and export diversification loan from the Paris Club. 
 
14 In Nigeria the programs were supported by the World Bank through a $450 million dollar trade policy 
and an export diversification loan. This forced the government to loosen fixed exchange rates, and relax 
market controls. 
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Although critically illuminating a particular symbolic economy, there are limits to 
constructing a history of Nigerian oil-fueled modernity exclusively through an account of 
a circulating exchange-value. While evoking the kinds of tensions central to “the 
contradictions of oil capitalism” (Apter, 2007, 259) it offers little to understand the 
dynamics and discourses taking shape around production itself. It’s important recognize 
that beneath the play of appearances Apter documents there is a complex set of 
connections and structures being forged. In spite of lagging state investment in labor and 
industrial growth, for instance, there remains a great deal of work to produce, protect and 
move Nigerian oil. The various processes, materials and protocols have produced hybrid 
institutional and bureaucratic configurations between the state, transnational corporations 
and civil society organizations. These arrangements license very different modes of 
signification and politics and provide an opportunity to expand and refocus questions on 
power and sovereignty in Nigeria.  
In this dissertation, I argue that the forms of life taking shape around and through 
the industrial infrastructure have become central to both extraction activities and to the 
Nigerian national myths and imaginaries Apter is concerned with. These spaces therefore 
offer unique inroads for combating “curse” prescriptions, rethinking the prevailing 
theories on the “oil state” in general and Nigeria’s political economy in particular.  
Representations of a slick, oil-backed modernity have always been askew in the 
oil fields. The roads, the electricity and the architecture Apter describes are not 
dissimulated they are often completely absent. Living in mostly rural areas, residents of 
oil producing areas have, for decades, been structurally thwarted from participation in the 
state governing bodies and the industry that sustains it. They have often been brutally 
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repressed for asserting any kind political resistance or opposition. And yet, visible from 
this view on the ground is the way these stated boundaries of state governance and 
corporate asset management blur together. While the oil itself is owned by the state, a 
large portion of the infrastructure is built and managed by transnational companies who 
operate in joint-venture partnerships with the national oil company. While the land most 
affected by decades of drilling and transporting oil belongs to delta communities, the 
pipelines and wellheads running through their backyards remain private property of state-
transnational conglomerates. Nigerian soldiers are sent to patrol and protect pipelines 
from sabotage rather than citizens from operational spills. In such a context, power and 
control cannot be conceived as operating from within in a singular form, either the 
government or the transnational corporations. The ways in which the infrastructure have 
been built, managed, damaged and repaired instead points to a myriad of decentralizing 
processes through which various agendas have become lodged within wider practices and 
structures of the Nigerian state. 
The aim of this dissertation in parsing out the dynamics around the production of 
oil is therefore neither to deny the importance (and centrality) of the state, nor to suggest 
that Nigerian sovereignty is merely the sum of its engagement with foreign oil interests 
and material interventions. Instead, it seeks to complicate the reading of semiotic 
universes and everyday life through which social and political stakes are registered in 
Nigeria. For instance, gubernatorial candidates initially armed militias like MEND15 in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Although incorporating a number of Ijaw groups across the delta by 2005, MEND developed as an 
umbrellas group for a number of smaller militias. However there were others, these included: MOSIEND, 
Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBA), Supreme Egbesu Assembly (SEA), The Atangbala Boys (TAB), Niger Delta 
Vigilante (NDV), Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF), and Niger Delta Freedom Fighters 
(NDFF). However, because MEND was the predominant group active in the area of Delta State where I 
conducted fieldwork, I often use it as a central example of how these larger groups operated.  
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1998 and 2003 to help win elections. Growing more sophisticated, they were able to 
evolve into organized groups and to directly challenge that government’s authority. To do 
so, they blew up export terminals and trunk lines and affixed their own taps and pumps to 
wellheads. This destruction and repurposing of infrastructure was explicitly political, 
coupled to demands for a National Sovereign conference, equitable distribution of 
resources, and outcries against political pay-offs. At the same time, actions taken on the 
infrastructure suggested how larger contentious issues like ownership, rights and identity 
are in fact part of a tangled historical and institutional webbing connected with decades of 
the industry’s material expansion where notions like “development” and “community” 
have acquired double (sometimes triple) meanings. Moreover, attention to the space of 
production and interference with it points to how categories defining “work” and labor 
generally in Nigeria have been unsettled as policies favoring privatization and 
deregulation of the oil sector have became increasingly common. 
 In committing literal sabotage to flows of oil Niger Delta militants evidenced the 
critical ways in which the so-called lifeblood of the nation, are knit into global markets 
through shipping routes, pipeline projects, security networks, forecasting technologies 
and financial offshoring. The dissertation suggests that these actions and the amnesty 
programs seeking to tame them are not merely symbolic but, as the subjects of 
investigations, they help illuminate the murkier set of connections that undergird 
Nigeria’s oil industry and its national narrative of oil-driven modernity. Constructing the 
ethnography around the social worlds in oil production zones I work to bring attention to 




emerged as categorical distinctions are hardened discursively, but are increasingly 
blurred in practice. 
 
 
Re-assembling Hydrocarbon Networks:  
Exploring how extraction has generated a mutational field of affiliations in Nigeria, 
however, requires a concept for framing the very extensive assemblage that is the oil 
industry itself. A commodity that has revolutionized human mobility, oil is in many ways 
its own epic. It has thus acquired a rich metaphoric life. Flows through drill bits, mud 
pumps and pipelines link national strategies to bodily functions: the devil’s excrement, 
the national lifeblood. Transmuted into regimes of life and death (Collier and Lakoff, 
2005; Watts, 2009) oil appears as a central vehicle of governance, part of a wider 
governmentality (Foucault, 2003, 2008; Huber, 2013). It is a critical component of what 
Dominic Boyer has called, “energopolitics,” a world-making force, as “power over 
energy has been the companion and collaborator of modern power over life and 
population from the beginning” (Boyer, 2011, 5). To this extent the mere representative 
life of oil remains deeply entwined with the historical forms to which it became critical: 
mass production and consumption, visions of endless economic expansion (Mitchell, 
2011) and now troubled by indecomposable plastic trash, endless wars (Negarestani, 
2008) and the choking of atmosphere with carbon residues. Indeed, it is more than any 
singular analysis can gage. Overloaded and over coded oil appears as a war machine 
stalling under the weight of its own excess (Bataille, 1985; Deleuze and Guattari, 1987; 
Stoekl, 2007). 
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The metaphoric richness is inspired and compounded by an awareness of oil’s 
extensive connection with the material mainlines of the global economy. Beginning with 
the rock oil rush in Titusville, Pennsylvania in 1859, the search for oil fueled (in all 
senses) an expansion of railroads, shipping routes and markets across the earth, 
expanding European, and particularly American, empires and capital.16 Yet control of oil 
revenues and markets has always been essentially linked to political and material controls 
of the oil infrastructure itself. Oil production and pricing mechanisms from 1928 until the 
1960’s were largely controlled by multinationals, known as the seven sisters17. These 
companies (through hidden agreements) owned the great majority of global oil finds and 
flow lines allowing them the power to exploit or shut down particular or potential 
production sites in order to keep oil prices at profitable levels. Their control was 
significantly diminished with the rise of OPEC in the late-1960s. Assisting and 
encouraging nationalization campaigns in global south, over 60% of the worlds oil 
reserves and infrastructural systems (by the late 1970s) came under the command of state 
oil companies, many acting in collaboration with OPEC (Para, 2003). Yet for the past 25 
years, involvement of both corporate and state oil companies in financial markets has 
increased as new material constellations and mechanisms of power and control emerge. 
In particular, investment in the offshore and the employment of both physical and 
financial risk management systems have worked to barricade capital from the site of 
production in tax havens and to obscure pricing mechanisms and the locus of control 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 The expansion of American power through oil was likewise accomplished through the fixing of all 
purchase and sales in oil in dollars, thus privileging the dollar as a foreign reserve currency and ensuring a 
global demand for it. 
 
17 Gulf Oil, Standard Oil of California (SoCal), Royal Dutch Shell, Texaco (now Chevron), Standard Oil of 
New Jersey (Exxon) and Standard Oil Company of New York (Mobil, now part of ExxonMobil), Anglo-
Persian Oil Company (now BP) 
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(Appel, 2011; Johnson, 2015; Labban, 2010; Rodgers, 2014; Sawyer, 2005). Michael 
Watts has referred to these new configurations between the state, oil corporations and 
financial markets as the “oil complex,” a way of distinguishing how the industry is being 
restructured by what he identifies as “the economization of security” (Watts, 2005, 378).  
In Nigeria, to define these shifting imbrications with securitization practices, 
however, scholars have often employed Watts’s earlier and famously rendered concept, 
“petro-violence,” (Watts, 1994; Zalik, 2005; Collier, 2011; Omeje, 2006). Watts’s 
theorization of “petro-violence” offers catchall concept for relating the internal tensions 
between the profit-seeking interests of transnationals, oil state governments and needs of 
local communities. The implication is that these compounding tensions escalate as new 
financial and legal instruments are absorbed into the oil complex, intensifying both 
conflicts and the repression of any social dissent (Watts, 2008). While certainly, as in the 
case of Nigeria, violence has largely defined the local, national and geopolitical 
dimensions of oil extraction, petro-violence often places the emphasis for investigating 
this complex and widely expansive industry rather heavily on its conflictual nature. As 
the dominant mode for analyzing relationships around production, employing the concept 
of petro-violence can leave little room for considering the kinds of intimate entwinements 
that undergird the tensions and violence it identifies.18 The introduction of new 
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18 I am not suggesting that the concept of “petro-violence” is a distortion or that it is unhelpful. Both Watt’s 
work and those of scholars employing his concept have helped outline and identify some of the central 
forms of injustice and contradictions involved with extractive capitalism, and this dissertation is deeply 
indebted to that work. I am simply suggesting that there are other, relatively unexplored arrangements 
involved with oil production, arrangements that are not as easily identified with violence and volatility 
(even if they contribute to it) and therefore tend to be overlooked by this literature. This is especially true in 
the literature produced on the Niger Delta where, since Saro-Wiwa’s murder, there has been a tendency to 
focus exclusively on the often clashing opposition between state/corporate forces and the local Niger Delta 
activist groups. Meanwhile, the role played by NGOs, oil workers, technology and regulatory bodies 
(institutions and practices that seek to smooth and harmonize relationships) has received hardly any 
attention at all.  
! 25!
technologies and knowledges in the Niger Delta also produced new institutional and 
personal connections between residents, companies and the government. While clashes 
between groups have certainly become common, evidenced in the spectacular forms of 
resistance by militia groups in the Niger Delta (exploding pipelines, kidnapping workers), 
I argue that the production infrastructure and sites around extraction offer the view of a 
more nuanced political terrain. These networks are not simply instrumental to particular 
interests, but organize a host of materials, relationships and meanings, including some 
that are unintentional, unstable and subject to change.   
Trying to analytically tame oil’s epic themes and enormous infrastructural reach 
while also viewing how this reflects in the everyday, oil appears more as an assemblage 
(or agencement), a fluid network of multiple, material and expressive components. 
Bearing traces to the sense used and developed by Deleuze and Guattari (1987) 
assemblage indicates a political economy in constant states of becoming: capture, 
consolidation, nomadic innovation and action. Rather than focusing on internal tensions 
creating thresholds out of which new historical eras are formed, for Deleuze and Guattari, 
the political is always in flux.  
Thinking of oil as an assemblage has been the focus of recent work that draws 
largely from science and technology studies. Influenced by Bruno Latour and Michel 
Callon’s work on the agentive role of technical devices and the calculating technologies 
in science, the pumps and casings as well as financial instruments form some of the many 
heterogeneous elements that have been considered (Appel, 2012; Barry, 2007, 2009; 
Mitchell, 2011; Shafiee, 2012). In this sense, the ‘oil assemblage’ can be viewed as an 
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arrangement of human and non-human elements (Latour, 1993, 2005; Callon, 2007).19 
Along these lines, Timothy Mitchell has written that the oil assemblage is part of a 
“technopolitics.” He argues that the calculus surrounding supply of oil made possible a 
series of political alignments that produced the object of the economy itself, from Bretton 
Woods to neoliberalism. Inverting discourses of technological and political progress, the 
technopolitical suggests that it is through the engineering of infrastructures, legal and 
extractive technologies, that particular social and political terrains are quite literally made 
(Mitchell, 2011, 5).  
Through an accounting of its various, assembling parts, work on the 
technopolitical, seeks to provide a view of how massive technological systems like oil 
become an integral part of modern commerce and governance (and their prevailing 
doctrines) (Mitchell, 2005, 2011; Barry, 2007; Collier and Lakoff, 2005; Von Schnitzler, 
2010). Yet it also places an overwhelming amount of confidence in the power of 
networks of expertise to illuminate new connections and subject positions. The human 
and non-humans in this ethnography, however, are the people, materials, institutional and 
industrial practices that do not fit easily within this technological system. This includes 
the practices of fishermen, local refineries, former militants, community subcontractors; 
those for whom the modulated oil extractive systems are not explicitly designed or 
addressed to. Yet, I argue, the ambiguity and misrecognitions involved with their 
engagement also become part and parcel of that work of metering systems, the history of 
oil markets and the development of risk management systems. To follow the stakes of 
such engagement, its marginal and tenuous connections to the larger project, they should 
not be seen as simply one more equivalently attributable actant within a greater assembly. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 Bundled supply contracts that are traded as commodities themselves. 
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Instead, I suggest that they refocus attention to the importance of inequalities and buried 
fault lines that wide-spanning engagements with the materials and technology and 
institutions entail. They present the opportunity to examine, more specifically, the way 
larger “assemblages,” gap, come apart, how the political terrain being built involves 
certain imaginaries and work of reconfiguration that take place on the fringe. 
In the dissertation, therefore, the examination of this fringe requires a view of the 
everyday and mundane ways that extraction apparatuses are entangled with surrounding 
social worlds. On the one hand, the infrastructure stands at the center of legal briefs, 
practices and discourses regarding claims around land, ownership, authority and identity. 
On the other, the designations of legal and legitimate spaces (seeking to separate 
production and non-production, work and collateral damage) are also overlaid with 
stories. In the Niger Delta, for instance, oil can disappear from rubrics of calculation 
altogether, only to resurface into a nefarious world of rumored estimates. Yet these 
stories sometimes involving metaphysical appearances also refer to a history of very 
active, material interventions with the system of extraction itself. These engagements and 
the stories that accompany them have generated very different narratives and 
understandings of what is referred to as the “oil assemblage.” 
Studies of the social life around the technical systems share ground with classic 
anthropological concerns in regards to how a built environment organizes experience, 
cosmologies and social relations in space and time (Mauss, 1954; Bourdieu, 1980; Evans-
Prichard, 1969; Malinowski, 1984). More recent trends in anthropology influenced by 
Heidegger’s work on “things” (1977) works towards developing a new sense of material 
culture, focusing more on substance and character of objects (See Miller, 2003; Brown, 
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2005; Ingold, 2011). However, an infrastructure poses a different question, one in which 
the material and the spatial are congealed in a system as much as an object. As Brian 
Larkin has recently written, infrastructures embedded in social worlds are always more 
than merely technological systems. He points to the importance of “understanding what 
sort of semiotic objects they are, and determining how they address and constitute 
subjects as well as their technical operations” (Larkin, 2013, 329). In the Niger Delta the 
semiotics of pipelines and wellheads are intimately connected with their physical 
presence. Those who navigate their pathways, either avoiding or using gas flares to dry 
their laundry and working on or steering around flow lines, employ a set of “tactics” 
making the territory of the oil and gas industry part of their own worlds. As Michael De 
Certeau is keen to point out, these tactics exacerbate and disrupt in more than surface 
means, they point to the experiences involved with constituting such practices (De 
Certeau, 1984).  
 Thus the infrastructure consists of more than networks to transmit information and 
knowledge or products to particular consumers and spaces (Castells, 1996) the oil 
pipelines here form an ecology, becoming part of a landscape and the layered histories 
embedded with it. The ways in which such an ecology is engaged: being repurposed by 
communities as a form of political sabotage or rerouted into the illegal bunkering 
economy, points to the ways in which the larger “economics” guiding the space of oil 
production (i.e. metering systems, labor policies) are part of a material realm.20 Rusty, 
bacteria eaten pipelines breakdown regularly and spills caused by operational dysfunction 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 These malfunctions, of course, are not limited to the Niger Delta, but in fact, take place regularly across 
spaces of extraction, from spectacular accidents like the Deepwater Horizon, to small scale leakages in 
pipelines that seep into groundwater. Many accidents and malfunctions also go unreported as workers and 
companies seek to keep their incident rates low, see chapter 4. 
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pockmark the landscape. Calculated sabotage or break-ins explode pipelines into 
ravaging fires. As Rudolf Mrazek’s in his book, Engineers of Happyland, explains, the 
metaphor of technological progress connected with infrastructure projects can be at odds 
with the materiality of the thing itself. The oil infrastructure, as the lifeblood of the 
nation, draws attention to the multiple temporalities and meanings involved with the 
erection and maintenance of the Nigerian oil economy. However, its material presence 
also signals how these technologically designed connections can be punctured or re-
rerouted thus giving way to both utopian and dystopian imaginaries of the future. 
In this dissertation, therefore, I am interested in what I call these imaginaries of 
dis-assemblage and re-assemblage. By this I mean to distinguish between readings of the 
dynamics of the oil assemblage writ large, like the technopolitical, from a more 
ethnographically grounded focus on what takes place when extraction networks become 
objects of interference and re-configuration at the fringe. On the one hand, I am interested 
in how this dis-assemblage and re-assemblage takes place in and through the very 
technologies, practices and politics entwined with them. On the other, I am reading these 
breaks and disconnections as both literal and figurative, considering the kinds of desires, 
meanings and political imaginaries that are elicited by tampering with this system. 
Following such processes and attendant imaginaries might help apprehend the responses 
to a global oil capitalism in the Delta that neither appears as an alternative to it (a violent 
break with a volatile system), nor merely as one more part of an always widening (or 
impossible to critique) assemblage. I suggest these imaginaries of dis-assemblage re-
assemblage brings to the study of oil and its ever-expanding connections some 
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perspective of how these built worlds become imbricated within particular social worlds 
and political possibilities.  
 
Seizure and sabotage within neoliberal idioms: 
 
Thinking about dis-assemblage and re-assemblage is particularly useful in 
fleshing out the dynamics taking shape following the amnesty, a period in which the 
more explicit, political issues raised by the militancy movement became reformulated 
into terms recognizable within an international lexicon of partnership development and 
economic subjectivity. During the period of armed struggle, before the raid in Oporoza 
and before Tompolo’s surrendering tears, the destruction of oil terminals and the 
disabling of critical trunk lines seemed to suggest that the social unrest in the Delta posed 
a deep and formidable challenge to the state’s power and rationale. The aesthetic of the 
movement blended cultural display with infrastructural destruction. Posing for 
photographs, militants painted in white and red war paint, bedecked by charms attempted 
to emphasize their connection to the traditional with Kalashnikovs strapped firmly across 
their chests.21  
These images, during the period of fighting, were often displayed and printed next 
to those of burning wellheads, gutted pipelines, conveying the consequences of capitalist 
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21 Although I don’t focus very often on the aspects of the militant movement itself in the dissertation, a very 
central component of activist groups was to instill a narrative that forefronts a right to oil by way of 
ancestry. As Omolade Adunbi has written, a strong pillar of MEND’s rhetoric was grounded in the notion 
of “ancestral promises of wealth” in which Niger Delta communities believe they have been led to village 
sites from myths of promised abundance (Adunbi, 2011, 102). That the state itself has refused to recognize 
such a right becomes a sort of property crime on the level of blasphemy. Part of efforts to reclaim this 
promise therefore involved the reviving and expanding of Ijaw warrior cults like Egbesu (see Golden, 
2012). However this was practiced in strictly private shrines. The militants who were photographed in full 




exploitation and suggesting that a radical opposition had formed against it.22 Yet, over the 
past 60 years in which this infrastructure was being routed through delta communities 
(and indeed even during the period of armed struggle itself) the interplay between 
communities and these infrastructures representing transnational extractive capital has 
been more complex. Being embedded within community spaces and providing successive 
programs for development monies and work training programs, the companies managing 
oil production have become insinuated within critical life support networks, 
supplementing and in some cases even supplanting the responsibilities of government to 
administer care and security to its citizens in the delta. 
In lieu of urban development, the infrastructure often acted as a kind of 
supplement for what was otherwise absent. When activists threatened to interrupt work 
sites, this was recognized as a common (if demeaning) bargaining practice with 
companies. Making such threats might result in the donation of water wells and 
generators. These were certainly never considered triumphs for the community, but they 
speak to the ways that threatening infrastructure destruction became a practice around 
which relationships between groups and institutions had to be constantly mediated. Over 
time, successive programs and agreements to thwart this threat have become as defining a 
feature of the social universe as the history of conflict and protest. Thus the amnesty 
following the formal surrender of militant groups does not signal any radical shift, but 
offers a more protracted view of the ways community life, cultural and political 
representations were already bound up with the oil and gas value chain. 
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22 This aesthetic of painted militants and destroyed infrastructure made it from the news to the pages of 
Vanity Fair and the MOMA. See Junger, 2007 and Boulos, 2008. 
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The emergence of ‘supplemental’ channels of accumulation, leverage and power 
as African states becomes entwined with circuits of neoliberal global capital (and often 
backed by certain categories of belonging) has received much attention. Critical African 
Anthropology has explored the importance of alternate circuits formed by cycles of 
foreign aid, debt and unregulated trade in African postcolonial states. Emphasis here has 
been on the proliferation of trade and resources outside formal economic mainlines but 
controlled either by individuals at the top of authoritarian and corporatist states (Bayart, 
Ellis and Hibou, 1999; Bayart, 1996). Elsewhere, these circuits have been presented as 
beholden to rapacious international powerbrokers. Here flows of capital are seen as 
moving away from patronage-oriented centers and towards, “market-based tactics and 
non-bureaucratic organization of warlordism” at the state’s peripheries (Reno, 1999, 
218). Both perspectives, following where flows of cash and goods are moving, however, 
often frame these networks as in competition with the state or with the project of civil 
society. Yet, here I argue that the actors and projects that are part and parcel of 
establishing (or battling) these alternate channels are often difficult to pull apart.  
Massive extractive economies still define a great deal of the African economic-
scape: gold mines, diamond mines and Coltan, rushes for oil in Uganda and Ghana and 
an ever-increasing incidence of small, organized artisanal miners. And increasingly, these 
spaces have been inundated by reforms connected with neoliberal practices seeking to 
consolidate capital and celebrate free markets and free trade industries (Harvey, 2003). 
While the term, “neoliberal” is often deployed as a way of describing a particular era of 
capitalism or an ideological position, it more often operates as a set of practices through 
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which its discourses and technologies are legitimized.23 As Foucault outlines in his, The 
Birth of the Biopolitical, lecture course, neoliberal economic theories largely emerged in 
the writings of German ‘Ordoliberals’ and Chicago school ‘anarco-capitalists.’ Within 
these schools, liberal political values, like personal freedom, were reconceived in 
economic terms, i.e. maintaining the freedom of the market (Foucault, 2008). To 
establish the hegemony of the market, new arrangements and linkages between power, 
value and governance have to be established. In the oil sector producers have thus sought 
more enclosures to control the inflow of money and commodities, attempting to cordon 
off and limit interference by states and populations considered undesirable (Ferguson, 
2007; Appel, 2012). At the same time, in order to securitize its enclave, such (potentially 
unruly) exclusions must be continually managed. To this end corporations often employ 
discourses and programs to promote morally saturated notions of individual responsibility 
and economic partnership development that likewise conflate the value of free markets 
with good governance (Zalik, 2005).  
However, in Nigeria, these programs designed to limit political space and to 
institute particular forms of entrepreneurial economic subjectivity continue to operate 
alongside other arrangements and practices. The state company, NNPC, remains the 
owner and overall manager of all its hydrocarbon resources. Meanwhile within the delta 
and among Nigerian oil workers, forms of barter, gifting and trade between individuals, 
outside the purview of any overarching market, are still common. Oil companies 
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23 Here I am thinking with two recent texts that have worked to concretize and define more clearly 
neoliberalism and track its dispersion across American and European governing bodies: Maurice 
Lazzarato’s Governing by Detb and Wendy Brown’s Undoing the Demos. While Lazzarato focuses on the 
systems for capturing wealth and Brown on rise of “homo economicus” in political thought, both authors 
describe a process by which neoliberalism emerged as a political rationality in the 1980’s under Thatcher 
and Reagan growing more pervasive, particularly in the forms of agreements that governments make with 
large, transnational corporations and owners of capital. 
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themselves are often required or compelled to participate in these more interpersonal 
exchanges (see Chapter 2). In this sense, what can be considered, the neoliberal, has only 
encroached by fits and starts, producing particular conditions of possibility rather than 
any grand design (Lazzarato, 2015, Brown, 2015). And these conditions can lend 
themselves to often-unforeseen possibilities. As Jean and John Comaroff point out, 
neoliberal practices and ideologies have not eroded the state away, rather they suggest its 
reforms intersect with, reanimate and changing the past (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1999, 
2000). In this sense, it is always a fragmentary project, which has to operate in and 
through other economic practices, operations that sometimes cannibalize their own 
theoretical assumptions and fail to produce the desired outcomes, subjects and 
exclusions. Interested in the intersection of neoliberal economic practices with particular 
social worlds, therefore, my dissertation locates itself within a tradition of 
anthropological studies attempting to account for various circuits and institutional norms, 
past and present, and that comprise different economic communities rather than a 
singular one (Appadurai, 1996; Comaroff and Comaroff, 1999; Elyachar, 2005; Maurer, 
2005; Munn, 1992; Morris, 2010; Roitman, 2005). These works view how ‘neoliberal 
capitalism’ and/or market ideologies of speed and efficiency become part and parcel of 
other imaginaries of power, law and governmentality (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2000; 
2006; Morris, 2010). Meanwhile actions seeming to undermine state control by seeking 
avenues of accumulation outside of it, exemplify the dislocation of processes reproducing 
state power, and the field of multiple economic networks in territories not so much 
fragmenting, as never fully realized in incorporation (Roitman, 2005). At the same time, 
contestations to control networks provide a view the wider spectrum of processes, actors 
! 35!
and institutions that “give rise to the concepts and objects of an economy” (Roitman, 
2005, 10). The neoliberal here is seen as an incomplete fragmented project itself.  
Yet this dissertation also explores how efforts to dissipate political space by 
privileging economic growth and expansion, practices connected with large-scale projects 
wielding neoliberal instruments of legitimation also produce condition of possibility for 
more direct contestation to its project. And it is not incidental that in the Niger Delta this 
dynamic takes shape in practices seeking to destroy and/or reroute the infrastructure. 
Producing an image in which the fate of state prosperity becomes indelibly linked to the 
global economy, fantasies of the kinds of power invested in infrastructures gains ground: 
an embedded groundwork of control, surveillance, and full market delivery. For fronting 
efficiency and profit-driven free-enterprise in the extractive sector, the arrangement of 
rationalized, movable parts, bodies, pipes and oil appear as the vehicles of power 
themselves. In the aftermath of the amnesty, while the political ground for contestation is 
ever more eviscerated, the assemblage feeding global markets and state coffers can be 
still be accessed. These various parts, containing literal and metaphoric designs for a 
particular project can likewise be imagined as disassemblable.  
However, the aim of the Niger Delta struggle viewed from the period of amnesty 
appears less of an effort to disrupt and destroy than an effort to insert and work from 
within a certain set of practices, practices that, for decades, had tried to work through and 
within its own community organs. The engagements with the infrastructure here go 
beyond the tactical organizing of an activist movement and touches on the contradictions, 
fractures and partialities and contingencies of a neoliberal program that has to contend 
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with other social forces (Tsing, 2005; Riles, 2011), applied unevenly (across very 
different historical experiences) and with unpredictable outcomes.  
At the same time, I argue that the ways in which residents and Nigerian oil 
workers interface with the networks of extraction, sometimes enhancing, sometimes 
detracting from its powers, has over time become integral to the functioning of the state 
and its relationship to circuits of global capital itself. Following the malfunctions and 
mutations involve with alterations to the Nigerian oil assemblage, I remain focused on the 
slippages that blurring that occurs as these conflicts become mediated alongside the 
efforts to further privatize, securitize and rationalized the state’s lucrative mainstay, the 
metaphoric and material lifeblood.  
*** 
The vision of the dreaming tapster described in Ben Okri’s short story, who falls 
victim to an accident at the Delta Oil Company worksite, engages the oily residues 
presents of Nigeria’s extractive project, providing a phantasmagoric portrait of the state’s 
predicament vis-à-vis its globally networked oil economy—as caught in an endless set of 
contradictions. The dissertation oscillates between an assortment of analysis, events, and 
narratives giving attention to work through which such phantoms and contradictions 
become part of the overlapping social worlds produced through the construction and 
maintenance of the oil infrastructure caught in the everyday worlds burgeoning around 
extraction sites themselves. Following the movement between infrastructural breakdown, 
repair and sabotage each chapter explores an aspect of how the space surrounding 
production is being transformed after the amnesty. Chapters one and two are designed to 
provide background on the forms of entanglements that have occurred as the oil 
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infrastructure was built and expanded but also repaired and reconfigured after the 
amnesty giving attention the material and institutional transformations. With this larger 
historical framework in mind, chapters three and four provide ethnographic materials on 
the oil bunkerering system and the subcontracting labor system. Considered marginal 
aspects of the oil assemblage, I suggest that such practices intersect with experiences of 
marginalization and mechanisms for producing difference established through multiple 
political and economic processes in revealing ways. They offer a more in-depth look at 
conflicting imaginaries and desires involved with efforts to reassemble and restructure 
the production infrastructure in the wake of the amnesty. 
 
Chapter 1 begins with the story of how the Escravos River Area became a central 
hub for oil extraction in Delta state. It sets up the geography and landscape of the fieldsite 
highlighting the movements that have developed between large urban areas, remote 
communities, shrines, work camps, international building sites and the capital. Pointing 
to the different reforms and material engagements that have guided the mapping of an oil 
pipeline network onto a river system, this chapter suggests the ways in which various 
histories coalesce around the body of the pipelines. It develops a theoretical framework 
for thinking about the material life of infrastructure, pointing to how a space of extraction 
is both assembled and haunted. 
Chapter 2 provides an in-depth exploration of how practices and institutions 
connected with extraction are domesticated in Nigeria and the Niger Delta. It focus on the 
connection between subcontracting regimes building and repairing the oil fields and 
corporate social responsibility programs that have become a necessary component of 
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such work. The chapter examines how these arrangements came to be licensed largely 
through the generation of successive “oil host community” programs. While such 
programs essentially work to create legal distance for corporate actors, they also saturate 
understandings of ‘community’ and responsibility.’ Using interviews with corporate 
managers and accountants, internal reviews, statistical records, company town hall 
meeting with communities I demonstrates how in practice, the world of extraction and 
that of communities protesting them rely on many of the same practices, discourses and 
legal tenants even as they articulate different understandings of value, power and the 
market. 
Chapter 3 uses ethnographic materials collected during a period in which 
bunkering and local refining was in ascendancy in the creeks, giving attention to how 
connections are punctured, dissolved, and reconfigured, generating new sensibilities, 
passage points and imaginaries of ‘economy’ and ‘oil economy’ itself. Their emergence 
is also discussed in terms of shifting associations of work, accumulation and wealth with 
risk, destruction and loss following Nigeria’s return to a democratic electoral regime. In 
particular, I view how this ‘business’ is not just a collaboration between security workers, 
local residents and oil company personnel, but how bunkering becomes a central fantasy 
of power built around the infrastructures itself associated with both excess, theft and 
negativity. I suggest that as oil theft overgrows its place at the margins of extractive 
activity to become a form of regulation itself. 
Chapter 4 considers the world of sub-contracted labor and its relation to global 
energy security imperatives to safeguard operations from the community. The lives, 
livelihoods, and imaginations of oil workers are also entwined with contests around 
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sovereignty, control and networks of accumulation in the delta. I argue for the need to 
include oil workers in accounts of oil assemblages and the politics emerging through it. 
Using ethnographic material collected from the workers detailing their daily rituals and 
movements the chapter also examines these larger concerns around policy in view of 
accounts by workers describing their own relationship to the machinery as they try to 
navigate the threat of accident and the devil. Their accounts suggest an essential and 
missing dynamic taking shape in the aftermath of the amnesty agreements: how 
increasing discourses and instruments of risk become socialized within broader 
representations of the future. 
 
Finally, I conclude this dissertation by thinking more critically about how insights gained 
from studying practices and histories of the oil infrastructure in Nigeria can inform the 
study of oil more generally. Returning to the events that take place on the anniversary of 
the bombardment of Oporoza, to the renovations and celebrations of peace, I reflect on 
how the cycle of making and unmaking build up a kind of debris that serves as 





















Although there are no paved roads, one of the more heavily trafficked routes in Nigeria’s 
Delta State is from Warri, capital of oil production in the Western delta, to Chevron’s24 
shiny new Escravos Gas to Liquid plant. In the early months of 2010, the Gas to Liquid 
Plant was still under construction at the mouth of the Escravos river opening into the 
Atlantic. The manifolds and compressors stood silent beneath large red and blue cranes as 
they moved building materials around the sand-filled production site. Meanwhile, every 
day, hundreds of workers were shuttled to and from Warri and the plant by seaplane or by 
helicopter. Supply boats crisscrossed their shadows below, as they navigated a dense 
tangle of waterways. Speedboats packed tight with uniformed Nigerian soldiers (often 
from the nation’s interior) in bright orange life-vests could occasionally be seen darting 
through the passageways. The soldier’s backs were rigid, their riffles pointed towards the 
sky. They glanced anxiously at the water as they were conveyed to new checkpoints and 
surveillance sites around the creeks.  
This tidal estuary, a labyrinth of salt water marshes and mangrove forest traversed 
by narrow muddy channels, makes river travel across the 50 miles separating Chevron’s 
industrial outpost and Warri a three, six or even ten hour journey by boat—depending on 
the size of the motor and the route.25 In between the movements of supply boats and 
soldiers, fishermen in canoes can be seen hauling in the day’s catch as public speedboats 
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24 Which also houses its oil terminal and tank farm, capable of exporting 420,000 bpd of Nigeria’s 2.6 
million bpd—figures from 2012  
 
25 It is important to keep in mind how difficult it is to find one’s way on the ground. While there are larger 
creeks and more trodden pathways that have been made by successive dredging campaigns, any wrong turn 
can lead even the most experienced boat drivers astray. 
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calmly ferry vendors, relatives, and residents to one of 60 small riverine communities, a 
mix of bamboo and concrete homes, perched intermittently along the riverbanks.  
However, the greatest mass of material moving across the Warri/Escravos axis 
remains unseen, hidden within a transport system made of long, angular, intersecting 
lines of steel and concrete coated pipes. Like the rivers, the pipelines fan out across the 
delta, and pump crude, gas and condensate from extraction platforms, through flow 
stations and quality control centers. Rather than a few giant gushers, over 60% of 
Nigeria’s oil are mined from small fields spread over a 28,000 square km floodplain. As 
the industry expanded the floodplain was carved into a patchwork of territorial 
concessions. The tidal channels of the riverine were overlaid with a plot of nodal points, 
hubs and spokes, connected like dots by over 7,000 km of pipelines—more than the 
distance to the center of the earth. While oil engineering is often noted for the challenge 
posed by its vertical endeavor—burrowing deep into the subsoil—in the Niger Delta it is 
also a design of great horizontal ambitions. Oil installations are located across remote 
forest communities, at the center of medium-sized towns and on the outskirts of large 
urban areas. The pipeline network thus materially and institutionally strings together an 
entire region of rural, peri-urban and metropolitan zones in a hydrocarbon web.  
Along with organizing particular spatial relations this massive infrastructure 
transposes a range of temporal frames on the delta, where time becomes measured in 
man-hours and flow rates. This work, of building channels coupled to a standardized set 
of industrial metrics at first glance seems to segregate the spatio-temporal borders of the 
oil industry from areas like the Escravos riverine where fisherwomen still set crayfish 
traps and cast nets according to the ingress and egress of the tide. Indeed, journalists 
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covering the Niger Delta never fail to take note of the striking juxtaposition of this billion 
dollar industry producing the substance of modern energy systems par excellence, against 
the muddy banks of small fishing villages without either running water or electricity. 
Such accounts often highlight the way residents use gas flares to dry garri and laundry or 
use pipelines as walkways, “making do” under conditions where they are excluded from 
the wealth and development around them. And yet, in this chapter I am concerned with 
how industrial space within zones of apparent abandonment (see Biehl, 200526) belies a 
much more complex social and political history within which boundaries are established 
through processes that remain an active part of everyday life.  
Writing on the trans-national forms of economic production and their ambiguous 
spatial arrangements, Andrew Barry develops a theory of “technological zones” for 
conceptualizing the ever-shifting boundaries of territory, metrics and infrastructural 
arrangements within which oil becomes visible as a substance, resource and value.  
A technological zone can be understood, in broad terms, as a space within 
which differences between technical practices, procedures or forms have 
been reduced, or common standards have been established. Unlike the 
territories of nation-states and empires, technological zones cannot be 
marked on a map, yet they do have limits. Moreover, they may also imply 
particular demands on the identity of objects and persons that exist within 
them…A zone is an agencement or assemblage that accelerates and 
intensifies agency in particular directions, and with unpredictable and 
dynamic effects (Barry, 2006, 239-241). 
As assemblage, oil is constantly enmeshed in technical processes of translation and 
commensuration (Barry, 2006; Latour, 2000) becoming a polyvalent form and figure that 
organizes heretofore unrealized potentialities and unanticipated linkages (Mitchell, 2011). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 In considering the proximity of these worlds in which one group seems to be deeply excluded and 
ignored as the political economy appears to have no place for them, Joao Biehl’s work offers a way of 
thinking about these spaces differently, seeing those zones of apparent ‘abandonments’ still contain people 
who continue to experience life and make meaning. Moreover, these are also spaces where larger social 
restructurings and their failures are re-narrated in inner worlds and domestic orders of those excluded 
spaces. 
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For instance, seismic devices mapping the contours of reservoirs provide a basis for 
projecting highly contested reserve estimates. Or, in the case of the Niger Delta, pressure-
measuring cables placed inside pipelines can be linked to deeply political and social 
concerns such as armed activist movements committing pipeline sabotage (see Chapter 
3). Additionally, Barry points out how technological zones present certain possibilities 
for “framing the terms in which issues emerge, and political disputes occur” (249). Barry 
focuses on the divisions that are made between “global/Western political and economic 
forms and their non-western counterparts,” (250) as transnational technological zones are 
enmeshed in other institutions and forces. The technological zone therefore refocuses the 
analysis of oil extracting regimes to the political work that takes place within the 
supposedly neutral science behind its technology.  
Here, however, I am interested in how these same technologies partition space 
and reframe discourses central to representations of the extractive industry in Nigeria. 
While composed of the component parts and subjected to the processes of rationalization 
that Barry identifies with technological zones, oil infrastructures are also material bodies 
that have to contend with bacteria, rust, and build-ups of wax. They can also be 
destroyed, punctured and rerouted. In the case of the Niger Delta extraction technologies 
and oil infrastructural bodies must also contend with a highly visible, densely populated 
field.  They must not simply be read as merely instrumental, but rather as part of a lived 
environment.  
The industrial architecture, darting and bending among the riverbeds does, indeed, 
form an ecology of sorts in the Niger Delta where pipelines arc over fishing streams and 
burrow beneath the backyard of villages. Living less than five miles down stream from 
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Chevron’s Escravos Gas To Liquid (EGTL) project, one resident told me that in his 
community there are three suns: “the one in the sky, the gas flares [produced by burning 
associated gas] and the lights from Chevron.” Daily rhythms of the tide and of the 
seaplanes comingle as fishing season activities compete with cycles of construction and 
repair work on the infrastructure. The whirring motor of the swamp boogey—a crane 
mounted on a barge whose name evokes lurking monsters—can be heard from sun up to 
sun down. The work of the oil industry is registered not only visually, but also by the 
whole body, attuned to shifts in sound and odor. The twice daily passes of the seaplanes 
and buzzing of helicopters is paid sharp attention to by Escravos residents listening for 
warning signs as too many or too few aerial movements signal potential problems with 
the military.27 The sudden pungent smell of gas wafting across a community can send 
residents, quickly putting out their kitchen fires and grabbing treasured belongings, 
running to the riverbanks trying to escape signs of a potential dangerous spill or accident.  
In this chapter I wish to emphasize how the transnational technological processes 
and heterogeneous orders involved with the oil infrastructure, are reflected and refracted 
through the social worlds in the Niger Delta. As it becomes part and parcel of stories 
about the past and of imagined political futures, the oil infrastructure is also a space of 
actionable possibilities where the recognizable boundary between processes considered 
internal and external to production are not only made but also unmade and reconfigured. 
These processes indicate how the oil infrastructure becomes an instrument for organizing 
material, abstract and historical space. Following the past and present events connected 
with this space thus provide the surrounding pipelines, wellheads and security fencing a 
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27 Increasing sky activity is often accompanied by rumors of imminent attack or speculations regarding 
what takes place behind the company’s gates. 
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certain historicity. In this chapter I consider how the area known as “Escravos,” the name 
of the river that has been a conduit for centuries of commodity exchange on the West 
African coast, has been transformed into a name for designating Chevron’s growing 
infrastructural footprint in Delta State.  
The area between Chevron’s Escravos Gas to Liquid Plant (EGTL) and Warri, 
where Chevron have their main offices for production in the Western Delta became a 
primary fieldsite during my 23 months of research. As the EGTL building phase was still 
in progress at this time, members of surrounding communities often remarked on the 
changing landscape, a description that involved retellings of past stories and histories of 
the region. These narratives provided a portrait of the tangible, vulnerable and reinforced 
pathways that constitute the oil infrastructure. The pipes, the fittings and the flanges were 
understood in consonance with the altering of river ways, emergence of local markets, 
and aesthetic sensibilities and have been rendered into narratives by both transnational 













 A vast coastal plain at the southernmost tip of the country, Nigeria’s oil producing 
Niger Delta has, for over 60 years, hosted one of the world’s most extensive transnational 
oil and gas production infrastructures. There are 159 oil fields and 1481 wellheads 
(Garuba, 2013) from which the nation’s oil and gas is transported. While a small portion 
of this is sent to urban-based national refineries in Warri, Port Hartcourt, and Kaduna, the 
great majority of hydrocarbons make their way to one of the country’s six export 
terminals from which they are shipped to global sites of petroleum consumption.  
The Escravos river area has become an integral part of this national and 
transnational system. It hosts oil facilities from both Shell and Chevron. Foreign 
Transnational companies must operate as joint-ventures with the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Company (NNPC) and therefore are officially known by the names of their 
jointly formed subsidiaries: Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) and 
Chevron Nigeria Limited (CNL).28 And yet, most residents living in the area simply refer 
to these compound limited liability companies by their more familiar names, “Shell” and 
“Chevron.” In large part this is because while NNPC formally commands the joint 
venture with its equity ownership, transnationals control the day-to-day operations and 
are the most visible representatives on ground. Shell operates five small flow stations in 
the area; including one just across from the Escravos Gas to Liquid  (EGTL) project in a 
small settlement known as “Shell Beach.”29 However, Chevron’s investment here has 
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28 These joint ventures also include other owners. 55% of SPDC is owned by the NNPC, 30% by Shell 
while Total has 10% and Agip only 5%.  
 
29 It also includes Jones Creek, the largest flow stations in the area.  
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recently far overtaken Shell’s. Their export terminal pumps approximately 460,000 b/d of 
crude and they are poised to become the second largest export site for gas and gas 
products in Nigeria. At the time of my fieldwork, company managers as well as liaisons 
from the Governor’s offices were quick to point out that the construction of Chevron’s 
Escravos Gas to Liquid (EGTL) plant was the most expensive infrastructural expansion 
ever to take place in the Western Delta. Utilizing a vast array of contractors and 
subcontractors the project was also the largest private employer in Delta State at the time. 
The area, known to Chevron workers and investors as “Escravos,” in fact hosts 
multiple production arenas with various histories. The tank farm was built by Gulf, in 
1969, when Warri and Escravos were still part of the Midwest State. When Gulf was 
acquired by Chevron (Socal) in 1984, as part of the largest corporate merger in history (at 
the time), the tank farm was expanded. Plans for a gas gathering and LNG processing 
plant were announced to comply with new Nigerian (and global) regulations to 
significantly reduce gas flaring (Nigeria is the second largest gas flaring country even 
though gas flaring has been outlawed since 1984). The government has long encouraged 
companies to reduce flaring (new Nigerian legislation is constantly enacted to phase out 
gas flaring to comply with the UNFCCC and Global Gas Flaring initiative). However, 
most multinationals have dragged their feet until recent events began to make this 
“requirement” into an alternative line of profitability. 
The Escravos gas project, delayed and deferred as oil and gas prices slumped into 
the 90’s was only revived (and reconceived) in 2002. It was certainly no coincidence that 
plans for a gas gathering and processing plant were finally put into effect at this time. In 
February 2000, participating nations for the West African Gas supply pipeline signed an 
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Inter-Governmental Agreement finalizing plans for Nigerian fields to supply the energy 
needs of the West African coast. Chevron, as the largest stakeholder in the pipeline, 
(36.7%) was therefore well poised to sell its own gas to its pipeline.30 This opportunity 
was enhanced after Chevron, during yet another merger in 2000, this time with Texaco, 
acquired the company’s infrastructure in the area, almost doubling their footprint at 
Escravos. The plan was also made more attractive to the company’s shareholders by the 
current state of hydrocarbon markets. The wellhead price for natural gas began to tick 
upwards after the US government passed the Commodity Futures Modernization act (or 
the Enron Loophole) in 2000. Deregulation allowed Over-the-Counter (OTC) markets to 
soar. Natural gas transactions, in particular, accelerated to 10 and 12 times greater than 
delivery purchasing (O’Sullivan, 2010). The market was thus awash in demand and 
investment money.31  
Chevron’s site at Escravos, now part of Delta State, decided in favor of 
implementing a new, somewhat experimental gas processing technology, a Gas to Liquid 
(GTL) plant.32 GTL uses a process known as Fischer-Tropsch, named for the scientists in 
1920’s Germany who developed a method for gasifying coal into synthetic crude. It was 
relied on heavily during WWII by the German army. The process was further refined in a 
series of plants erected in South Africa to generate that country’s fuel supplies from coal 
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30 Other shareholders include: Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (24.9%); Shell Overseas Holdings 
Limited (17.9%); and Takoradi Power Company Limited (16.3%), Societe Togolaise de Gaz (2%) and 
Societe BenGaz S.A. (2%). See: http://www.wagpco.com 
 
31 The gas supplying EGTL is associated (or flare) gas that is released automatically in drilling. It would 
hardly qualify as unconventional, which is where most of this investment money went, i.e. towards 
ventures like hydro-fracking. However, it is clear that as hydrocarbons became a powerful force on 
financial markets, fuel prices were rising and investment in energy sectors was a growing trend. Watts in 
Subterranean Estates (2015) points to this relation in the case of financing for risky ventures like offshore 
drilling 
 
32 EGTL is only the second GTL project ever constructed for export. The first was built by Shell in Qatar, 
completed in 2011.  
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in 1952. However, the Escravos plant would be only the second plant ever built for GTL 
exports that include gasoline and diesel with low sulfur content, making them mixable 
with conventional fuels and much lighter.33 Thus, the EGTL project (including the gas 
plant) is part of an overall gas use strategy that includes domestic and regional natural gas 
sales through the West African Gas Pipeline and international sales of GTL products. It 
was, therefore, a costly undertaking requiring quite a number of institutions, workers and 
materials. 
The project broke ground in 2005. What was initially a small sliver of land barely 
10 meters from Aruton (at Ugborodo) was expanded ten-fold by massive sand-filling to 
support the plant. This process created an entirely new island. By the time I arrived here, 
in 2009, the project was only 40% complete. EGTL was described to me in interviews 
with project managers as “a stick project with modular components.” The plant itself was 
the “stick,” a permanent structure. Yet the bulk of the project and the fabrication of 
components were designed, purchased or constructed elsewhere by established 
engineering firms and manufactures for the global oil and gas industry. The scope of the 
project was thus much larger than the strip of land at Escravos. Engineering and 
procurement took place in Houston, Milan and in Monterey, Mexico. Steel structural 
components were manufactured in Thailand and pipe spools were imported from Tunisia. 
Wax filtration modules were shipped from South Africa. Two LTFT (Low Temperature 
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33 Unlike Liquified Natural Gas plants, the conversion of gas in the case GTL is permanent. Although it is 
expensive to build, there are a few reasons why, according to Chevron’s literature, GTL remains profitable. 
Unlike Liquified Natural Gas which requires the use of expensive purpose-built cryogenic carrier vessels 
for distribution, GTL products can be conveyed by conventional tankers and be processed through already 
existent infrastructure for distribution. Furthermore, they can be mixed with conventionally refined liquids, 
such as diesel. GTL products have low sulfur content, thus mixing transforms any diesel into a substance 
that can be labeled a clean-burning fuel. 
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Fischer-Trospch) Reactors weighing 2,200 tonnes each were delivered from Japan.34 The 
modules and pipe racks needed for the project were built in Abu Dhabi and shipped to 
Warri Port by way of Madagascar. In newsletters distributed to its staff, workers and 
shareholders, the EGTL project celebrated its international character boasting that 
workers from over 40 different countries were represented, from managers in London and 
Houston to crews from Mexico, Columbia and Indonesia. Its 2009 review even highlights 
this geographical spread of “productivity” by listing the number of man-hours at each site 
alongside a photograph of all the “team babies” born to oil workers at international 
satellite locations during different phases of the job. Below the photo is written, “clearly 
the team has been working on more than the Escravos modules.” 
However, at Escravos itself, the project works to minimize and confine its area of 
operation to its manufactured island. Although not technically offshore, the site, already 
surrounded by water, is additionally bound off from its surroundings by high electrical 
fencing. Its gates tightly control the movement of goods, equipment and workers. Much 
like offshore rigs, the site contains its own communications systems that are synched with 
Houston. In 2008, the project clocked 10 million man-hours from workers that included 
Chevron staff, employees of their main contractors (Japan Gasoline Company (JGC), 
Kellogg Brown and Root (KBR) and Snamprogetti) and workers from over 350 third-
party national and indigenous subcontractors.35  
Most of the Nigerian contract and subcontract companies were based out of 
houseboats anchored in the river or they stayed in guesthouses constructed within 
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34 Their erection within the GTL complex was the heaviest lift performed anywhere in the world in 2009. 
 
35 These contracting and sub-contracting systems are themselves feats in institutional maze-making and I 
will describe this elaborate configuration in more depth in the following chapter. 
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communities. Higher-level foreign workers at times had the option to stay with the 
management class in Chevron’s base at Warri, Prodeco Camp. However, depending on 
the phase of construction, many from each group were housed in stratified living quarters 
within the EGTL complex. These accommodations were divided by both status and 
nationality: between senior and junior staff and between Chevron staff, contract staff, and 
subcontract Nigerian workers. The site can house up to 7,000 (mostly male) workers at 
any given moment. An EGTL logistics manager, eager to convey the great scale of the 
labor involved with this undertaking, printed out for me a sheet of paper listing the 
amount of food ferried to the EGTL site every month: 
26 Tons Chicken 
26 Tons Meat 
20 Tons Fish 
89 Tons Vegetables 
3 Tons  Rice 
13 Tons Cooking Oil 
9 Tons  Cheese 
160,000 Eggs 
109 Tons   Fruit 
 
The outer perimeter fence is not the only wall constructed here. The workspace is 
divided into four areas with a series of pass gates guarded by soldiers. Employees are 
required to wear badges at all times indicating their company and their level of access. 
Workers beds are made behind thin aluminum walls in (mostly) temporary cabins with 
cheap linoleum flooring. Even here, with blaring air conditioning, the mud and swelter 
cannot be kept at bay. A number of the housing and cafeteria structures were designed to 
serve during a short period of construction, after which most workers would be deployed 
to one of their company’s other sites, perhaps in Nigeria or perhaps in Australia. 
Corrosion mitigation tactics are taken to ensure the integrity of pylons and the steel 
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manifolds. Yet, some workers complained that the floors of their bedrooms were already 
wearing thin. 
Structures like oil enclaves pose a unique ethnographic question for anthropology. 
Ostensibly sealed from the delta at large, with a transitory population rotating from site to 
site on various hitches, EGTL resembles what Marc Auge has written of non-places, “a 
space which cannot be defined as relational or historical, or concerned with an identity” 
(Auge, 1995, 77). In his book, Global Shadows, James Ferguson describes the 
increasingly walled off compounds of transnational global extraction projects as the work 
of legal and material insulation facilitated by “new sorts of spatial flexibility made 
possible by developments in communication, air transport and so on.” (Ferguson, 2007, 
205) The oil extractive enclave, he claims, manifests an ideal model of transnational 
neoliberal economic activity that, coupled to a regime of private military contracting, has 
come to define the growth of new mining and mineral interests in Africa. Careful 
scholarship has long pointed to the ways in which previous colonial ambitions fueled by 
designs on extractive capital, worked through technologies that divided and spatialized 
population and access (Fanon, 1961; Mbembe, 2009; De Boeck, 2006). However, 
Ferguson here wants to distinguish new, neoliberal, economic practices by quantifying 
their social viscosity. Concluding that previous state-centered extractive operations were 
“thickly” overlaid with the relationship between the state and its citizens (cf. Nash, 1989 
and Ferguson 2000) he identifies the corporate oil enclave with minimal investment in 
the local and national lifeworlds. Dropping anchor in remote mineral-rich pockets of the 
African postcolony with fully mobile communication and labor regimes, the 
entrepreneurial capital sustaining neoliberal market economies in his analysis is 
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designated as, “socially thin.” Yet this conclusion appears at odds with the great amount 
of social, material and political work that the erection and maintenance of these networks 
seems to entail.  
Through an ethnographic exploration of the current shift of investments in oil to 
offshore installations, Hannah Appel has rigorously fleshed out the stakes of what 
appears as a low social investment, capital-intensive project. She examines how the 
particularity of a place, like Equatorial Guinea, is processed and pinched to conform to a 
standardized, pre-established model, as “a bundled and repeating set of technological, 
social, political, and economic practices aimed at profit making that the industry works to 
build wherever companies find commercially viable hydrocarbon deposits” (Appel, 2011, 
697). As much a material as a representational undertaking, Appel borrows the term 
“friction” from Anna Tsing to suggest that modularity and sequestration of the oil 
industry are made possible through deep entanglement with sticky and sometimes 
resistant local and national socio-political life (Tsing, 2005). Thus, very dense social 
work becomes necessary to make the oil enclave appear socially thin. While pointing 
towards trends taking hold of the oil industry as its industrial components now have to be 
reconciled with its massive power within financial markets, both Ferguson and Appel 
draw from examples of relatively new oil industries: Angola and Equatorial Guinea. This 
perspective limits their investigations to the perimeter wall enclosing production itself 
rather than considering how these new practices of enclaving are refracted through older 
infrastructures, norms, understandings and desires attached to oil and its technical, 
institutional bodies. 
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In Nigeria for example, this imaginary of isolation, even at the level of 
appearance is difficult to maintain. As Appel herself notes, open contestation over 
Nigeria’s onshore production “has buried the industry’s fantasies of frictionlessness in 
decades of political negotiation” (Appel, 2011, 695). Here, indeed, the industry has faced 
decades of sabotage and attacks from peaceful and armed social movements protesting 
the effects of pollution and institutional marginalization. Such movements have laid bare 
the very “messy” character of extraction. Repercussions in the Niger Delta from over 60 
years of pumping oil are currently the subject of a number of high profile lawsuits (Bodo 
v Chevron and Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum) while anxieties regarding reports of 
massive oil theft are on the rise among industrial actors (see chapter 3). Chevron’s EGTL 
plant, despite being surrounded by security walls and aligning itself with the modular 
transnational character of an offshore installation, has also had its progress stalled 
numerous times due to unrest. The initial estimated cost of the project was 1.7bn USD 
but in 2008 it ballooned to 5.9bn USD. In 2013, when the plant was completed the final 
estimate was given as 8.4bn USD. The inflating budget has been blamed largely on the 
actions of community fighters or community activists since Niger Delta militant groups 
began staging their attacks. These activities, the company argues, have created delays and 
postponed the projected completion dates from 2007 to 2013.36 After the amnesty was 
signed in 2009, however, the design for the architecture and the plan for the surrounding 
communities were being reconfigured. 
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36 However, it should be noted that inflating costs is not always a negative for powerful contractors. KBR, 
the main contractor on the project, also has a long history of inflating prices for work after receiving 
contracts. Contracts are often “cost-plus” meaning that the contractor recoups expenses along with a built-
in guarantee profit percentage. This percentage ranges from 2-10% of the total budget. Therefore 
contractors have incentive to inflate costs in order to inflate their profits. (Briody, 2004) 
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The EGTL operating plans largely resemble and utilize many of the same 
policies, tactics and technologies as new offshore-based industries. However, it is 
necessary to consider that the construction of borders also produces new engagements 
around it. If there is indeed a modular quality and imaginary to the oil industry as Appel 
and Ferguson suggest, then there is also a way in which these pieces and parts are not 
only making the oil enclave as a particular assemblage, but also setting the conditions 
within which such an assemblage can be dis-assembled and/or re-assembled. This 
involves recognizing that these parts and the processes have to engage not only new 
technologies but also other materialities associated with the erection of a subsoil system.   
An ethnography of the infrastructures and environs of the EGTL project presents 
an opportunity to explore contingent and historical traces through which Nigeria’s oil 
industry emerged in the Niger Delta swamps. Even as new technologies seek to enclose 
extractive activities off from their sites of production in is important to consider how 
narratives relating to value, capital and power have shifted as the space itself is altered. 
To explore these infrastructural time-space configurations assembling and disassembling 
across the Escravos-Warri axis, I therefore present the history of the area through four 
vignettes from the period following the amnesty. Each scene revolves around a material 
that has had a part in fashioning and defining the landscape and geographies of the 
Escravos area as well as involved in its current, post-amnesty refashioning: paper, earth, 
cement and steel. Each story unfolds a different moment in the history of the area and 
each is staged at a different point along the oil infrastructural network running from 




Along with the importation of ready-made materials and an arsenal of technical 
expertise, Chevron, and its main contractor, KBR, moved Jacob, an International 
Community Relations Manager, from a project in Angola to the Niger Delta in 2005. 
Having received his PhD in economic geography from the Sorbonne in Paris, Jacob had 
worked as a private consultant for Chevron in the Sudanese oil fields and for Sunangol in 
Angola. His job was to interface with community leaders and to address their concerns 
regarding the company. He described the “expertise” he brought to his clients as that of a 
“mediator.” He had to meet and to identify which local authorities the company should 
engage and supply with subcontracts. In addition to this, Jacob had managed to solicit 
funding from Chevron and KBR to generate a book, a limited edition, on the oil host 
communities living in the shadows of the EGTL project. In a draft copy I was allowed to 
survey, I flipped open the flimsy paper copy to reveal the first page: a map of the 
Escravos region on which is marked the locations of the oil blocs owned by Chevron and 
where they overlap with particular communities. These communities: Ilaje, Itsekiri, 
Gbaramatu and Egbema appeared in similar bulky shapes and in bright inky colors of red, 
green, yellow and purple. Zebra lines indicate where they overlap with the oil blocs. 
Flipping the page, I noted they had printed an aerial shot of the EGTL plant under 
construction (at 45%).  
In addition to re-inscribing certain ethnic categories of citizenship, the printed 
map is remarkable its presentation of a nearly featureless space. Tentatively titled (at the 
time), “The Cultures and Traditions of the Escravos Riverine,” Jacob describes the book 
as “a gesture.” “We must show our appreciation and our respect to our host 
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communities,” he explains when I ask the reasoning behind the book. Beneath each 
ethnic community grouping is a set of sub-headings: Festivals, Dance, Food, Language, 
Traditional Rulers, and Gender.37 To write the articles, Jacob had recruited Nigerian 
scholars and professors at the nearby Delta State University, Abraka. While writing, 
Jacob explains, they were given explicit instructions to produce pieces that focus on what 
he called, “traditional cultural aspects” of these societies rather than any changes that 
may have occurred within them over time. “We were very clear, we did not want any 
sections or debates that deal with the history of the region. This issue is too contentious 
and we don’t want to create more problems,” he said without mentioning exactly what 
“problems” concerned him.  
Considering that the map, a sketch of the riverine and oil blocs, is the first page of 
the book, followed by an image depicting the steel manifolds of a Gas to Liquid plant, it 
seems strange that the book’s contents should be confined to a portrait of the 
communities living around it as somehow separated from the space-time of the industry, 
as if it were the communities and not the corporation who resided in guarded enclaves. 
Oil companies have an investment in collecting knowledge and histories about the Niger 
Delta. Both Shell and Chevron have archives of materials, from oral tales and reports 
conveyed or authored by community liaison officers to written and researched accounts 
commissioned from security consultants to help decipher the fault lines between and 
within communities.38 However, this book was not meant to produce knowledge, but 
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37 Jacob showed me the draft because he was inviting me to take part in the project, to serve as a consulting 
editor. He cited my background as an “anthropologist” and my research visiting these communities as the 
reasons behind such an offer. I declined explaining that I did not consider such a proposal appropriate given 
my position as a researcher. However, it was a bit unsettling to recognize where such categorical 
technologies were appropriated from. 
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something else. Creating a book or pamphlet celebrating the traditions of its host 
communities was a popular trend among Community Relations Managers with whom I 
spoke in the Niger Delta at the time. These texts were not designed for sale, but for print 
and distribution (often in elaborate ceremony) to host community members and to 
politicians. Jacob suggested that the thought behind the creation of the book was to 
demonstrate the company’s respect for those communities, committing their customs and 
traditions to text. And yet aside from reifying certain ideas about “culture” the question 
remains as to why corporations wished to generate a document cordoning off the past 
from the present.  
The Niger Delta region has been a critical part of global trade networks for over 
600 years and therefore the contours and pathways through which people and goods 
move has altered greatly overtime. As the name Escravos—Portuguese for “slaves”—
indicates, Chevron’s worksite used to be an arm of the transatlantic slave trade. The name 
was given to the river by the Portuguese explorer, Duarte Pacheco Pereira, who 
comments that the name came from an encounter where “two slaves were obtained by 
barter there when it was discovered.”39 The Portuguese arrived at the coast looking for 
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38 see Leaked Shell Report, 2004, or transcripts from Chevron vs. Bowoto case, 2010 where Chevron 
performed for the court a wide breadth of knowledge and understanding of the history of the region in order 
to exculpate itself in the case.  
 
39 According to EJ Alagoa, Escravos was never a main slaving port. The river was too shallow. Apparently, 
this initial slave-based exchanged was misleading as to the types of commerce that dominated the river. 
Alagoa, basing his conclusions on oral histories he collected in 1968, insists that Gbaramatu communities 
participated only marginally in overseas trade. And while they have stories of sail ships and Dirimo 
Bekewei (black/dark whitemen) he finds little evidence that anyone would travel to parts of the river where 
the slave trade was engaged. He insists that the Itsekiri, who were heavily involved in the slave trade 
operated mainly from Forcados (only 10 miles South along the coast). As for Oporoza in the Gbaramatu 
area, he believes they were mainly a “salt town” trading salt for clay pots and/or slaves (so that they could 
trade with Europeans). In the histories I collected from community elders in Gbaramatu (Oporoza and 
Kokodiagbene) slavery seemed to play a much larger role in the development and expansion of the 
community. Although, certainly, there was never a thriving slave market, such as seen in Calabar and in 
Bonny, there were a number of leaders who held powerful reputations through their involvement with slave 
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gold and peppers in the early 15th century. By the century’s end they had established a 
number of substantial slave markets, reorienting the long established trans-Saharan trade 
routes from the interior towards the Atlantic littoral (Crowder, 57). The trade, through 
which Mbembe has bitingly written the West African coast was “born to modernity,” 
(Mbembe 13) played out on the river ways. Niger Delta raiders captured slaves further 
upriver and transported them in war canoes to trade with European ships anchored 
offshore (Jones, 1963).  
Before the Portuguese arrival, the coastal Ijaw and Itsetkiri communities at 
Escravos lived by trading fish and salt with riverbank and floodplain farmers upriver for 
cassava and meat (Derefaka 2002:224). The river ways were essential circuits for trade, 
markets, and marriage. However, reversing the direction of activity to the coast, these 
early transactions with international slavers introduced firearms, gunpowder and gin 
spirits, all of which remain essential aspects of Niger Delta ritual and exchange systems 
up to the present. Materials became a basis of influence for social and political 
arrangements. William Pietz has written that these early transactions necessitated some 
form of mediation for sanctioning new social relations whose meaning and logic were 
unintelligible to European merchants (Pietz, 1995, 25 see also 1985 and 1987 articles on 
fetishism). All along the West African coast this took the form of  “fetish oaths” which 
European merchants swore with African trade partners, enabling a “functional 
misrecognition,” that facilitated exchange (Pietz, 1995, 23).40 Within the Niger Delta a 
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exchange. In particular I was given accounts on two central villages within the Gbaramatu kingdom one 
which was founded by a successful slave trader: Kokodiagbene, and another, Benikrukru which was 
founded as a refuge from slave trading at Oporoza where Pere Sei Ikirentimi I, ruling Gbaramatu from 
1495-1560, was acknowledged by the Council of Chiefs as trading directly with Portuguese Slavers.  
 
40 Europeans believed the fetish, itself a pidgin of the Portuguese word, fetisso, acted as the superstitious 
other of laws of contract, by Africans whom they believed attributed supernatural agency to material things. 
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number of other cross-cultural transactions and appropriations through which power was 
symbolized. The so-called “traditional” garb of Niger Deltan Ijaw and Itsetkiri leaders 
incorporates the top hats and decorative walking canes worn and used by Europeans. 
Successful Delta traders adopted titles like King and Duke as personal names (Jones, 
1963). An Itsetkiri Chief married a Portuguese noble woman in the 17th century and their 
son, Olu Antonio Don Domingos, returned to take up leadership in Itsetkiri political life 
at Escravos and Warri.  
As slave trade gave way to early trade in palm oil to grease the mills of the 
industrial revolution in the 19th century, the West African coast was once again 
transformed as Deltan traders established thriving merchant states (Bonny, Owome and 
Brass), presided over by famous and fearsome, “merchant princes”: William Koko of 
Nembe, Jaja of Opobo, Nana of Itsekiri (to name the most well-known). The power of the 
Merchant Princes rested largely on their abilities to maintain control of the winding and 
difficult to navigate rivers, by occupying strategic points to block first the Portuguese and 
later the British, from entering the interior.41 European trading factories set up along the 
banks trying to inch their influence into the interior. In this period the coast was awash 
with a range of currencies, varied transactional forms and systems of credit. As Jane 
Guyer writing on the marginal gains earned by different actors along the West African 
coast remarks, each transaction entailed a threshold through which multiple participants 
sought to manipulate the outcome in their favor (Guyer, 2004, 18). Liverpool trading 
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The fetish, connoting the misrecognition of a thing as the bearer of its own value, also allowed for an 
ideological opposition between reason and faith, rationality and irrationality, becoming, in a sense, a 
European fetish for ills of materialism. 
 
41 EJ Alagoa’s work has tracked the extensive history of these engagements, the revolts and schemes used 
to work against European forces. See, Alagoa, 1968, 1993, 2010 
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houses began to finance trade through speculative ventures on supercargoes (British 
merchants trading with Niger Deltan middlemen) trying to double their investments 
(Crowder, 98; Okonta and Douglas, 8). Perhaps one of the most easily identifiable lasting 
mark of competing gains, is the practice of the ‘dash.’ The ‘dash’ was originally “a gift of 
trade goods made by the supercargo and later by the agent of the factory to the 
middleman for every consignment of oil which he sold to him.” (Jones, 1963, 99) What 
was initially a merchandise gift, chosen by the middlemen, given by firms competing for 
their consignments, became a fixed percentage of the money paid for the oil. In other 
words, a little “dash” on top, to encourage loyalty. The “dash” still asked for and given in 
conjunction with many economic and financial transactions across Nigeria. Although it 
can be monetary or material, the dash cannot be part of the agreed upon price or 
exchange. It always stands outside of the agreement, posing as a gift.  
In the late-19th century, trying to subvert the grip of merchant princes (and 
competing European powers), the English Crown provided Sir George “Goldie” 
Taubman with a charter to develop direct trade relations with the interior. This charter, 
overriding a host of other, competing agreements inaugurated an era of sweeping changes 
to legal and material trading pathways. In 1886, his Royal Niger Company obtained 
political authority over territories all the way up and into the Benue and Niger River 
confluence, tasked with routing out of remaining practices of slave trade in the interior, a 
standard justification during the British conquest of Africa (Shenton, 1978). This 
abolitionary agenda happily afforded the company direct connections with hinterland 
traders. The Royal Niger agents established and claimed three British protectorates 
corresponding to the T-shaped river meeting: Eastern, Western and Northern. Goldie 
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used his position to secure a monopoly on trade, (even though this was expressly 
forbidden in the charter and by the terms of the Berlin conference) (Crowder, 169). Yet 
by the 1890’s the Royal Niger Company was foundering, its sphere of influence 
threatened by the very middle men that had been forced out of business and who, 
sometimes collaborating with the French, would sabotage the company’s shipments. 
Revoking Goldie’s Charter in 1899 the British took control of the company’s 
administrative and commercial infrastructure (Jones, 1963, 192) and the colonial state 
was officially established through the amalgamation of former protectorates under 
General Lugard in 1914.  
Power under colonial rule shifted away from the riverine communities as political 
life became dominated by larger groups that the British nominated to represent each 
region: Ibo (Eastern), Yoruba (Western) and Hausa (Northern). Sweeping away the 
remaining power of coastal states, the colonial government replaced numerous treaties 
between individual towns and trading companies with contract law. All indigenous 
currencies were withdrawn from circulation (Guyer, 12)42 and practices like the “dash” 
were abolished (at least formally).43 This reordering of political economic systems took 
place within the infrastructure, as well. The colonial government constructed roads, new 
ports and railways, increasing the speed and channels that could bypass (at least to some 
extent) the river ways.  
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42 Although she notes the complex ways in which many of these, like the cowrie, had been in decline many 
years previous to the establishment of the colonial state and that colonialism did not establish an overall 
complete currency system. 
 
43 The trade recession in the 1920’s caused local firms to reduce their costs and collectively agree to abolish 
the dash. Came into effect in 1927 without warning to middlemen. (Jones, 1963, 108) 
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If such things are left out of Jacob’s book it can be read as part of a logic which 
tries to side step consideration about how an economic infrastructure comes into being. It 
is possible to see this echoed in the fact that the map displayed on the front piece of the 
book has left out the pipelines. For while there are numerous maps available of the area 
around Escravos, they chose the one where the viewer sees simply one area overlaid on 
another like a Venn diagram charting possible logical relations between data sets. And 
yet, “Escravos” as it stands today, enclosed by moats and electrical wires, is sustained by 
the vast, creeping tendrils of its hydrocarbon circulatory system. As with the previous 
emergent political and extractive instruments, the genealogy of the oil infrastructure that 
rendered Chevron’s EGTL possible involved interaction among various interests and 
instruments, cartography, the mangrove forests and new forms of capital investment, 
along with a civil war and emergent aspects of carbon-based power (Mitchell, 2011). 
While previous markets in the delta worked to control the rivers, the pipelines have 
generated a secondary circuit of flows. The construction of this network, created a new 
object in relation to a new infrastructure whose history is not neatly representable but 
remains leaden with material traces that continue to trouble the fantasy performed on the 
page. In its final form, “The Cultures and Traditions of the Escravos Riverine,” would 
have a rather flimsy appearance. Rather than any hard cover, it will be simply slipped 
inside a laminated cover and cheap binding, resembling an extensive legal brief, treaty or 











The Different Inn, 2010 (author’s photo) 
 
In the riverine area surrounding the EGTL project, however, residents navigated 
murkier and more intransigent forms connected with those blocks marked out in Jacob’s 
book. Across the river from the EGTL site sits a small bar, The Different Inn. It is 
constructed at the muddy river’s edge in Madagho, a part of Ugborodo community. A 
mural painted across the back of the inn depicts a Floating Production Storage and 
Offloading (FPSO) vessel used for collecting oil and gas from offshore drilling wells. 
This particular FPSO has a bright blue hull and decks crowded with cabins, cranes and a 
helipad. The inn is a small concrete block structure. Inside, worn white plastic chairs are 
stacked next to a wooden bar selling sometimes-chilled bottles of Star and Gulder. In the 
dry season, customers move chairs outdoors to the banks of the river where one can 
“catch breeze” blowing off the gulf.  Looking across the water to the EGTL construction 
site visitors to the Inn are surrounded by both the material and figurative enclosures that 
make up the oil and gas universe. Framed by the portrait of the FSPO behind them, a 
string of offshore rigs, about 14 visible from the shoreline, glitter on the horizon. The 
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sound of a small personal gen (generator) sputters in the background. Last month the 
community lights were supplied in the evenings by a large community generator, gifted 
to Madagho by Chevron in 2004. However, after a group of women occupied a pipeline 
construction site a few weeks ago, Chevron cut the community’s fuel supply for the 
machine leaving residents to scrounge for their own electrical needs.  
While Madagho remained in darkness the lights from Escravos beamed even 
brighter. Temi, a youth leader in the community, explains that the women had been 
protesting Chevron’s long-ignored promise to build a shoreline protection for the 
community whose boundaries have suffered from erosion. Temi points to the place where 
the village’s burial site and former shrine dissolved and disappeared into the ocean in the 
late 90’s. While bitterly accusing the industry’s increasing reliance on dredging to clear 
the waterways, Temi also nods to the EGTL complex and to my surprise, without a hint 
of irony, exclaims, “isn’t it beautiful? It’s like gold.” I ask him if he means “liquid gold” 
as oil is sometimes called. But, instead Temi describes “gold” in a list form beginning 
with the electric lights illuminating the night, the large flat screen TVs he insists the oil 
workers can watch, the rumors he heard of swimming pools and football fields laying on 
the other side of the fence where, he explains, he was once accosted by Chevron’s 
security for driving his boat too close to the company’s jetty. “Chevron people, they will 
be catching fun. Not like us, in the dark.”  
The Different Inn, built where the river meets the sea, used to be known as the 
Sailor Inn. In 1953, before the discovery of oil, the colonial government initiated a plan 
known as the “Escravos Scheme” or the “Escravos Bar project,” to dredge the mouth of 
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the river and to build a break wall.44 The dredging scheme (not completed until 1964) 
sought to create a viable inlet to the river system and Warri port. It was designed to 
provide a draft up to 20 feet (for ships carrying 1,200 tons), smoothing out the Escravos 
River into a water highway for international tankers and oil prospectors.45 Gulf Oil began 
producing just beyond that break wall a few years later, in 1965. As the river mouth 
widened, the area became a waypoint for workers and ship captains. In the mid-1980s a 
man known as Rasta erected the Sailor Inn for international seamen, Nigerian tugboat 
drivers and oil workers coming to spend their evenings drinking and smoking J 
(marijuana) before embarking in the morning to Warri Port. By the mid-90’s however, as 
the structural adjustment reforms laid waste to the Nigerian economy, activity at Warri 
Port slumped to less than 10% capacity and Rasta was broke. When residents and oil 
workers fled during the first Warri Crisis in 1998, Rasta abandoned the structure.  
In 2002, when Chevron re-convened its plans to expand the Escravos terminal 
into the Gas to Liquid plant, a member of the Marine Association, anticipating an influx 
of workers, bought what remained of The Sailor’s Inn. He transformed it into, well, a 
Different Inn. An artist from Warri was hired to paint the image of the FPSO to attract 
customers. According to Temi, since the FPSO represented the most high-tech 
infrastructure with the highest paid workers the image was conceived as a way to 
exemplify the status of the bar. In addition to the inn, a set of small private rooms set in 
rows beneath the ironwood trees were also built for sex workers, arriving also in 
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44 In fact the first offshore rig towed to the shores around Escravos was a submersible crane for building the 
breakwall. The contract was awarded by the British to Costain worth 8 million pounds, one of the largest 
civil engineering contracts awarded in the commonwealth at the time. (Guardian, May 13th, 1959) Costain 
was also heavily involved in the building of roadwork across southern Nigeria. 
 
45 The Escravos scheme turned Warri into the third largest port after Lagos and Port Hartcourt 
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anticipation of the new project. The depiction of the lone FPSO surrounded by ocean 
proved to be a portentous sign, however, of a future the new owner had not anticipated. 
Only a year and a half later, following the second Warri Crisis, Chevron would close its 
gates and ban its workers from leaving the site, moving them exclusively through the air 
by helicopters and seaplanes. 
This shift towards near-total enclosure of Chevron’s site, although set off by 
attacks on the company’s installations in 2003 (which I discuss in more detail below), is a 
trajectory that cannot be appreciated without first taking into account the political 
arrangements, legal instruments and technological dynamics of the early independence 
period in which oil infrastructure building began. The first commercial export of oil in 
Nigeria took place in 1958.46 On the 1st of October 1960, just 18 months later, Nigeria 
received formal independence in a relatively peaceful handover of power from the 
British. The new nation, opting to maintain the three-state structure put into place by the 
colonial government, followed a federalist model in which each state was to retain 
control of its industrial revenues. In fact, oil, right after independence contributed little to 
state revenues, dominated instead by earnings from cash crops and minerals. However, 
the equation significantly altered as oil came to play an increasingly central role in 
national politic life. In 1965 oil constituted only 5% of national revenue. This grew to 
43.6% in 1971 and had skyrocketed by 1980 to 80%, eclipsing and displacing agricultural 
industries in the North and West of the country.47  
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46 Oil prospecting began with the German-owned Nigerian Bitumen Company in 1908. However it was 
Shell-BP who struck black gold in 1956. 
 
47 This last jump had a lot to do with the oil shocks of the 1970’s, which I discuss further in chapter 2. 
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However, oil’s status as political instrument first emerged during the civil war 
period from 1967-71, known as the Biafra War. The war, preceded in 1966 by a coup and 
counter coup overlaid in ethnic-regionalist terms, was set off after the Igbo in Eastern 
region declared their own nation, The Republic of Biafra in May 1967. The federal 
government invaded the secessionist region, resulting in a nearly three-year war with an 
estimated 2 million casualties, the vast majority of which were civilians who died from 
starvation when the federal government erected blockades around the Biafra territory. 
The rhetoric from the Biafra and the federal government sides did not have to do with oil 
nor did the source of tensions between the Igbo and the state rest in the oil fields. 
Nevertheless, during the war oil remained strategically and tactically important for 
Biafrans, the federal government and for the oil companies seeking to secure their future 
with the winning side. Still in the throws of war, the military government of Yakubu 
Gowon passed new resolutions to legitimize the federal government’s claim on the 
subsoil resources. The most consequential was the 1969 Petroleum Decrees that vested 
within the federal government legal ownership of the subsoil resources.48 Also, critically, 
the Biafran period initiated practices that coupled corporate aid to oil interests. While 
countries like France supported Biafra, hoping to gain future oil concessions, 
corporations like Shell tried to hedge their position by providing fuel and support to both 
the Nigerian and Biafran armies. At the same time, they led campaigns to ‘relieve’ the 
Biafran famine caused by the ongoing fighting and a government blockade Shell was 
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48 This decree that even while instituted under a military regime during a declared state of emergency has 
been incorporated unchanged into both the 1979 and 1999 democratic constitutional re-drafting. 
Nationalization of petroleum resources was of course already becoming common among third world oil 
producers (at this time) following the establishment of OPEC in 1961. However, choosing to implement the 
legislation in the midst of Biafra only strengthened the position and legitimacy of the federal government. 
And in fact, the decrees were passed immediately after federal troops retook Bonny Terminal and Port 
Hartcourt from the Biafran army. 
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helping to bankroll (Zalik, 2005; Peel, 2010). This alliance, between aid, political 
violence, corporate interest and oil would significantly impact the organization of politics 
and institutional bureaucracies both within the Niger Delta and Nigeria at large (see 
chapter 2). 
Yet these legal and structural frameworks were fashioned in tandem with new 
practices for physically managing and capturing the oil. Amidst the exchange of fire and 
the firming up of ownership claims on the primordial subsoil and its future productive 
potential, the material pathways of the industry had to be rerouted. Only a month after the 
war started, oil production dropped to 50,000 b/d from 580,000 b/d, reaching as low as 
30,000 b/d by January 1968. Production was especially stalled in the Eastern Delta, in the 
area around Port Hartcourt. At the time, Shell-BP had build 300 miles of pipeline from its 
fields to its terminal at Bonny. The Western Delta was a more fringe producer. However, 
amid fears of rising sabotage, Shell decided to reroute their lines towards the west, 
expanding their fields around Escravos and increasing capacity of their terminal at 
Forcados to achieve a new 350,000 b/d. Gulf, which had exported its first shipment of oil 
from Ugborodo in 1965, similarly increased investments to its Western oil blocs near 
Escravos, building the tank farm and export terminal at its Ugborodo location to avoid 
fighting in the East.49 
As the war continued and the pipelines and wellheads multiplied, many living in 
the oil producing areas opted to cut a deal with the federal government, exchanging their 
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49 However, this is not to say that fighting did not take place in Warri. In fact, Gulf’s installations were 
bombed twice by a Swedish count, Carl Gustav von Rosen, as part of “guerrilla war in the air” against the 
Nigerian federal government in support of Biafra. His fighter planes, MF-1 Minicons and T-6 Harvards, 
attacked oil installations in Warri, Sapele, and Escravos. “You wait until January and you’ll see a big air 
circus open up,” he told a correspondent for the Guardian reporting on the war in November 1969. Yet, 
throughout the war, the area remained mostly in the control of the federal government and the oil 
infrastructure here faired better than older lines built to Port Hartcourt and Bonny. 
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support for the promise of being awarded territory for their own states.50 Following the 
Biafran surrender in January 1970, the federal government did carve out three new states 
to accommodate Niger Delta minorities that supported them: Rivers, Bendel (including 
Warri and Escravos) and Cross-Rivers. However, by this time the oil industry rested 
firmly within the grip of a centralized military government and these areas saw few 
anticipated benefits. Instead, the state consistently slashed returns to its new oil producing 
states. Allocation of oil revenues returning to oil producing states had been 100% before 
the war. By 1970, after the passing of the 1969 Petroleum Decrees placed the reins of 
control in the federal government it dropped to 50%. By the early 1990’s it reached as 
low as 1.5%. Yet, during this same period, production more than quadrupled (from 
500,000 b/d to 2.5 million): a boon not only for the state but its transnational partners. 
Nigeria’s oil was particularly desirable for its low sulfur content, making it cheap and 
easy to refine. As costs for enforcing industrial regulations were ignored without 
consequence and the value of the naira plummeted, Nigeria had become the cheapest site 
to produce a barrel of oil by 1996 (according to survey of Nigerian oil industry conducted 
by Arthur Anderson consultants—Frynas, 21). Although it contributed very little to the 
march towards war, by time of Biafra’s surrender oil had become a central object of the 
reunited national unity state. As General Gowon famously declared during an interview 
only a few months after the peace accords were signed, “The only problem Nigeria has is 
how to spend the money she has.” 
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50 It should be noted that the motivation here, again, was not really about a contest to control oil revenues. 
Many Niger Deltan communities (particularly around Port Hartcourt and other urban areas) were motivated 
by a desire to claim territory and holdings of Igbo businessmen who had dominated the commercial sector 
in the Niger Delta. Although the Biafran war certainly shapes the kinds of strategies and frameworks within 
which oil will later become a particular object of contestation in and of itself, during and immediately after 
the war, it was land, particularly control of burgeoning urban territories, that was of most concern. 
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It is between the end of the war and the early-1990s when oil had become the 
mainstay of the Nigerian economy, that management of the flows of oil began to shape it 
as a particular object of contestation. Unlike previous colonial eras where Deltan 
communities served as critical middlemen, under the hydrocarbon regime of an 
independent Nigeria profits were circumvented directly to the federal level. However, 
this was compounded by shifting geographies and the 1978 Land Use Act as the Niger 
Delta was being carved into a new set of territories in the rush to access oil fields. 
Villages became pipeline byways; wellheads were set up next to farms. Despite no longer 
owning mineral rights, when multinationals began extracting oil, they were still obligated 
to negotiate deals with local authorities for using their use of the surface land area. Under 
the Land Use Act of 1978, however, state governors became the titleholders of all land, 
which it supposedly held in trust for the people (Section 1) with the ability to revoke right 
of occupancy for public use, including “for mining purposes or oil pipelines” (Section 
28). As Frynas has pointed out, “in theory a governor could acquire an entire state and 
then assign it to a single company” (1997, 77). Shifting away from previous practices 
where they had to directly negotiate with communities for land rights to a compulsory 
land acquisition policy, companies had license to organize their extractive networks more 
freely. (Frynas, 1997, 80-100) Yet working to maximize surplus by working its profit 
streams through the marshes of the delta without sticky community negotiations, had 
unintended effects. 
Having compulsory land acquisition enshrined in the law, meant that companies 
were only legally bound to compensate communities for destruction caused by their 
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activities rather than for use of communal lands.51 Because the only way to access 
compensation monies was to establish some direct injury from or connection to 
production, proximity to the pipelines and installations being erected became quixotically 
desirable. A number of communities would rise up in the night, setting up a small camp 
and claiming it as a discrete community. They could then legally lodge claims with the 
corporations over the pollution or destruction to the forests in which they were 
operating.52 Some communities, like Egwa 1 and Egwa 2, even have names that match 
those given to the oil fields on which they live, a living trace of how the area was settled 
and developed around the perimeter of wellhead.  
Not that there wasn’t plenty of injury taking place in older and more well 
established communities. It is estimated that anywhere between 500,000 and 2 billion 
barrels of crude have spilled in the Niger Delta due to operational failure, poisoning 
farms and fishing waters and leading to destructive fires.53 Moreover, as certain 
communities rose up others were disappearing due to dredging exercises that were 
constantly being approved to expand waterways for barges hauling cargo and equipment 
deep into the mangrove. At Escravos, this caused major erosion, as the main river and its 
smaller tributaries grew from narrow passages into fields of water. As is evident from the 
women’s protest Temi describes at Madagho, the washing away of entire sections of 
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51 Moreover, the Land Use Act meant that no court had the jurisdiction to inquire into the adequacy of any 
amount paid in compensation. 
 
52 These satellite settlements growing along the pipeline emerged as a strategic practice to make claims on 
the space around extraction. As I describe in more depth in chapter 2, these settlements were still part of 
communal lands whose titleholders tended to reside in established towns and villages. However, since it 
was easier for corporations to ignore communal rights, the capitals of these communities were cut out of 
negotiations for land use.  
 
53 This disparity in the figures itself speaks to the limits in recording the amount of spills. And just what 
counts as spill and what counts as sabotage according to the company can have some dubious counting 
practices involved. See chapter 3 for a more in-depth explanation. 
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communities due to intense dredging and drilling is an ever-present threat. In addition to 
drilling, companies trying to shorten the travel time between oil fields and facilities have 
constructed canals that have caused saltwater to flow into fresh water zones, destroying 
fresh water ecological systems.54  
While interviewing some of the women involved in Shoreline protection protest 
which occupied Chevron’s pipeline site, one of the organizers, Mary, explained their 
motivation thus: 
We are suffering so let us find a way to reach where we can control the 
erosion. So many houses have gone. We built a lot of fine fine houses but 
everything is washed away. The only opportunity we have now to hold 
Chevron and federal government responsible is the pipeline that we can 
stop…all their things spoil if they do not give us a good answer, so we are 
going to hold the place. They will not work there…we believe that is the 
only way they will control the ocean for us. 
 
Far from a singular sentiment, she explains that this has been a tactic used by the 
community for many years to varying effect. This particular protest was elaborately 
planned. Over 200 women from the Itsetkiri communities all the way to Warri arrived, 
sleeping in the open for three days until Chevron and the governor’s office sent a 
representative. The group even hired a caterer from Warri to bring supplies and cook so 
as to keep the protestors fed while they stayed onsite. The language deployed here is 
familiar. As capital investment worked to overcome the swelter and maze of the 
swamplands at low cost, it also produced the Niger Delta as an ecological disaster area, 
mobilizing a popular politics against its activities. The occupation of company worksites 
to earn concessions for oil producing communities has been ongoing since the 1960’s, 
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54 Unlike more quickly unfolding disasters, like spills and fires, these processes which slowly deteriorate 
the lived environment are more difficult to take up with companies and the state and are rarely awarded 
compensation. 
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(although as I discuss in the following chapter, the explicit environmental discourse was 
introduced by the Ogoni activist Ken Saro Wiwa). The emerging language of community 
rights and infrastructural occupation to protest spills, erosion and pollution couples the 
mourning for a past that is not recoverable (such as disappearing burial sites) with 
demands to build a shoreline for the future (see Chapter 2 for more expanded discussion 
of rights). Thus, amid a flurry of legislation and shoddily executed goals, the oil 
infrastructure became an object not just of economic value production, but an instrument 
of political contestation.  
This activity alters the very presence and purpose of infrastructure. Oil 
infrastructures are designed and manufactured to service end users.55 The pipelines are 
designed to meet the needs of hydrocarbon consumers while the networks sustaining its 
operations are meant to meet the needs of producers and oil service workers. In other 
words, residents living in villages like those at Escravos have no formal role in the 
industrial workings of the infrastructure, only in the legal armatures that have grown up 
around it. Yet, as the women protestors’ accounts make clear, the design is at odds with 
outcomes in Nigeria where it has been reorganized and reconfigured both materially and 
institutionally, generating new narratives as, over the past fifty years, the spatial 
definitions of the industry have become materially messy and the infrastructure has taken 
on a signifying character of its own.  
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55 It is also interesting to note that oil pipelines evolved as a way to circumvent other infrastructures. They 
were initially built to compete with railway monopolies. In fact, the first long distance line was built in 
1879, the Tidalwater pipeline (although pipeline gather systems were first introduced in 1863 (Yergin, 17)) 
in Pennsylvania oil fields to circumvent Standard Oil’s stranglehold on transport. Caught up with 
movement and struggles to control or ruffle oil markets, ownership of pipelines proved crucial for keeping 
costs low (Yergin, 33, 381) 
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Unlike more urban areas of Nigeria, Escravos riverine communities never had 
access to state built roads or power grids. The pipelines therefore came to form one of the 
few architectural links between the Escravos communities, the company and the state. 
Generating pockets of modern amenities in remote swamplands, new markets and desires 
have been constructed along with production infrastructure. Companies hauled in 
generators or gas turbines to provide their worker camps and extraction sites with 24-
hour power. They covered pathways between oil fields with asphalt and brought tanks of 
clean and potable water for their workers, small-scale networks to support their work 
sites. As foreign and urban Nigerian workers arrived an influx of new commodities 
became available and in demand. Residents living around the oil fields still vividly recall 
tokens and favors they exchanged with oil workers, from coins, magazines, their first pair 
of jeans to a radio and metal and plastic building materials. Workers would drink in the 
evening, taking fresh peppe soup and palm wine while trying to seduce or be seduced by 
women from Ugborodo. In the wake of these transitory comings and goings, workers left 
behind a scattering of names and place names: John from Aberdeen, Cameron from 
Morgan City, Muhammad from Beirut, and a number of children born to Itsekiri women. 
A sign post erected at Ugborodo still lists the names of cosmopolitan destinations 
recording the distance (and direction) of these international visitors from Chevron’s site: 
Beijing 11,373 km, Amsterdam 3,197 km, Kiev, 5,519 km, Jakarta 11,340 km. 
Befriending boat captains, some Niger Deltans also entered into the international 
seaman’s trade themselves, mostly as deck hands. I met men who had spent their youth in 
the hull of a tanker travelling the world’s oceans only to return after getting caught ashore 




In the Niger Delta, because of the spidery history of extensive onshore 
production, pipelines, embedded in the soil, achieve an intimate character in the lives of 
people at Escravos. These stories about the oil industry, absorbing both the legal 
discourse of community rights voiced by activists and experiences of the industry that is 
part of the history, landscape and even the very name of “Escravos,” generate sometimes 
conflicting images, but nevertheless fill the space around it as they are told and retold. In 
part, I am thinking here with Kathleen Stewart’s employment of ‘thangs,’ used to 
designate events and their narrations, amidst the stripped down coal hills of Appalachia 
“in-filled” with the clutter of commodities, histories, fabulations, “a nervous system of 
signs and agencies” (Stewart, 1996, 56). However, this attention to the narrative and 
historical life of an economic infrastructure is also an effort to engage with what Brian 
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Larkin’s recent article has suggested of the affective dimension of infrastructure, point 
out how “roads and railways are not just technical objects then but also operate at the 
level of fantasy and desire. They encode the dreams of individuals and societies and are 
the vehicles whereby those fantasies are transmitted and made emotionally real.” (Larkin, 
2012, 333)  
However, the infrastructure itself sits alongside another kind of matter, the dirt 
from dredgers, the slicks from spills. The hard, steel pipelines sink into what Stuart 
Mclean has called, “intermediate states of matter,” which he suggests has often acted as 
the murky, dangerous material against which claims of reason and historical progress 
have been staked (Mclean, 2011). If large-scale infrastructures bear witness to certain 
promises of modernity, to both those whom it includes and those whom it excludes, then 
the loosening, soft ground around speaks to a particular lack. Thus, while voicing his 
frustration in preformed discourses about loss, Temi still looks at the EGTL lights 
twinkling across the expanding river and describes it as gold, beautified by the very 
things he identifies as missing in his own community, In Ugborodo, by contrast, the 
muddy and unprotected banks sliding each day further and further into the sea.  
Yet, against this desire for hard boundaries, the persistence of the mud and the 
blackened ground within the experience of residents does other work. It can also 
defamiliarize, agitate and unsettle representations that are usually associated with 
infrastructural projects. Amid the pervasive political frameworks fashioning the 
centralized power of the state and movements opposed to its control, the ways in which 
the soil and subsoil of the Niger Delta are engaged with suggests the projects with which 
they are bound-up are in fact more porous, difficult to decipher and open-ended. The 
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interplay of the mud and sand from the dredger with the hardness of the oil infrastructure 
renders a kind of alternative vision of materialism, less attached to a single set of actors 
and notion of progress. Ringed around the smooth surface of a seemingly innocuous 
pipeline, is instead the potential for imagining a more pliable capacity, a potential 
reassemblage of the narratives and practices connected to the work of building an oil 
infrastructure.56  
Forming the intimate geography of those in the riverine, few names are 
exchanged anymore. Working to contain, enclose and protect production facilities from 
community interference, the global security giant, Erinys, partnering with a West African 
company, Intels was hired to provide, “integrated logistics.” All of Chevron’s operations, 
including those at the EGTL plant have been closed, shut up behind the electrical fencing 
and reinforced and outfitted with cameras. The clients at the Different Inn sit across the 
creek, imagining life behind the sparkling lights, “the gold,” as they sip their beer. The 
idea of “Different” in the Different Inn, however, suggests statements like Temi express 
more than a desire to live inside the enclosure, but for a different kind of configuration, 
where the infrastructure retains a set of associations and traces that cannot be eradicated 
as new fences are built. Rather, the pipelines remain as a sign of exclusion but also, 
burrowing into the muddy banks mark a connection to the space around as a vital 




56 It is important to point out that this notion of ‘re-assemblage’ does not just apply to imaginaries among 
oil producing communities and community members. It is also part of the way that the oil industry itself 
operates, but working to anticipate and re-order its connections in view of shifting circumstances. I suggest 
as much below in describing the HDD line, which exemplifies how, in the aftermath of the amnesty, these 
efforts to re-configure the material, technical and personal connections became essential for engineers and 
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However, as erosion, drilling, and spilling dissolves the space of the riverine, the city was 
busy fortifying itself in hard, smooth planes of concrete. The villages and towns on the 
waterways through which the pipelines weave are linked materially and politically to 
urban worlds at Warri. In spite of the mobile telecommunication apparatuses and offshore 
rigs, companies required an extensive base camp. Shell and Chevron both have main 
offices, their own yards and jetties in Warri where they store equipment and house 
workers coming off their rotations. These structures have also been central to 
proliferating enclosures within the city at large.  
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In 1968 Shell’s Western Delta headquarters were moved to Warri from Ughelli in 
order to better access the river system through the port established there.57 The company 
built a five-acre camp not far from the Nigerian Port Authority (NPA), at Ogunu. The 
complex, unlike anything Warri had previously seen, was a gated garden, complete with 
neat rows of white washed split-level homes and grassy green lawns, a swimming pool, 
recreational center and even an 11-hole golf course for the exclusive use of Shell 
employees and their families. The Nigerian Oil Company, a newly formed and 
empowered entity, having joined OPEC in 1971, was working towards finalizing an 
indigenization policy (ultimately enforced in 1977) requiring foreign, multinational oil 
companies, to, among other things, employment for skilled staff force to Nigerians. 
Nigerian families now lived as neighbors with their Dutch and British co-workers. 
However, like the EGTL plant at Escravos the Shell enclave was internally segregated by 
nationality.58 The company instituted alternate “swim time” for Nigerians and for 
expatriates.59 A second all-Nigerian camp was erected at Edjeba along with a second 
recreational center to host the parties and events for Nigerians, so that the two social 
worlds could continue to exist separately. 
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57 The original headquarters was at Ughelli was only 40 miles away at the site of their first successful well 
Afiesere I, in 1958.  
 
58 As I discuss at length in chapter 4, this is something that has not changed much over time within the oil 
industry 
 
59 In fact, I was told by a number of former residents, who grew up at Shell’s Ogunu camp that growing 
tensions finally came to a head during an incident in 1986 when a number of Nigerian teenagers took to 
drag racing down the streets of the compound. One youth stopped short of hitting an inebriated Dutchman 
stumbling home from the company bar. The man began beating on the youth’s car, and then on the young 
man himself as he existed the vehicle to try and apologize. The young man, however, happened to be the 
son of a powerful military general. Rushing to the military barracks, to display his wounds to his father’s 
comrades, the military officers quickly set off for Shell’s housing complex, dragging the offending 
Dutchman to jail. The company was outraged but had to remain deferent to the military officers. 
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 Patience was born in Warri town by a waterside settlement at Ogbijoh market in 
1948. She describes how nearly all the structures she remembers from her childhood have 
been razed and built over, “probably more than once.” In 1973, as the oil prices were sky-
high, Patience married a man from Egarah who had studied in London and landed a job 
with Shell in Warri.60 Patience’s husband, among a new generation of Nigerian 
employees had earned a place as Head of Materials by the 1980’s after indigenization 
policy reforms forced out European holders of senior staff positions. But as she was his 
second wife, Patience was not allowed by Shell policy to live within the compound nor to 
receive any health care benefits offered to her husband and his first wife. Nevertheless, 
Patience, with her connections to wider Warri commercial sector began a business selling 
the one material that in Warri appeared in even higher demand than oil, cement.  
The government was awash in oil monies as prices skyrocketed during the 1973 
oil shocks. And coupled to Shell’s growing presence this meant a number of construction 
contracts and jobs, and the emergence of a small wealthy middle class in Warri. New 
industries abounded. The Warri Refinery was built with an aim to fuel national electric 
grids. In 1984, Gas plants were built to power Delta Steel and the old British railroad was 
renovated to move the materials to and from Nigeria’s Northern region. A dividing and 
hardening of the marshy town began, as streets and shelters were paved in the cheap and 
abundantly available chemical compound of hardening cement. The substance became 
associated with new housing compounds, built to accommodate expatriate engineers. 
Much like the Ogunu model, these complexes built cement walled enclosures with 
swimming pools, bars and recreational centers. Warri business owners able to get 
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60 The only way for Nigerians to get hired by oil companies as senior staff, even to work in Nigeria, in the 
1960’s and 70’s was to travel to London. 
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contracts, and government officials, rolling in oil money, used the same concrete to build 
large mansions; they became patrons of a rash of new cement churches, roads, hotels and 
nightclubs.61 In addition to money and equipment, Warri pidgin, it grew increasingly 
dynamic picking up phrases and slangs from American and European oil workers. Their 
curses began to creep into vocabularies, but often as mishearings. “Son of a bitch,” 
became “sana a beef,” “Mother fucker” became “Mofofo.” “Speaking broken,” as it is 
called, the sound English makes after shattering on the pavement, its fragments refracting 
against the hard surface that Warri had become. 
Patience became one of the main cement dealers in town. Her house is stuffed to 
the rafters with objects amassed over time during Warri’s boom years, where cement sold 
like hotcakes as the city was thrown into a frenzy of expansion. Her house remains a 
museum of this period, packed with ashoke and ashebi62 popular in the eighties and early-
nineties mixed with two broken TVs, radio clocks, engraved calabashes recording her 
children’s elaborate weddings, snow globes containing miniatures of New York City and 
Disney World where the water has long evaporated, commemorating a trip taken with her 
husband twenty five years ago. “We were the big people in this town,” she remarks 
recalling the events attended with her husband, dancing with dignitaries, “I had high-
heels and everyone would turn when they heard them click-clicking down the road.” 
Clubs and bars were filled with visitors from Benin City, Lagos and Port Hartcourt. 
Among the new emergent elite, she insists the city bent over backwards to accommodate 
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61 In 1999, Shell eventually updated the Warri flight options, building the Osubi airport. It is now operated 
in conjunction with Chevron and Agip. 
 
62 Popular textiles worn by Nigerian ladies for important events 
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Shell and its workers, “people used to say that when Shell sneezed, Warri would catch 
cold.” 
Perhaps the saying proved an ominous warning as these days, she laments, 
shaking her head, sitting in an oversized parlor, whose concrete walls crack a bit further 
every dry season, “Warri is known as the roughest place in Nigeria.” In the 1990’s Warri 
began to fill up with other visitors. Residents from Escravos and other riverine 
communities arrived here looking for work or shelter as their communities were 
swallowed by the sea while others, fleeing fighting between neighboring communities or 
between militants and the Nigerian military, set up shantytowns all along what had 
become the defunct Warri Port.63 Today the areas around Warri Waterside, from Pesu 
market to Ogbijoh, are populated by members of Ugborodo, Gbaramatu and other Ijaw 
and Itsetkiri riverine communities. Bars and shops vending shoes, cloth, bread and 
groundnuts form a maze across this expansive settlement crowding the flanks of the 
concrete embankments along the river, surrounding it is a hotbed of activity. Enormous 
wooden cargo boats loaded with water, fruit, bread and meats depart for local 
communities. Meanwhile young and old women from the villages steer their canoes to 
the waterside to collect money, buy garri and hawk their fish. These hard banks attest to 
both the mutually dependent nature of the city center and the remote oil fields and the 
mutual vulnerability between them as land dissolves around the latter and the former is 
tightly-packed beneath a cracking concrete shell. 
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63 Warri Port has been extensively renovated, however, over the past 7 years, as it renewal was part of 
Chevron’s contribution to the city hosting it. Although, it is worth noting that the EGTL project basically 
also necessitated a large operational port in Warri.  
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Ogbijoh Waterside (author’s photo) 
 
Packing cargo boat to Ugborodo from Warri Waterside (author’s photo) 
 
But this “hardening” city, like Patience’s concrete parlor, begins to show its 
cracks with time. Cities like Warri (and Port Hartcourt) became designated “oil cities”, 
seats of the growing power of the now nationalized petroleum industry in the 1970’s. Yet 
in the 1990’s the dissolution occurring in the remote oil fields began to overrun the power 
and control of the oil cities.64 The first battles of the Warri Wars, or, the Warri Crisis as it 
has become known, erupted in March 1997 at the waterside markets near Patience’s 
childhood home. Shots were fired on Warri waterside as Ijaws upset by the government’s 
decision to relocate the local government headquarters of Warri South West (the area that 
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64  I discuss in further detail in chapter 2 how this shift is also related to the devastation of the Nigerian 
economy under structural adjustment reforms. 
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includes the Escravos riverine) from an Ijaw territory to an Itsetkiri area. Under Nigeria’s 
three-tiered government system, Local Government Areas (LGA) are the third group, 
after the federal and state levels of governments. They are generally viewed as 
institutions that bring government and development closer to people, as their 
headquarters are built in local territories instead of state or federal capitals. During 
periods when the country has been a democracy, they are meant to serve as the political 
grassroots.  
However, the LGA system more often produces political frictions. Employing a 
practice of rule by cultural categories, this form of governing largely evolved from the 
system of Native Administration under British Indirect Rule wherein subject populations 
were ordered according to classified ethnic grouping (Frynas, 1997). The group who 
controls a Local Government Area receives funds directly from the state government. 
Therefore, the placement of Local Government Headquarters matters a great deal as it 
translates into power for a particular community. In addition to access to government 
funds, control of the LGA is associated with lucrative government and oil company 
contracts and employment opportunities (see chapter 2).  
Throughout “the crisis” as the Warri conflicts became known, commentators 
framed it as the resurfacing of an age-old ethnic rivalry, lingering from the early period of 
European contact.65 And yet, the issue that loomed large and lethal in 1997 had less to do 
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65 As I mentioned already, Itsekiri communities, located at the tip of the river, forged the first early trading 
links with the Portuguese, and Ijaws and Urhobo’s were often captured and sold. The Itsekiri’s had also 
been the main groups with whom the British signed trading treaties, and later, during the period of formal 
colonization, as their ties to European traders translated into increased access with British educational, 
religious and administrative systems, the Itsekiri’s assimilated to new power technologies and they were 
able to legitimize their land claims to the areas around the sea and to Warri town. Although oil is the 
indisputable catalyst for the Warri crisis, the question of “who owns Warri” has been a long and enduring 
battle (see Leton, 2006). 
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with lingering bitterness over the slave trade or colonial favoritism, but the displacement 
of large groups from the muddy riverine and the Nigerian government’s policy of 
distributing oil revenues from the center based on an ethnic geography.66  
No longer simply about the LGA location but about a larger sense of 
marginalization as wealth was accruing in elite estates in the city, fighting spilled over 
into the streets of Warri. Large mansions and other houses and markets were burned. Still 
today, all around the waterside, buildings remain marked in fading spray paint, “Isoko 
house” to indicate that these residents did not belong to the warring groups (nor any of 
the wealthy powerful ethnicities), in hopes that their homes would be spared from attack. 
After three months of fighting, the government sent in federal troops and peace 
negotiations were arranged and the LGA moved back to its original location at Ogbe-
Ijoh. Human Rights Watch estimates that around 200 youth were killed in the fighting 
and 200,000 barrels of oil a day were shut-in (HRW 2003, 5 and 1997, 111-4). Military 
presence in the region soared as the government deployed new detachments to safeguard 
the oil infrastructure, set up checkpoints for those moving in and out of Warri markets on 
the waterside and instituted a curfew from 6pm to 6am. All this, Rebecca Golden has 
written, perpetuated the emergence of the “tough boy fighter” of what became known as 
the “Waffi” boy, a pidgin term playing on “Warri” and “fierceness” that emerged 
following the 1997 fighting (Golden, 2012). “Our boys are hard,” explained Patience, as 
she describes how they have given Warri a reputation for ‘roughness.”  
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66 This is a practice redoubled in the dealing of transnational corporations parceling up the Niger Delta 
ethnic-territorial groupings patterned along the pathways cut by an expanding production infrastructure In 
Chapter 2, I will further elaborate this set of arrangements, and how, the oil infrastructure itself intersects 
with and reinforces divisions along ethnic-territorial lines 
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 Simply agreeing not to change the LGA site did little to stem future outbreaks. 
Violence in Warri continued sporadically, with major flare-ups following the 1999 
elections, and continuing to 2003 during the second Warri Crisis when eruptions between 
the Ijaw, Itsetkiri and Nigerian security forces were not simply directed at the city itself, 
but expanded back to the creeks. This time, increasingly organized militant groups set 
fire to Shell’s wellheads and flow stations, bringing the company’s extraction operations 
in the Escravos area to a complete halt. During this period oil companies also began 
shifting a number of staff and departs away from Warri, moving operations to (what was 
then) a relatively more secure Port Hartcourt67. Increasingly, investment was placed in 
offshore fields to decrease their vulnerability.  
Although fighting within the city limits has decreased since 2003, companies have 
not returned to full capacity. Rather, the opposite. Shell, deciding that clashes damaging 
its onshore infrastructure were now generating unmanageable risks, initiated a plan to 
withdrawal from Delta state, selling off its onshore assets, piecemeal, and leaving unpaid 
bills for local contractors and unfinished development contracts for local communities. 
Officials I spoke with at the time denied this, saying only that they were “reducing their 
footprint,” but they were secretly selling off the fields and infrastructure. Patience opens 
her books and shakes her head and makes that distinctive disappointed clicking sound at 
the back of her throat. She points out the slow pace of sales from her cement inventory. 
When I ask her about the Shell she replies, “what do they say? once beaten twice shy, I 
don’t think they are going to come back…It’s over ten years now nobody has recovered 
from that crisis. We are just managing and managing like that.” By 2012, Shell had fully 
divested from all holdings in the western delta, including its once grassy Ogunu and 
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67 By 2006 Port Hartcourt had grown just as volatile, if not more, than Warri 
! 88!
Ejeba68 staff camp.69 Warri, once known as “Shell town,” was now just a shell of 
concrete, with the cracks on its once busy streets and middle class housing compounds 
growing wider every year.  
Fresh cement continues to be poured in some places. Chevron’s headquarters at 
Prodeco camp has expanded to accommodate new contractors and workers as it struggles 
to finish work on the EGTL project. However, their housing, unlike the ones built by 
Shell in the late 60’s and early 70’s, signals the new era of off-shoring even onshore 
areas. These are not family friendly housing, but mostly 1-room apartments where 
workers rotate out on their hitches at the EGTL plant. Few Chevron workers have ever 
stepped foot on any part of Nigeria not walled in. They are instead shipped from the 
airport to the company bus, to the company compound and either by seaplane to their 
worksite or by bus across the road to their main offices, moving neither on the Delta’s 





In the aftermath of the amnesty, repairs to and re-imaginings of the technical and 
material life of the oil infrastructures, oil cities and oil producing communities (turned to 
rubble during the fighting) became a major focus. Interested in how the EGTL plant was 
remodeling previous oil infrastructures and their socio-political worlds at this time, I 
followed a Nigerian service contractor, Fenog, hired to build and replace a number of 
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68 These bought by Pan Ocean 
 
69 This divestment and offshoring away from conventional models does not mean the end of onshore 
production, on the contrary, numerous Nigerians and smaller international companies are now taking these 
sites over, initiating a new era of extraction in the Western Delta which it is too early to comment on. 
However, I will touch on it a bit later in chapter 4, as it has quite a lot to with the history of subcontracting. 
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new gas and oil lines for Chevron around the Escravos area. I accompanied them to the 
villages of the Ijaw Gbaramatu Kingdom, only 5 miles up river from the Different Inn 
and EGTL sites, and spreading northeastward up the Escravos and Warri Rivers towards 
the city of Warri.70 Unlike transnational workers, around 200 of Fenog employees were 
lodged throughout these villages (as part of an arrangement with community leaders) in 
guesthouses so as to more easily (and cheaply) access work sites.  
Gbaramatu produces about 400,000 bpd of oil and is traversed by numerous 
pipeline byways. Unlike its Itsekiri neighbors at Ugborodo and Madagho who traded 
extensively with Europeans, Ijaw communities were branded in the colonial archive as 
“pirates,” and “ruffians,” as small bands of raiders resistant to early British rule (Ikime, 
1969; Jones, 1963). Gbaramatu in particular, refused to install any “traditional” Pereship 
under British Indirect Rule System after 1924.71 Still wary of state approved cultural 
rulers, they did not appoint one until 1976.  
In what was considered a “peace time,” Fenog’s task, to reconstruct and reroute 
older pipeline byways connecting to the EGTL plant and Tank farm, involved a massive 
technical re-assemblage of the Escravos area. Fenog was sweeping up contracts in the 
industry after having recently acquired a Horizontal Directional Drilling (HDD) rig. 
Perhaps nothing so perfectly embodied the new objectives and needs of corporations 
operating in Nigeria as the Horizontal Directional Drilling technology. It was purchased 
from Prime Drilling, a German company along with a team of German technicians sent 
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70 Gbaramatu is a large kingdom in the area, with 65,000 people (1991 census) and more than 50 
communities. Although only 9 communities are officially gazetted by the government: Oporoza, 
Kunukunuama, Kokodiagbene, Binikurukuru (black snake), Okerenkoko, Aja-ama, Goba, Inikorogha 
 
71 Of course, the British went ahead and appointed individuals to their own constructed warrant chief 
system but they were never recognized by the community. 
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along with the machine to train Fenog’s 100% Nigerian workers on the new technology. 
The PD 500 HDD apparatus can lay pipelines at a depth of 60 meters for up to four 
kilometers, as opposed to conventional trench digging techniques burying the pipeline a 
mere 1 meter below the surface. Designed to more securely smooth passage of oil from 
ground to market, Horizontal Direct Drilling was sold by Fenog to its customers, 
Chevron (and also Shell), as rendering interruptions by communities, armed activists and 
oil thieves obsolete, or, as their website puts it: “innovative solutions to deliver cost 
effective solutions.”  
 
Fenog Pipeline Map (author’s photo)  
However ideally the technology was packaged, its implementation highlighted the 
lingering difficulties from decades of previous extractive ventures and the more recent 
spate of conflicts that had erupted in Warri and around the pipeline sites. Snags and 
interruptions during its building were a weekly occurrence. Sometime a steel pipeline 
joint was too weak or a crossing had to be redesigned and re-welded because of 
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unforeseen interference, most commonly due to another company’s pipeline in its path.72 
They also had to contend with community protests (not unlike the women’s protest at 
Madagho) and a number of brief and partial worker strikes.73 As is common practice in 
the Niger Delta, to limit and manage the complications of human interference, Fenog 
hired a few Nigerian soldiers74 to secure their workspace. However, perhaps the most 
unusual work stoppage took place six months into a job when one of these soldiers lost 
his service weapon. The event occurred during the interrogation of a boat driver over his 
involvement in selling the company’s fuel toppings on the black market. Like all its 
contracts, Fenog worked on a milestone basis—meaning that it only received funds after 
achieving a certain amount of progress. Towards the end of each milestone, pressure was 
on to stay under budget, and so when the safety/logistics manager suspected this 
particular boat driver was skimming off the top, he stopped and interrogated him. The 
questioning took place on the shore by the worksite at lunchtime. Outraged at the 
accusation, the driver shouted that he was being suspected because he was from 
Gbaramatu. Vehemently denying the charges, he then attempted to return to his boat in 
anger and drive away. The soldier on site that day ran to prevent his escape and the two 
ended up in a tussle during which the soldier’s gun slipped from his shoulder. With the 
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72 As I highlight in the following chapters, the staff in charge of the project often have quite a bit of leeway 
to deal with problems that arise during construction. I was often surprised at how, despite having a very 
clearly worked out design and set of measurements for building the pipeline, Fenog had no available map 
of where other companies had constructed their pipelines.  
 
73 I spent six month with Fenog and in that period three partial strikes occurred and many more were 
threatened. While the longest lasted two days and the shortest a few hours in the morning they were all 
related to shoddy conditions. Fenog operated under reduced safety conditions, their pay was often delayed 
and workers hired from the community continually clashed with Nigerian workers coming from other parts 
of Nigeria (as is evident in the story about the gun). These cases will be elaborated in chapter 4.  
 
74 The practice of hiring out soldiers as a private security force to multinationals is both legal and quite 
common in Nigeria where foreign private security firms are banned from carrying arms. 
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heavy steel barrel plunging fast, the weapon disappeared into the river. The startled 
soldier relinquished and the driver sped off in his boat. 
The loss of the soldier’s gun nearly brought the workday to a standstill as workers 
and nearby residents hovered around the banks. The gun is indelibly linked for most 
Niger Delta residents (and oil workers) to the region’s volatile history. In particular, the 
AK-47 or Kalashi, as it is called by Niger Deltans, became a permanent fixture in the 
Delta when peaceful protests and oil worker strikes escalated in the 1990’s. The 
government, at the behest of transnational organizations, deployed its military to guard 
the oil installations rather than to ensure the safety of its citizens (Watts, 1997; Saro-
Wiwa, 1992). Over the next decade, the Niger Delta became a ripe market for weapons 
being recycled at the end of the West African wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone. As the 
nation returned to a democratic electoral government in 1999 local politicians began 
arming youth to steal elections (Ifeka, 2005; Pratten, 2009). Peaceful protests turned to 
armed conflicts, as delta youth began to acquire guns of their own as was evident during 
the Warri Crisis.  
What had begun in Warri in 1997 as an isolate, armed dispute over a particular 
decision by the government, by 2005 had been declared an “all out war” by organized 
militias on the entire Nigerian governing regime and the oil companies who supported it. 
In 2005, Gbaramatu became the headquarters and staging ground for the armed social 
movement, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). The group 
kidnapped oil workers for ransom and attacked critical pipelines and export terminals to 
draw attention to their plight in a well-crafted public persona, designed to engage the 
attention and imagination of the state and international press. Militants posed for the 
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cameras of visiting journalists, bedecked in rounds of ammunition. Collapsing the 
material and symbolic, the pipelines with economy, MEND framed its efforts as 
threatening to “crumble the economy” if the Nigerian state did not recognize their rights 
to manage the subsoil resources whose extraction had destroyed and marginalized their 
communities. During this time assaults on the infrastructure and workers caused the low 
cost production forecasts throughout the 1990’s to rise suddenly. Even the deep offshore 
rigs sustained raids from militants. The government launched counter-attacks on villages 
trying to dissuade support for militant groups. Communities like Okerenkoko, Kurutie 
and Oporoza that had, for years, “hosted” the oil business were turned to rubble as 
residents fled to Warri.  
The amnesty agreement finally, if reluctantly, signed in October 2009 set the 
conditions for a fragile peace and oil companies soon returned to the delta to repair and 
restart operations. Under the terms of the agreement, however, arms underwent another 
symbolic reversal, as the rifles, grenades and rocket launchers militants acquired became 
exchangeable, for government sponsored training sessions. Images of militants armed to 
the teeth were now replaced with the spectacle of hundreds of ammunitions laid out in 
long rows as government spokesmen lauded the President and Governors for bringing 
peace to the troubled region. Thus, in accepting amnesty, not only did militants recognize 
(to put it in Weberian terms) the state’s legitimacy to a monopoly on violence but they 
also agreed to be recognized themselves as requiring the state’s forgiveness. They 
became popularly known now not merely as ex-militants, but as “repentant militants.”   
After the amnesty Nigerian soldiers took up residence in former militant camps, 
set up checkpoints along the river ways where Shell and Chevron production was coming 
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back online. The creeks remain uneasy, a peace not fully trusted. Travelling with former 
MEND members through the waterways in December 2010, we were stopped at one of 
the new checkpoints where the soldiers, joking with the group, nudged them for a dash 
that they were compelled to give. As we departed the group of former militants shouted, 
“It is we! It is MEND!” punching their fists in the air, all in unison, a sign used to 
frighten soldiers during the fighting period (2005-9).  
However, for a Nigerian soldier to lose a gun is a serious matter. Not only will he 
have to come up with money to replace it, but he will undergo what is rumored to be a 
brutal punishment/interrogation process. Therefore, to retrieve the soldier’s gun, Fenog 
recruited divers from a nearby community where residents frequented the watery depths 
to pitch poles and set crayfish traps. Since the river remains a mainstay of social life, it is 
not surprising that while the crowd watched, the search for a lost service weapon on the 
bottom of the river led to stories of other disappearances and reappearances. An older 
man among a gathering crowd of onlookers described making a small trade collecting 
18th and 19th century Dutch gin bottles from the riverbed and hawking them to British and 
American oil workers in the 1980’s. The green and amber hand blown bottles that had 
been popular trade goods still littered the riverbeds as the detritus of old global 
commodity empires. During expansions here in the early 90’s, Dutch dredgers pulled up 
large quantities of these bottles in their tow. They were picked out of clogged gears by 
the dozens, flooding the local souvenir business (admittedly rather small to begin with) 
and crashing it. Some bottles can be found on ebay for around $35, with captions like, 
“found in the Niger Delta,” and “own a piece of world history.”  
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Years of dredging, compounded by decades of oil spills had also turned the 
riverbed to muddy silt making it difficult for the unequipped divers to scour the river 
bottom. By the time it was dark the gun had still not been recovered. The next morning 
the soldier’s movements had slowed to the pace of a snail, his lower lip nearly bleeding 
from being gnawed on. The project manager sent word to a deep-water diver who had 
recently returned to the community from training in Lagos as part of his amnesty 
rehabilitation. Finding no work in spite of a shiny new international diving certificate and 
a worn pair goggles he had returned, like many others with little to show for his new 
skills acquisition.  
Agreeing to help for a small fee, after only an hour of searching, the diver 
motioned the soldier to come. In the deepest part of the river, the diver explained, he had 
met the person who was holding the soldier’s gun. The soldier’s eyes widened as the 
diver described how under the water he had met a yellow lady. In her arms was the 
soldier’s gun. But as he approached she began shouting complaints about the soldier’s 
disrespectable behavior. “Seriously complaining-O,” he added for emphasis as the project 
manager sauntered over. Sightings of water spirits, who have the appearance of people or 
sometimes human/fish hybrids, are known in Ijawland as bini orumo. They reside in 
underwater towns—watery versos of their terrestrial counterparts. According to Martha 
Anderson, these light skinned beings with flowing hair and associated with wealth from 
the sea most likely appeared with the arrival of Portuguese and Dutch traders (Anderson, 
2005). Similar to a Mami Water figure, a pan-African aquatic spirit, the bini orumo could 
promise great wealth but also great danger. A bit of a trickster, one of the stories I heard 
during fieldwork was that when Gulf first tried to erect its terminal at Escravos in 1968, it 
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had to employ a “juju man” to rid the company of meddlesome water spirits. The 
structure, the story goes, kept collapsing. But the juju man, blowing alligator peppe into a 
pot, quickly divined the source of disruption, went to the waterside and captured the 
culprit, a tiny mermaid, in an empty bottle of coca-cola.  
However, it was said that these days most bini orumo and mermaids had been 
driven away by the rumble of drills, the sweep of the dredger and the prayers of Christian 
converts. Yet there she was, meddlesome as ever, hijacking the steel gun authorized by 
state and corporate forces defending the pipeline and holding it for ransom on the 
riverbed, a liminal space between regimes of past, present and future value.  
The soldier came from the arid regions of northern Nigeria. Although unused to 
mermaids, he seemed to take the attitude of the spirit quite seriously, begging the diver to 
persuade the lady to relinquish the firearm. The diver promptly replied that the complaint 
had to do with a woman in the Gbaramatu community whom the soldier had offended. He 
suggested that the soldier think about his time there, find the woman who he had wronged 
and make amends with her. Only then, would the lady release the gun. After a few 
minutes of silence, the soldier jumped to his feet and pulled out his cell phone as we all 
listened to an arrangement made with someone addressed as “Madam,” to meet later that 
evening when his patrol finished. Satisfied, the diver ducked once more below the surface 
and brought up the gun. The soldier, beside himself with joy clasped the still muddy 
assault riffle to his chest then tipped it down to empty water from the steel barrel before 
pointing it at the sky. Two sharp shots rang out across the creeks as the soldier, barely 
able to contain himself, thanked the diver and burst into tears. 
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There was much speculation, over the next few days as to whom had been the 
object of the soldier’s disrespect and in what way he made his amends. The humorous 
dimension of the event was particularly stressed as those who had been on the scene 
amused others by performing exaggerations of the soldier’s anxious state and lauding the 
heroic efforts of the diver who had not only rescued the weapon from the watery environs 
but had placed a Nigerian soldier, who for years sauntered carelessly through the 
community, their AK’s poised lazily upon their shoulders, crassly wooing young women, 
in a position to account for his misdeeds. In a community whose repertoires of protest 
and contestation after the amnesty were being thwarted by the barricading and burying of 
the oil infrastructure beyond their grasp, the gun, an integral part of order in the oil fields, 
is transformed into an instrument for enforcing an unmet obligation.  
At the same time, this hard steel thing, held together by pins and rivets (a circular 
barrel echoing that of pipelines) disappearing into the murk made of the river, points to 
increasingly uncertain borders these enclaving technologies are supposedly erecting and 
hardening between inside and outside, past and present. These diversions through the 
residue and sediment of materials, bottles, and yellow underwater towns nearly razed by 
the rumble of the dredger link the present with the past and future of global commodity 
networks that have shaped the landscape. If, in the hydrocarbon era, the middlemen of the 
slaves and palm oil markets disappeared, these communities work to make themselves 
central to the infrastructure. For state and transnational operators working to bring 
production flows back online, the disappearance of the gun points rather ominously to the 
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gaps and holes that were only growing wider with each new effort to enclose and isolate 
the infrastructure from the surrounding area.75  
 
Unmaking Escravos: 
The Niger Delta oil fields are less an example of a failure to enclose the extractive 
enclave (as is so often described) as it is a striking manifestation of the irreconcilable 
contradictions that allow for any such enclave to exist. When recalling Chevron’s “The 
Cultures and Traditions of the Escravos Riverine” project I think of Abdelrahman 
Munif’s Cities of Salt. Jacob’s vision for the document strikes me as an inversion of 
Munif’s novel, whose volumes excise exact markers of place and ‘culture,’ but instead 
provide a texturized account of the built worlds growing, stretching and being broken 
apart as the American oil company bulldozes the Wadi, pours concrete roads, erects 
camps around which a city grows and spreads and divides, a transformation of an entire 
landscape from the desert to the sea. Jacob’s book and its map by contrast hangs like a 
limp casing, no bones, no flesh. I have tried here to present how the sealed off gates of 
the EGTL complex, the devastation of Warri as companies pull out, only demonstrate 
how deeply knit within the larger social and material worlds these infrastructures have 
become. However, at the same time, this history is being reconfigured, transformed as the 
earth is pushed, disintegrated, and hollowed out by steel tubes. 
These technical processes create a historical residue, perhaps even a 
sedimentation in time and space (Foucault, 1969). Yet they also offer a set of movable 
parts, bodies, pipes and oil, a kind of rationalized assemblage which can be constantly 
dis-assembled and re-assembled, like a modulate oil rig. The narrative life taking shape 
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75 And as I elaborate further in Chapter 3, it is no coincidence that by the time Fenog’s supposedly 
unbreachable pipeline was finished, oil theft in the area had sky-rocketed. 
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around these spaces also forms a patchwork of sorts, through which these connections are 
worked on, either to sever or to maintain a connection to the past. The word “Escravos,” 
lifted from the West Africa coastal slave trade becomes the name used in Chevron’s 
publications, asset listings, and SEC filings promoting its new gas project. It comes to 
designate a space on a map within which communities become lumped together as hosts, 
as if they too only exist in relation to the EGTL project. “Escravos” still creates an echo, 
of the history of long enduring entanglements of the West African Coast with multiple 
forms of capital, whose traces remain present as the infrastructural space is reconfigured 
over and over again. Yet these shifts and reassembling processes within the technical and 
material worlds after the amnesty have wider implications for the institutions, practices 
and political dynamics in Nigeria’s oil industry. In the following chapters I therefore 
consider how following the practices connected with the oil infrastructure become part 
and parcel of the social worlds in the Niger Delta: the meaning of community, concepts 











Chapter 2: Oil Community 
 
 
Oil is for sweet, awoof no get bone 
     --Soyinka, Opera Wonyosi76 
 
 
In October 2010, Nigeria’s 50th anniversary as an independent nation, its Golden Jubilee, 
was celebrated with great fanfare. Shell’s headquarters at Ogunu was no exception. 
Enormous tents were pitched in the parking lot, a series of dances performed by the 
company’s Delta State host communities were provided along with a comedy routine 
from one of Warri’s famous homegrown comedians. Presiding over events, Tony Attah, 
the General Manager of Shell Petroleum Development Company took the stage. He 
opened his speech by commenting on Nigeria’s rise in terms of its great technological 
progress. Fifty years ago at independence, he explained, only a few Nigerians owned a 
gramophone, but by now millions of Nigerians have GSM phones, an unarguable sign he 
suggested, of progress towards “a brighter future.” These accomplishments, according to 
Mr. Attah, bespoke of a felicitous relationship between the nation and its transnational 
operators. By way of example he recounted in brief the history of how an independent 
Nigeria gathered strength as the presence of Shell’s infrastructure expanded in Nigeria, 
from the first oil strike at Oloibiri in 1956, to the discovery of the massive offshore 
Bonga field in 1995. Highlighting Shell’s overwhelming support during the country’s 
transition to democracy in 1999, he explained that the two are now more than financial 
partners, they are both dually committed to upholding principles of “good governance.”  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
76 ‘awoof’ is a pidgin term for “freebies” or “jackpot”. Coupled with ‘no get bone,’ it means that one can 
get something for nothing. Literally, the phrase references the difficulty one has gnawing meat off the bone 
compared with the ease of receiving an already prepared juicy slice. Oil is a sweet life because it brings 
wealth without work. Soyinka, however, uses the phrase in an ironic tone. The poem, Opera Wonyosi, an 
adaptation of Brecht’s Three Penny Opera, is about Biafra, the horrors of war and the violence 
undergirding such sweet promises. 
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In the effort to link the progress of national democratic development to the 
expanding oil fields and profit margins of Shell in Nigeria, the General Manager 
conveniently skipped over the more unsavory intimacies of the company and 
government, such as Shell’s policy equally supportive of a series of military 
dictatorships. Sanitized historical narratives and ironies, however, were in abundance 
during the Jubilee celebration. The Nigerian government itself handed out Distinguished 
Nigerians Awards to three former military rulers, two of whom were praised for “keeping 
Nigeria one” in an elaborate televised ceremony. Yet the Shell Petroleum Development 
Company (SPDC) was happy to marshal evidence for its claims.77 Much like his 
colleague, during a lecture in Abuja on the Jubilee anniversary, the Managing Director of 
Shell in Nigeria drew parallels between Shell’s investment in both Niger Delta petroleum 
and human infrastructures. He explained that the company has already provided 57.7 
million dollars directly to development operations within communities just that year: 
“The poor are those without a voice. And they need help. In Nigeria, the government 
cannot provide all the help on its own. SPDC knows this and that’s why we place great 
importance on making a difference in the environment in which we operate.”78  
For the past 20 years Nigeria has perhaps offered one of the most well publicized 
accounts of repressive state violence and corruption in the oil fields, complete with 
sustained oppositional movements whose actions directly target transnational oil 
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77 I attended three other large SPDC events in 2010, including the retirement of the former VP of Security 
OJ Agbarah and former Managing Director, Basil Omiyi as well as an inauguration event for Mutiu. 
Perhaps because it was the jubilee year, at nearly every event some figurehead from the company gave a 
similar speech regaling the successes of a joint industry-state alliance which has allowed for the flourishing 
of a now democratic Nigeria, without, remarkably, any hint of irony, and only occasional references to 





infrastructures, leveling pointed accusations at corporations like Shell for thwarting 
development and political fair play. The Jubilee celebrations in Abuja were themselves 
interrupted by a bomb blast linked to Niger Deltan militias. And yet, these declarations 
by corporate executives are not simply a sleight of hand (although a fair amount of this 
occurs as well). They also reference recent attempts to renew and reframe relationships 
around operations, envisioned now as a collaborative, multilateral commitment to 
development under the rubrics of democracy and good governance as Nigeria emerges 
from under years of military rule.   
This has largely consisted of making ever-larger displays of their generosity in the 
form of corporate social responsibility programs. Revamping older corporate gifting 
programs, companies like Shell and Chevron have promoted an assortment of what are 
titled “new” interventions, ranging from mindset change workshops, microcredit loans 
and leadership and job trainings. They claim to foster an extensive development 
infrastructure within which the investment capital and technological sophistication of 
extractive projects can be made to work for the benefit of the wider political landscape in 
Nigeria’s reclaimed democracy. Yet, the somewhat awkward performances given at 
Jubilee celebrations, rewriting a history of exclusions as one of inclusion, provide an apt 
departure point for considering the role played by the widening application of these 
corporate sponsored development initiatives in representations of the “oil state”—
particularly as they have forged essential links between state institutions, the 
organizations for managing production, and the political mobility of oil producing 
communities in the Niger Delta. 
In the previous chapter I explored the imbrications of material worlds as oil 
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operations have taken up residence in the creeks of the Niger Delta. However, expanding 
steel pipelines to bring oil to market, the oil industry has also had to buttress itself with a 
host of shifting institutional arrangements and channels. In this chapter, I examine how 
these arrangements are domesticated by the arsenal of community liaison programs 
promoting good governance and development initiatives, drawing attention to the 




At the time of the Jubilee festivities, amid speeches on their valuable partnership 
with government, Shell was holding a not-so-secret fire sale, its onshore assets being 
hawked to the highest bidder. Despite representatives claiming that the company was 
only modestly trying to reduce its footprint, Shell’s community liaison offices had been 
besieged of late with frustrated oil host community leaders and subcontractors trying to 
sound out their fate. Among this group were a number of chiefs from Shell’s oil 
producing communities in Delta State who now congregated at their own table at the 
Ogunu Jubilee celebrations. Attending the event as the guest of one of these chiefs I was 
seated alongside them. The men, some in their late 40’s and others quite elderly had 
arrived decked out in their finest regalia, feathered hats, coral beads and long lace 
brocade. One chief wore white alligator cowboy boots purchased during a trip to 
Houston. The rich attire stood out from the company men in their grey and blue suits. 
Making the rounds after his speech, the General Manager greeted the chiefs and 
introduced two British executives visiting from Shell’s headquarters in London. 
“Welcome to Nigeria,” they exclaimed nearly in unison, all smiles. After a round of 
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introductions, the chiefs insisted on performing a kola presentation with the General 
Manager and the British executives, to provide them a proper Niger Delta greeting. Kola, 
a red and yellow nut seed, consumed mainly for its caffeinating qualities is ceremonially 
broken and shared (in communities across Nigeria) on occasions of marriage, birth, and 
death and while settling a dispute.79 But it can also be used to welcome guests and is 
commonly performed in the Niger Delta during important meetings. “He who brings the 
kola nut brings life,” exclaimed the chief with the cowboy boots as he produced from 
under his robes a perfectly unbroken kola.  
Providing kola, they explained, is essential, however, someone must also provide 
“a wedge” a folded stack of cash, as it is often put, “to stop the kola from rolling round 
the plate.”80 At first, gently pointing out that since they have provided the kola, the 
General Manager and his visitors must make the wedge, the chiefs became loudly 
disappointed when they saw only a few thousand naira had been placed on the plate. “Ah-
ah, don’t you know, we are the big chiefs in this Niger Delta, we are the owners of the 
community, big chief takes big money.” The General Manager, for whom this was not 
the first kola ceremony with community chiefs, dug back into his pocket, nodding at the 
uncertain foreigners to do the same as they fumbled awkwardly with the unfamiliar 
currency. With the plate now piled so high with 1000 naira notes that the kola could no 
longer be seen, let alone roll around, the presentation referred to by the chiefs as, “the 
lesson,” commenced. Speaking in his own dialect, the most senior began by praying for 
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79 Kola ceremonies are particularly common in the Delta and Eastern regions. Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall 
apart portrays the kola nut ceremony in chapter 3, beginning the meeting for a discussion about settling a 
debt. 
 
80 I was often told that if kola cannot be found it can also be substituted with cash. The use of cash with 
kola presentations I saw in Delta State were nearly compulsory, even if done with only 20 naira. While 
Kola rituals are common across Nigeria, I cannot speak to whether the requirement of cash is the same, nor 
when the cash substitute and wedge appeared, although this would be interesting to know. 
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the other chiefs. The kola was then broken, and turning to the British visitors he 
explained that he would provide them with a prayer in English, adding, “the one that 
children will understand.” To the foreign executives he prayed that god keep them safe, 
that kidnappers should be blind to them while they achieve the goals of their business 
plans. Turning to the General Manager he prayed that his appointment be blessed with 
clear sight, that he knows who are his friends and who are his enemies. After the prayer, 
the company men ventured a polite bite of the bitter kola, thanked the chief’s for their 
great hospitality, shook hands and moved off to the next table, leaving the cash to be 
divvied up among the self-described “owners of community.”  
On the one hand, the ritual appears to reproduce for a moment the kinds of 
backdoor dealings Nigeria is infamous for: from the ‘dashing’81 of money to community 
leaders to the high profile bribery scandals involving corporations like Halliburton 
exchanging nylon bags stuffed with cash to obtain major contracts from the state. On the 
other hand, the theatrics used during the fleecing of British Shell executives on 
Independence Day, laden with entitlements based on cultural categories, claims of 
ownership and patronizing language, is also important here. It offers a deeply coded 
exchange wherein can be read the history of the less publicized structures and systems 
through which the oil industry has extended its influence by positioning itself in-between 
the state and its oil producing creeks, where claims to cultural authority and establishing 
the authenticity of ‘community’ have played a large role.  
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81 See chapter 1 for explanation. The dash is essentially thought of as a ‘free gift’ but one that is placed on 
top of a more structured exchange, ie. a little extra on top, as a sign of respect. One might even be tempted 
to it liken to Mauss’s discussion of the hau. Although occurring within the confines of an already defined 
and calculated exchange, the dash (an old mercantile convention) poses as disinterested good will, but is 
given in an effort to establish an ongoing relationship and commitment.  
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Yet the kola sharing ceremony performed offstage, in the wings, with chiefs (most 
of whom have already been recipients of some of Shells 57.7 million in development 
funds) can be seen to converge with the claims made by the General Manager during his 
center stage performance of SPDC’s history. Over the years, the millions poured into 
successive corporate social responsibility programs has generated new partnerships 
between traditional authorities, government and civil society organizations, offering 
interwoven modes of social belonging and becoming part and parcel of efforts to produce 
particular political subjects. At the same time, these interventionist programs contribute 
to social dissolution and regional violence, and often lead to outcomes that have made it 
more rather than less difficult for oil companies to operate.  
While much has been written on how and why corporate social responsibility 
programs fail, here I am interested in following an opposite line of questioning. Why, for 
instance, do such programs continue to grow and spread in spite of the fact that they have 
not achieved their goals? And what emerges from successive efforts by corporate bodies 
to renew them, particularly as domesticating oil infrastructure building has become 
branded as a form of local capacity building in Nigeria? This chapter works towards two 
purposes: 1) to argue for the relevance of these often overlooked corporate gifting 
practices, and 2) to use ethnography to account not only for the matrices and conventions 
in which such practices are established but also to view the misrecognitions and slippages 
taking place within the work to reconfigure people and things in the oil fields under the 






Virtues, Vices and Value 
As Timothy Mitchell has written, “the transformation of oil into large and 
unaccountable government incomes is not a cause of the problem of democracy and oil, 
but the outcome of particular ways of engineering political relations out of flows of 
energy.” (2011, 8) For Mitchell, democracy and oil are technopolitical bedfellows, the 
representation of the former as a western rational concept and the latter as a catalyst for 
irrational economic behavior, is the work of both material and physical qualities, multiple 
interests, and calculative instruments. His point underscores the way that the bulk of 
literature and expertise on oil, has insisted on the seeming anathema between the oil 
producing states in the global south and democracy. Such conclusions have served well 
the interests of transnational companies, more than happy to shift blame to the political 
weaknesses of their host governments as a way of exonerating themselves from any 
accusations of abuse. At the same time, however, applying labels like “oil curse” to sum 
up the political of entire nations has not prevented western organizations (from the 
American military to host of development groups) from persistent efforts to “import 
democracy” into oil producing states as Mitchell himself points out in the Middle East. 
While I take a rather restricted view of these practices, neither quite delving into the 
concept of ‘democracy’ itself82, nor making claims regarding the extent to which 
Nigeria’s democracy conforms or deviates from any ideal, I am taken by Mitchell’s 
opening anecdote in Carbon Democracy, featuring the appearance of the “democracy 
expert” in Iraq arriving to deliver the nation’s democracy via power point presentation at 
a local government council meeting in 2003. “I have met you before.” he explains “I have 
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82 Although, I would be interested in pursuing such a line in a later iteration of this work, for now, I wish 
simply to concentrate on the forms of NGO and development programs operating in the Niger Delta under 
the stated interest of helping Niger Deltan subjects to be good democratic political subjects. 
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met you in Cambodia. I have met you in Russia. I have met you in Nigeria” (Mitchell, 
2011, 2).83 It is not so much the mention of Nigeria that catches my attention but the 
familiarity of such a gathering, in which an already packaged ideal for a country’s 
government and citizenship is delivered by an outside consultant, as a kind of “carbon 
copy” (Mitchell, 2011, 3).  
In perhaps a less championing style, community members, leaders and politicians 
from Nigeria’s oil producing communities have been ushered into halls and classrooms to 
participate in numerous exercises with titles like, “Understanding Democracy,” 
“Understanding Citizenship” provided as part of Mindset Change and local capacity 
building programs. Rather then the US military, these events are largely sponsored by 
transnational corporations but likewise touted as designed by international “democracy 
and development experts.”84 In Nigeria, as I hope to make clear, these programs, that 
claim to promote good governance value systems, become tied explicitly to actual 
infrastructural engineering work in the oil fields. Moreover, playing on divisions within 
the political body at large, the programs organized by transnationals purporting to support 
democracy and development, often acted as an intermediary between Niger Delta 
residents and the state. However, not necessarily in the way they’d anticipated. In 
practice these programs were being constantly revised and re-presented as new trends 
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83 And indeed, the pedaling of democracy expertise seems to circulate along with executives and engineers 
in the oil fields. A number of project directors, accountants and security experts in Nigeria working to 
design ways for managing oil producing communities around their projects had arrived directly from a 
previous postings in Iraq. 
 
84 This quote comes from an interview conducted with one of the American development program 
managers for Chevron who organized the research and designs for Chevron’s recent GMOU programs by 
consulting with international NGOs and think tanks.  
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emerged in development expertise, as the Nigerian political-scape was altered and as new 
practices of contracting were used in infrastructural building projects. 
 
 
The many legacies of Ken Saro-Wiwa: 
 Nowhere were the tactics of transnational corporations more obvious than during 
public events, like the Jubilee celebration, in which the company very clearly sought to 
perform its role as a benefactor. However, in interfaces with actual Niger Deltan 
communities, such self-presentations often malfunctioned. A few months after the Jubilee 
celebrations, I was witness to yet another kola breaking ceremony performed with actors 
from the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC). This occasion involved 
Shell’s staff at one of its main export terminals, at Forcados, at a town hall meeting in 
Ogula, the community that had been hosting its operations for over forty years. This time, 
the sharing of kola was the center stage event. About to embark on an extension of their 
airfields, the company representatives had, as is common protocol, arrived to disseminate 
information to the community about the project. With the town hall packed tight with a 
sizable portion of Ogula, the event began with a brief ten-minute description of the 
project and the company’s need for it. A moderator hired by SPDC translated the 
statements into Ijaw. “We are here asking for your support,” explained one of the 
Nigerian engineers of SPDC staff who had been selected to represent the company. 
Pointing to the bottles of soft drinks and fried meats being distributed to attendees he 
said:  
Entertainment in African culture is reciprocal, is symbolic. You give me and I give you. 
So the community has entertained SPDC and SPDC at this time is paying back—no, no, 
that’s not the right word—but what we got we must give to the community and we must 
drink, eat together…as a tradition we have the sum of fifty thousand [50,000 naira or 335 
USD] as a wedge to the kola and all the drinks and all that.”   
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To underscore his sincerity, the engineer added an additional 4,000 naira of his own 
money to help wedge the kola. The moderator of the event, trying to whip up the crowd’s 
enthusiasm, turned to the Ogula members, and exclaimed in pidgin, “Make una clap-o! 
Money done hard-o.”85  
Although applause broke out in the hall and a community elder rose to offer a 
blessing over the kola, when the floor was opened to questions, Ogula members seemed 
unmoved by the offered kola. Letting their knowledge, frustration and experience be 
known, they insisted that the company fill in the missing details from their presentation: 
Which contractors will the company be hiring? How much equipment will be arriving to 
do the work? How will they ensure that the dredging does not disturb the community? In 
what capacity does the company plan to use community laborers? There were an equal 
amount of questions about how the company planned to manage a public health crisis, as 
cholera was on the rise after the community toilets the company had promised during its 
last construction project were never built. Answering all questions briefly, with as few 
details as possible, the company representative explained that although he could not now 
answer every question they have no reason to worry. “SPDC is your partner,” he said, 
and then, in a statement as patronizing as it was disturbing, “Even when you are asleep 
we have thoughts for you. We are planning for you.” 
 However, during the presentation it was the slip of phrasing, in which the 
company representative tries to edit his suggestion that Shell is simply “paying back” the 
community for the decades of hosting its operations with a few cans of soda and some 
fifty-thousand naira, that really underscores the contradictions that became apparent 
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85 Everyone give him some applause, that’s real (solid) money. 
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during the meeting. Glossing the idea of entertainment in “African culture” as symbolic, 
it was evident that he struggled to place the exchange in an idiom that did not appear 
transactional, but rather, familial and reciprocal.  
Providing compensation packages for oil producing communities in the form of 
cash payments and “community assistance” programs was a practice of Shell since early 
prospecting periods. In the 1960’s the company began to sponsor local agricultural 
expansion programs and provide scholarships for youth from oil producing communities. 
These were non-contractual, but nevertheless over time became obligatory ‘gifting’ 
practices on which oil communities began to rely, particularly as the state infrastructure 
was not extended to the oil fields and they received ever shrinking revenues or support 
from government (see chapter 1).86 As Marcel Mauss has famously posited in his 
discussion on gift-exchange, a creation of a debt creates an alliance and a perennially 
enigmatic obligation to reciprocate, forming an endless circle and circuit of exchange.87 
Yet in the case of corporate gifting in the Niger Delta, despite the best efforts of the 
community relations department to partake in a discourse of reciprocity with the 
community, drawing attention to the reciprocal idioms of “African culture,” this circle 
has never quite been formed. 
These small projects offered up by corporations did little to ameliorate or address 
the material destruction taking place. In 1990, Ken Saro Wiwa, writer, civil servant and 
political activist started the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) for 
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86 As I touched on in chapter 1, returns to Niger Delta oil producing areas were constantly cut to feed 
national state coffers. They went from receiving 100% of revenues in 1960 to as little as 3% in 1982. 
 
87 Elaborations on the gift in anthropology have compared it to monetary relations under liberal capitalist 
regimes, or thinking about circulation: on the impossibilities, temporalities and debts implied by its 
conceptual employment as a supposed foundation for social relationships (see Derrida, 1995 and Siegel, 
2006). 
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social and ecological justice, demanding environmental remediation on the part of 
companies, and autonomous resource control from the government. Accusing community 
chieftains and national politicians of selling out their people and trespassing on the rights 
of marginalization minorities like the Ogoni, Saro-Wiwa headed a campaign to assert 
Ogoni human and environmental rights. Although often (and perhaps justifiably) accused 
of ethnicizing the cause by fore-fronting the Ogoni (as opposed to oil producing 
communities as a whole) (See Okonta, 2003), the target of Saro-Wiwa’s criticism 
remained the “slick” collusion of the government with oil corporations and addressed the 
need for oil minorities to hold equal political representation rather than be dominated by 
interests of the military elite ruling by fiat (see Saro-Wiwa, 1992, Genocide in Nigeria). 
During his last speech he drew parallels between the Ogoni struggle and a wider push to 
usher in “a fair and just democratic system” (KSW, 1995).  
At the time, local and small-scale protests were not uncommon across the Niger 
Delta (see EJ Alagoa). Attempts were often made by individual communities to get 
reimbursements and compensation payments from the company working in their areas 
(see chapter 1). During my research I heard multiple stories about occupations, small-
scale kidnappings that predated Saro-Wiwa, including a Texaco site taken over in 1982 
by a community who for three days fed workers a diet of water and garri88 so that they 
experience their struggle with poverty. However, MOSOP, authoring its own Ogoni Bill 
of Rights worked to articulate and publicize itself in the political and politicized language 
of global human and environmental rights movements, “a political ecology of 
citizenship” wherein the destruction of Ogoni land became a register for the defilement of 
their place in the larger political body (Apter, 2005; Saro-Wiwa, 1992).  
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88 Cassava flour, common food eaten across Southern Nigeria 
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Saro-Wiwa and MOSOP, however, must also be understood as the outgrowth of 
events taking place in Nigeria at large. Shagari’s Second Republic89 (1979-1983) ushered 
in with great expectations ended in a tailspin as oil prices dropped. Stuck between 
lowering OPEC quotas and later the adoption of Structural Adjustment Programs, the 
return to democracy was endlessly promised and continually deferred by each successive 
military leader, as Buhari was overthrown by Babangida and Babangida replaced by 
Abacha.90 Nevertheless, in equally constant preparation for its return (or at least to make 
a show of it), the central government developed and sponsored a number of civil society 
groups in the 80’s and 90’s. In 1987, Saro-Wiwa was the director of one such 
organization, Mass Mobilization for Self-Reliance, Social Justice and Economic 
Recovery (MAMSER), organized by Babangida to educate and mobilize citizens for 
upcoming elections, originally scheduled for 1990, but postponed till 1993.91 Ike Okonta 
has made the case that as delays continued, a number of these civil society groups 
became re-patterned as ethnicity-based anti-state platforms (Okonta, 2009). Ken Saro-
Wiwa, a prime example, left his directorship at MAMSER frustrated after the 1990 
election postponement to found MOSOP, with the stated mission to work to alleviate the 
condition of the Ogoni, “peoples suffering the yoke of political marginalization, 
economic strangulation or environmental degradation, or a combination of these.” (Saro-
Wiwa, 1995, 183)  Similarly inspired, the Ijaw National Council emerged in 1991, 
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89 Shagari was the country’s first non-military leader since 1966, elected under a new American-styled 
Presidential system after the government jettisoned the British parliamentary system in a redrafting of the 
constitution in 1978. 
 
90 And even a thwarted coup in between 
 
91 Although Babangida annulled the 1993 elections were a famous fraud, it did still set in motion a number 
of new institutions. 
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according to founding member Dr. Issac Mamamu, as an identity-based group  “for Ijaws 
to speak and demand in one voice,” rather than remain as part of ineffective civil groups 
where they felt “politically supplementary to other tribes.”92  
 Saro-Wiwa, a journalist, playwright and popular figure in the Nigerian media, 
was well poised to craft and broadcast his missive. Connecting local and national political 
struggles with anti-globalization and environmental movements, the Ogoni became an 
international cause célèbre in the mid-1990s. When Saro-Wiwa and eight other MOSOP 
members93 were arrested and executed in 1995 protests were held at Nigerian embassies 
in the US and UK. Shell, the main producer in Ogoniland, was accused of refusing to 
intervene with the judgment under military ruler Sani Abacha, and even perhaps of 
collaborating on Saro-Wiwa’s capture. On the day of his execution, Saro-Wiwa famously 
predicted, “I tell you this, I may be dead but my ideas will not die…I preach peace. Those 
who come after me may spit fire.”   
After the execution, protests in the Niger Delta did indeed became increasingly 
organized and more sophisticated. As Saro-Wiwa foresaw many turned to fire—however, 
only following the return to a democratic regime as groups were armed by politicians 
during the 1999 state and local elections (Ifeka, 2005). Still sidelined by central 
government powers, the now armed social movements continued with Saro-Wiwa’s anti-
government and anti-big oil discourse, agitating for environmental rights, social justice 
and greater resource control. Yet although the UN condemned the execution and the US 
began to deny visas to Nigeria’s military officers, only eight months later, Shell signed 
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92 From an interview I conducted with Dr. Mamamu on 11/07/10 
 
93 Saturday Doobee, Nordu Eawo, Daniel Gbooko, Paul Levera, Felix Nuate, Baribor Bera, Barinem Kiobel 
and John Kpuine. 
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onto a four billion Liquefied Natural Gas plant project at Bonny in the Delta. In response 
to the criticism it received, the company appeared to have re-positioned itself as a body 
now responsible for ensuring the protection and wellbeing of oil producing communities. 
Pointing to its plan to distribute new benefits to communities, the company announced 
that Niger Delta communities were counting on the corporation’s expanding presence and 
that “the people of the Niger Delta would certainly suffer” if the Gas Plant plan collapsed 
(Platform, 2011, 11).  
And yet, perhaps there is a way of understanding both Shell’s response and the 
rise of Niger Delta militias as similar (even if antagonistic) outgrowths of the events that 
took place around Saro-Wiwa’s foiled movement. In fact, there is another sense in which 
Saro-Wiwa’s ideas converged with and became embedded within (and indeed because 
perhaps already part of) wider discussions and practices taking place globally. This 
legacy points in a less trodden direction, in trying to understand the ways in which the 
continuation of opposition efforts in the delta have struggled to define themselves outside 
of the kinds of political identities promoted and proscribed by transnational operators and 
the state.  
Following the uproar over Saro Wiwa’s death, the Nigerian government 
introduced a series of parastatals to address “underdevelopment” and poverty in the 
region.94 Yet bogged down by top-heavy bureaucracy, funding often failed to reach 
remote oil producing areas. During my research, it became evident that the institutions 
most organized and accessible to community members were the structures modeled on 
Corporate Social Responsibility agendas being introduced at the same time by 
transnational corporations to “service the communities.” Although international 
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94 These include NDDC, followed by OMPADEC and DESOPADEC. 
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businesses began to integrate some aspects of human rights into their practices in the 
1970’s, the corporate social responsibility programs used by large-scale industries today 
were largely fashioned during the Rio conference at the 1992 Earth Summit (see Watts, 
2005).95 Here commitments by large companies to “behave ethically” by contributing to 
the well being of its workers, local communities, and economic development, was agreed 
to operate on a strongly encouraged but essentially voluntary basis (as are nearly all 
corporate ethics codes) rather than submit to any mandatory laws, oversight or 
regulation96 (Watts, 2005, 394).  
The Niger Delta became one of the earliest major efforts to implement corporate 
social responsibility projects (Watts, 2005). Following the negative press over Saro 
Wiwa, the areas around all major oil installations now became designated “host 
communities” by operating transnationals like Shell and Chevron. The host community 
systems essentially developed versions of the multi-stakeholders models associated with 
the “good governance” platforms designed by the World Bank (Watts, 2005). Here 
economic development, respect for democratic citizen rights and social inclusion formed 
a triad of sustainable governance that was meant to both support and supplement for 
weaknesses in the central government (Mkandawire, 2007).  
The good governance movements, as Mkandawire notes, became the centerpiece 
of the World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Programs. They were concerned with 
designing a massive, imposable framework, to manage both the microeconomics and 
governing capacities of state institutions (as mentioned above). Yet, adapted and 
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95 As Watts points out in his article, Ogoni leader Dappa-Biriye spoke at the Rio Summit, delivering a 
speech on behalf of the delta people. 
 
96 see “The Voluntary Guidelines on Security of Human Rights” as an example 
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reworked to perform as small-scale local development platforms in the Niger Delta, 
bankrolled by oil corporations, these arrangements became territorially configured around 
oil installations, with the intention of carving out discrete, manageable objects. “Host 
community” designations were given to particular settlements living in production 
pathways. A system of signed Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) between the 
company and each host was organized to regulate the distribution of gifts, entitlements 
and development schemes. MOUs (as opposed to any actual contracts) acted as evidence 
of exchange and co-operation, a social license to operate for transnationals (Watts, 2005). 
The Ogula town hall meeting, for example, is one of the legacies of the MOU system, 
wherein the community must be engaged and addressed as an interested stakeholder and 
awarded certain benefits in exchange for allowing the company to operate unmolested. 
Couched in the rhetoric of inclusion and partnership development, MOUs were primarily 
viewed as a preventative measure against unrest that might damage the company’s 
pipelines or reputation (Zalik, 2005; Watts, 2005; Ikelegbe, 2006). Increasingly popular 
among transnational operators, by 2000, nearly every settlement around the oil 
infrastructure was provided a host community designation (sometimes from more than 
one corporation). The host community system likewise altered the make-up of corporate 
outposts as they added new departments and staff to develop and train a series of liaison 
officers, set budgets for community relation’s management, and provided partnerships 
with civil society organizations, both grassroots and national NGOs. 
Promoting forms of developmentalism and population management that are 
conveniently made compatible with global security agendas, the host community system 
allows for a rethinking of more mainstream scholarly and political commentary on the 
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role of the African state vis-à-vis increasingly powerful encroachments of international 
organizations (Duffield, 2001) and extraction under neoliberal economic policies 
(Collier, 2010) that tend to focus exclusively on analyzing large-scale mechanisms of war 
and conflict. In one of the few studies to take a critical and theoretical approach to 
corporate social responsibility programs in the Niger Delta, Anna Zalik draws attention to 
the devolution of responsibility from the state and corporate institutions to non-
governmental sectors taking place in the Niger Delta. She argues, corporate sponsorship 
of NGOs works to structure relationships in a way that present transnationals as outsiders 
to a general regional or national problem, while in fact, their systems of managing local 
communities become a prime site for fashioning new logics of control (Zalik, 2005). 
Caught in the crosshairs of state and corporate interests, she suggests “community 
development” programs work to depoliticize opposition movements and potential 
sabotage by carving out the new terms of demands for the “subject of the oil state…to 
desire the ‘fruits’ of cheap oil, through their incorporation – however meager – into its 
incentive structure” (Zalik, 2005, 420). While certainly an important and a necessary 
point, Zalik remains rather at the wider structural level, describing how these programs 
are emblematic of new trends that co-opt elements of the public sector into the private.  
In an opposite movement, Suzana Sawyer tracks how the mobilization of 
indigenous communities in Ecuador, while becoming targets of neoliberal financial 
calculations in the oil fields, are able to find new ways for mobilizing against the 
government. Here, the infringements made by global extractive industries become a 
catalyst for renewed political action that brings about structural change (Sawyer, 2004). 
Although coming at the issue of resistance movements in the liberalized oil fields from 
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different angles, Sawyer and Zalik view corporate interventions as attempts to externally 
control an internal resource, speaking to a literature concerned with identifying forms of 
“transnational governmentality” (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002) rather than parsing out how 
such labels are produced. Both authors divide the social universe into strict tripartite 
roles. The multinational company represents profit-oriented foreign capital and the 
indigenous groups a positive force for social justice, while the state becomes a 
battleground between them. It is certainly not that I disagree with this perspective, but 
rather that I am more interested here in how establishing actions and stated intents can 
often be slippery. I would argue instead that sites of control in Nigeria rather resist strict 
definitions. And it is in the more ambiguous moments and relationships produced in the 
exchange of money, materials and rhetoric of performances acting on and within the 
material and institutional arrangements that opens up space for considering the kinds of 
power formations that not only expand but also malfunction and mutate.  
Arguing for a more nuanced approach to sites of power emerging at the interstices 
of NGOs, International organizations and large injections of global capital, Julia Elyachar 
suggests that attention be given to more unformed edges of these state and non-state 
distinction, “Ethnography must itself be strategic, and tactical, in its nature, choosing 
those nodal points of research where the state appears ‘fuzzy’ and categories blurred” 
(Elyachar, 2005, 95). And indeed, given that corporate-sponsored civil society NGO 
programs, purporting to substitute and supplement for the state do little to either stem 
attacks on oil infrastructure or eradicate opposition, there seems a great need to consider 
the ways in which they produce their authority. Rather than some form of transnational 
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governance, imposed from without, it is important to see how these programs become 
lodged within wider processes and structures of the Nigerian state. 
 
The Niger Delta Story: 
There are, for example, many blurry edges that appear during the kola 
presentation at the Ogula town hall meeting itself. The audience, composed of 
community members sits facing a raised stage, upon which is placed a long table for 
Ogula’s chiefs and leaders, the decision-makers—all but one of whom arrived a few 
minutes before the meeting, flown in on one of Shell’s helicopters.97 There are no 
government officials present, yet the project is introduced as being co-sponsored with the 
government who will operate the airbase. Not only slipped within chiefly and 
government agendas, Shell itself built the town hall—as one of its previous host 
community projects—for the community to hold collective decision-making meetings.98 
These configurations indicate the way the host community system has played rather 
directly into an already existing political geography. Corporations like Shell and 
Chevron, whose projects are intensely geographic, dole out development services and 
compensation packages according to ethno-territorial land claims (Frynas, 1997;Omeje, 
2006).99 Thus they have to contend with the specter of other boundary lines. Southern 
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97 And all but two left immediately following the meeting, rushing to Shell’s waiting van, and scrambling 
to get out on the first departing helicopter. 
 
98 In other areas, the insertion of the company between organs of community power is even more obvious. 
In Madagho, for example, Chevron has built a community courthouse, after the original one was destroyed 
during inter-community violence over chevron’s host community allotments. 
 
99 This can often be tricky as land, nominalized as “customary” belonging to particular clans and kingdoms, 
allowed, for years, other groups to occupy and exploit areas for fishing and farming during particular time 
periods (often seasonal). These always operated through sets of agreed upon rights. When transnational oil 




Nigeria was already divided by the British imperial project into a number of Native 
Authorities. These institutions, fusing all judicial, executive and rule-making powers in 
the unchecked sovereignty of the chief, as Mahmood Mamdani has written, worked 
towards “the containerization” of a subject population by categorizing ethnic groupings 
and propping up customary authority (Mamdani, 1996, 53; also see Bala Usman, 1978, 
on Nigeria context in particular). Additionally, British colonialists deputized three 
monolithic ethnicities: Hausa, Igbo, Yoruba, as the overseers of the three colonial and 
later independent Nigerian states. 
However, in the lead up to independence in 1960, minority groups, particularly in 
the delta where they controlled large markets (see chapter 1), voiced concerned about 
continuing the three state make-up of the colonial state, for fear of domination by larger 
ethnic groups.100 The Willinks Commission, an investigation put together by the colonial 
administration concluded fears about minority exclusion were unfounded. Doing little to 
allay the anxieties around growing centers of power for those who saw themselves as 
marginal to it, in 1966 Issac Boro launched a 12-day would be revolution seeking the 
creation of a Niger Delta People’s Republic, setting a precedent for identity-based 
uprisings that has numerous iterations across Nigeria up till today. For twelve days, 
Boro’s uprising occupied all state infrastructures and the oil fields demanding the right, 
as an ethnic minority, to protect the Ijaw community.101 Biafra declared succession only a 
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100 Since many of these ethnic categories were those already officially recognized by the colonial 
government and so in the Independent state, many of the Local Government Areas (LGA) simply followed 
similar divisions. See Chapter 1 for a discussion on LGA formation. 
 
101 On January 15th Ironsi’s power grab gave way to fears among Delta residents (for whom, Belawa was 
considered an ally). Boro and his fighters insisted on an invalidation of all oil contracts and took over the 
government infrastructure in Kaiama. However, unable to hold out against the assault of government 
troops, Boro conceded defeat after 12 days, explaining “the suffering of people became unbearable.” (Boro, 
1982) 
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few months after Boro’s defeat, during which time the petroleum industry was 
nationalized.  
As the implementation of various legislations allowed the centralized state to 
claim control over the oil sector and its rents, divisions and contests for power began to 
emerge around revenue-sharing formulas (see chapter 2). Oil rents are directed to the 
center and distributed to Nigeria’s 36 states. Access to revenues has therefore been 
central to staking claims and rights vis-à-vis the state. What is commonly called “dividing 
the national cake,” became a matter of establishing how much states and local 
governments are awarded in the monthly oil monies sharing in the name of federal 
allocation.102 Local Government Areas are themselves determined by ethnicity and 
population numbers. Therefore the more Local Governments Areas that a particular 
ethnic group controls, the greater the percentage of oil monies it can acquire. It is 
therefore not surprising that the number of Local Governments has increased from 26 to 
334 since 1960, with hundreds more being petitioned for.103  
As Michael Watts points out, “Once law endorses cultural identity as the new 
basis for political identity, inevitably ethnic mobilization provides the idiom in which to 
access oil wealth—a national resource after all—is fought over” (watts, 2008, 41). 
Nigerian historian, Claude Ake has written that modes of solidarity and political 
participation have allowed the state to always operate as two publics: where that of 
cultural affiliation often overrides the civil (Ake, 1997). It is within this friction that 
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102 Since Biafra all local government areas (and even states) were carved out during successive military 
regimes. Note that policies like the land use act were not just about oil, but about a general centralization of 
the power to make geographical boundaries by the state. 
 
103 Likewise the number of states expanded from 3 to 36 
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much of Nigeria’s violence is read, as the tension between particular affiliation and the 
imaginary of a whole, what Watts concisely points out as a fault line within the ever-
incomplete Nigerian national project.104 
Despite encouraging fragmentation along ethnic, territorial lines at the national 
level, the State has reacted with immediate and immensely brutal violence to uprisings 
put in identitarian terms. The state, seeking to maintain its sovereign control and uphold 
its commitments to transnational corporations has imposed terrible retributive violence 
upon communities. Cases of government soldiers burning and raiding oil communities 
like Odi, and Opia have became infamous warning tales. Meanwhile, the system of 
distribution payments given by corporations ensures competition for host community 
designations, producing decades of infighting between neighboring villages. For this 
reason, academics and journalists have suggested that the delta becomes emblematic of a 
general crisis of sovereignty in the post-democratic state, as following the end of the 
military regime, the state is flooded with private interests, private security operatives, 
increased tensions between groups and the rise of vigilantes (Pratten, 2009). 
Certainly there is no way to argue with the empirical fact of the violence Niger 
Deltan residents have experienced over the decades. In the creeks as well as in oil cities 
like Warri and Port Hartcourt residents were keen on approaching foreigners like myself 
and offering to tell “the story of the Niger Delta,” the history of corporate and 
government collusion and repression, a tale of dispossession and exploitation. The Niger 
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104 Questions of identity, geography and ethnicity (vs. tribal categories) among Nigerian scholars have also 
become a central focal point of reading political future of the country through discussions of its past. At 
stake in such debates is whether forms of ethnic nationalism and communal politics would be useful or 




Delta Story makes light of the rather crude security measures that have been used. As 
Nitzan and Bichler (2007 or 2002) point out, arms and oil often traffic together at both 
the state and international level in ways that constantly raise the stakes of controlling its 
flows, and the Nigerian Military is well equipped to confront unarmed fishermen and 
villagers.105 Additionally, the amount spent on enforcing the private property rights of the 
joint-venture conglomerates in Nigeria has now reached absurd levels. Shell has spent an 
estimated $99 million USD on Nigerian army soldiers and logistics in 2008 alone. This 
includes 600 police and Mobil Police (Mopol) known by their more familiar nickname, 
“kill and go,” 700 JTF soldiers, a specialized task force deployed for targeted goals, and a 
1,200 strong internal police force used as personal body guards and gatekeepers known as 
the SPY police (the Supernumerary Police) and plainclothes informants (Platform, 2011).  
Violence associated with oil dominates not only the way in which regional 
tensions can be understood, but the established the paradigms within which everyday life 
in Nigeria is imagined a kind of “terror as usual” (Taussig, 1992). However, in addition 
to direct intimidation of oil communities and the agitation of older rifts established during 
colonial and nation-building periods, transnational corporations have also invested 
heavily in developing apparatuses to manage the build up and fall out from those same 
conflagrations. And in spite of their well-known role in the many devastations 
experienced in the delta, these areas are also inundated with signs and reminders of the 
oil company’s involvement in everyday decisions about community leadership, potential 
public health hazards, employment, and the connection to state infrastructure (such as the 
expansion of airfields, the regulation of the waterways.) Corporate social responsibility 
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105 Mitchell refers to this as their “useful uselessness” in helping to recycle dollars as oil producing states 
purchased an excessive amount of weaponry from US and European arms manufacting companies. 
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programs organizing such involvements are thus more than merely creating cover for 
exploitation and neglect, they are transforming, in very fundamental ways, how 
“community” and its relationship to the state is represented and organized. And yet, 
attention must not only be given to attempts to manage “community”, but the ways that 
such controls often slip, fail and open up very different conditions of possibilities.  
 
Owning community 
Pumping money into the host community, partnership development programs, 
signing MOU’s with one village after another, corporate efforts to safeguard production 
by creating networks of care and support sought to create new channels of 
communication and mechanisms of recognition. These endeavors, however, began to 
produce “community” itself as a certain kind of object. When the chiefs at the Golden 
Jubilee impromptu kola ceremony, claim to be “the owners of community,” they play 
directly on and into this history. Chieftaincy titles in most Deltan clans are not inherited 
but bestowed after demonstrating commitment to the wellbeing of a particular 
community. Since, once accorded authority, chiefs therefore become representatives and 
defenders of the community’s interests, oil companies implementing the MOUs in the 
mid-1990s would sign and administrate programs through them.  
While never meaning entitled to “ownership,” chiefs often claim to the company 
that they have the power to speak on behalf of the community and the ability to control 
potential unrest and the unruly youth leading them. Using these claims to leadership as a 
personal financial resource (with little oversight), many Deltan chiefs used community 
development funds to build lavish homes in Warri and Port Hartcourt, spending most of 
their time far from the communities. As many local and international watchdog 
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organizations have published in their reports, the MOU system allowed individuals to 
profit off positions of authority (see Platform, 2011; Amnesty International, 2007; 
UNHCR, 1999).106 Such practices have given way to a race for titles in the Delta. It is not 
uncommon to meet wealthy chiefs with multiple titles, some outright purchased from 
elders and kingmakers.107 Title seekers look to capture them not only in their father’s 
community but also their mother’s, which was, until recently considered rare. Titles have 
been awarded to people with feint relation to a community at all, including a few foreign 
community liaison officers for transnational companies. 
However, perhaps the more organizing (and little remarked on) term in the claim 
of “ownership of community” here is ‘community’ itself and how it becomes established 
as a value. As I mentioned, oil companies patterned their engagement programs on 
already politicized geography of Deltan communities. But the formation of a “host 
community” was also a practical exercise that had to define its object. A community’s 
value under the MOU system was ranked according to their proximity to critical oil 
installations. Communities with wellheads, for example, would receive more funding for 
programs than a pipeline community. Re-stitching the patchwork of riverine settlements 
into hierarchies organized by the oil infrastructure tugged apart longstanding geographies 
of clanship and kinship. For instance, if the town holding the central seat of authority for 
a clan or kingdom were located more than a certain distance from the company’s 
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106 Collaborating with chief’s was not a new concept in MOU arrangements. Movements like MOSOP had 
already included a critique of chiefs collusion with the oil-government complex. However, the MOU 
system formalized the exchanges between the company and chief’s in a contract packaged for discretely 
marked out communities. Frustration with chiefly authority collaborating with oil companies, however, was 
only further exacerbated under host community systems. Chiefs sometimes became the target of 
community violence, their houses burnt to the ground by young men frustrated by lack of opportunities to 
access power and wealth (Ifeka 2005, Ikonta 2007, Golden 2012). I will discuss this further in chapter 5. 
 
107 Although it is important to note this is not true of all chiefs, there are many to whom such accusations 
would not apply. 
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infrastructure, it would be excluded from the official list of “host communities.”108 
Meanwhile a small fishing camp could be recognized by Shell or Chevron as its most 
valuable host community. According to the community relation’s manager at Chevron, 
the ranking of communities were based on an assigned “dollar values” after being 
assessed by accounting teams. In other words, from the amount of oil they are able to 
extract from a particular community’s wellheads, and the value of a contract in a 
particular concession area, the company will then estimate the amount of funds to be 
allotted to invest in a particular community.  
Entering into the rational calculus of the global oil industry at large, these host 
community programs had a number of effects. Up until the late-1980’s, Joel explains, the 
terms used to describe particular areas often deployed designations used by the colonial 
government: kingdoms divided into clans and quarters where you had “towns,” 
“villages,” and “fishing camps.” Joel a former banker turned Niger Delta activist, began 
his own NGO, NIPRODEV, in 1999 after the first Warri Crisis, distressed over the 
increasing amount of internal clashes, not just between different ethnic groups in oil 
producing areas, but also within them. “Oil companies didn’t understand the way in 
which land ownership was organized in the area.” He explained,   
They simply make deals with people who were living directly in the area where 
their operations were, rather then going to the clan heads and distributing the 
money across to the greater communities. Everything just became ‘community,’ 
after time, even a small fishing camp became ‘community’! They go to Chevron 
and say such and such satellites are discrete communities. This causes deep 
problems within the kingdom. The oil funds should be distributed out and evenly 




108 A struggle recorded in a thick archive of mostly unresolved legal land disputes. 
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The labeling and offering of development funds to each group as ‘community,’ 
disaggregated long-established kingdoms, flattening local authority structures and 
hierarchies of ownerships. Host community programs therefore contributed to the 
decentralization of the organs of decision-making.109  
The entrenchment of these “host community” programs became highly divisive, 
particularly as the projects for development dug boreholes, built schools or installed 
community generators that serviced a single community and never sought to connect 
individual host communities to each other or to any urban centers.110 This not only 
guaranteed a high stakes competition to secure one community’s candidacy over 
another’s as vital to the oil company to access development funds, but as neighboring 
areas broke apart, it re-ordered relationships to other heterogeneous powers. Soon, the 
most organized and well-funded institutions available for delta residents to make appeals 
and to lodge complaints became these development bureaucracies—soliciting community 
participation. Joel explains that this had less to do with any actual benefits seen (as often 
there were hardly any), than it did with the perceived relationship of the company to the 
state:   
Government is one big thing. It has no beginning and no ending. It is so big but 
you cannot touch it… then government brought in these soldiers to protect the oil 
companies so that they will continue to extract oil and gas, so that they’ll 
continue to make money for the government. Now, everyone sees the oil 
companies as part of and parcel of the federal government. Because our thinking 
is that the oil companies are working for the federal government and the 
government is using them to extract the resources in our land. 
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109 While the central authority in most kingdoms continued to exist, they do not exercise the same degree of 
control. And as I noted in the previous chapter, groups were settling along the pipelines and advocating for 
reparations money before the host community system was in place. However, the host community system 
ended up institutionalizing such orders  
 
110 These programs are often blamed for the proliferation of satellite communities I mentioned in Chapter 1 
that would spring up alongside the pipeline overnight as well as schisms between and within various clans 
and kingdoms that have led to decades of intra and inter community conflict. 
! 129!
 
Although it is common to hear statements such as “Shell/Chevron is government,” more 
often residents I spoke with seemed to describe transnational corporations, like Joel did, 
as simply a more vulnerable collaborator and potential leverage standing between them 
and the impossibility of the state, always residing in abstraction.111  
 Yet, the deferment to oil companies for their demands is not merely one of 
practical inference, but rather a relationship that is produced and sustained in regular 
interfaces between the company with the community in the form of town hall meetings 
like the one at Ogula, where these relationships of provision and reciprocity are staged 
and enacted.  
 
Mr. Trust:  
Far from the oil producing creeks, I visited another active staging ground for corporate 
social responsibility models. The main offices of Chevron EGTL project in Warri are 
unassuming, built off NPA Expressway and surrounded by high wire fencing, a set of low 
built concrete offices house the central control for the project. Workers and managers, 
housed in similar concrete blocks across the street are transported every day across a 
narrow strip of pavement in white vans accompanied by an almost comical amount of 
heavy police escort.  
Meeting with the head of Chevron’s Community Relations Management for the 
Escravos Gas to Liquid (EGTL) project, I was not a little amused when he introduced 
himself as Mr. Trust, the nickname he had acquired during his tenure. Mr. Trust had been 
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111 In a workshop held by Joel’s NGO, residents from across western delta oil producing communities were 
invited to review a copy of the state’s budget for their community. The NGO also invited some their local 
government councilors whom hardly anyone in the community could name. Only one of the twelve invited 
councilors showed up and not a single project that the government budgeted for, in the past three years, had 
materialized in the communities. 
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with Chevron since 1995. As he was from the Niger Delta, he described himself as both 
personally and professionally invested with the work with which he is engaged. Right off 
the bat, Mr. Trust stated that he was not afraid to admit that Chevron had made grievous 
errors in its handling of community affairs, contributing to and exacerbating their 
problems. Delving into previous forms of ‘partnership development,’ he impressed upon 
me the important difference between the older MOU (Memoranda of Understanding) 
agreements developed in the mid-1990s and the Global Memoranda of Understanding 
(GMOU) that they established in 2005. The interruptions and the increasing visibility of 
ethnically united armed groups after the Warri Crisis he says, acted as a wake-up call to 
the company that the host community systems were ineffective and something “more 
sustainable” was needed. According to Mr. Trust, earlier host community systems 
promoted corruption of community leaders, a problem he diagnosed as a matter of 
oversight and transparency, “When you give money to the chiefs they embezzle the 
money –you don’t see it again; they go and build a house, they go and marry wife they 
waste our money. Where is our money? Who is looking to see where it goes?”  
According to Mr. Trust, it was exactly “trust” that had eroded during earlier 
programs in which the corporations had divided up host communities, determined their 
needs and dictated the terms to them. “Chevron is an oil corporation, not a development 
company,” he explained by way of excuse, pointing out that it is the communities who 
“really should take control of their own development.” The new GMOUs, in contrast to 
the MOUs, therefore seek to do just this. They are designed to centralize institutions 
responsible for community relations, moving away from individual and bi-lateral 
arrangements. Grouping communities into broader administrative units, corporate 
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community liaison officers now tried to equalize the difference between previous 
distinctions: pipeline communities, producing communities, and those on the periphery of 
operations in a certain area. “Host communities” were thus remade as more wide-
spanning, conglomerate “Regional Development Councils” (RDC).112 The Gas to Liquid 
project at Escravos, for instance, now only had three RDC’s: Egbema/Gbaramatu (Ijaw) 
Development Council, Itsetkiri Development Council, and Ilaje Development Council.  
Regional Development Councils consist of an elected board whose presidency is 
rotated between (officially gazetted) communities within a particular grouping to 
maintain fairness. It is conceived as a system of checks and balances between 
community, state, civil society organizations and company representatives. While there is 
an oversight committee composed of representatives from Chevron, the state and local 
governments, and from a grassroots NGO, it is the community controlled Councils who 
ultimately decide on which projects to implement. According to Mr. Trust this helped 
streamline a system of individual agreements into a more transparent and comprehensive 
unit, “with the GMOU there is accountability…There is no way anybody can embezzle 
money here because there is a partnership arrangement where government, the company 
and the community are all involved in spending this money.” 
As an instrument to redistribute oil money earned not as rents, but as capital, as an 
investment in the future conditions of the community, these GMOUs are thus understood 
to in some ways to by-pass the traditional hoarders of oil money, i.e., the state, and the 
chiefs. Mr. Trust was particularly proud of the way in which the finances had been neatly 
ordered, shaping transparent contours to “community,” a feeling echoed by the president 
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112 Although my research focused more on the Chevron side, which is why I present it in depth here, Shell 
Nigeria re-organized its community relations in a similar way, generating a GMOU also that replaced 
previous community-by-community arrangements with larger administrative units, called “Clusters.” 
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of Gbaramatu’s Regional Development Council at the time who assured me that “Bill 
Gates will be able to look at our books and be impressed.” But this involves having 
mechanisms in place to measure the program’s success. “It is all set down here,” Mr. 
Trust explains as he pulls out a copy of the GMOU—a document, it is notable, that is not 
made available to community members at large to view (only to community leaders). 
Running his finger down each page, he points out that the company agrees to provide a 
bulk amount of naira113 as “all their own money to manage,” as well as contracts and 
employment opportunities. In return, the community has a singular and simple role to 
play—nevertheless one that seemed to necessitate enormous repetition on his part: 
You have to make sure that they don’t vandalize our equipment. No 
vandalization of our facilities. Make sure you secure and protect our facilities. 
We give you funds, we are developing your community all you have to do for us 
to is be sure you secure our facilities, protect our facilities. Don’t take the laws 
into your hands. Follow the due process in resolving issues. 
 
“Should any problems arise”? I ask, referring to this “due process.” Mr. Trust smiles 
widely and while explaining how happy he is I asked this questions, he flips to yet 
another page in the agreement: “See, see. There is a conflict resolution mechanism. If the 
community are not happy, there is a mechanism for addressing conflict they have to 
follow. Everything is right here.” What he pointed out was, essentially, a chain of 
command: 
First of all you need to report realistically to the regional development council. 
The regional development council will inform public affairs, public affairs looks 
at the issue, if the issue cannot be resolved, public affairs takes it to the 
management of Chevron if it cannot be resolved, you take it to government. 
Government will –at some point we’ll have to bring in government to resolve the 
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113 In the example he showed me I saw it was 130 million [850,000 USD] but it varies from council to 
council as it is based on their dollar values for the company. As he explains: “The more the facilities that 
we have that will give us money the more money we give to those for their development. So the amount in 
each case depends on the facility available in this area, depends on how much crude oil you produce in this 
area, depends on the pipeline there, depends on the flow station. All the GMOUs are not equally funded the 
funding is given to you depending on production.” 
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issue…in any case they cannot go and disrupt our operation without following this 
protocol. 
 
While setting up an impossible line of protocols to be followed in order to legitimate any 
disruption seems somewhat futile given the longstanding practices of disruption (see 
chapter 1), new conflict resolution mechanisms had indeed been the thrust behind the 
development of the GMOU system. Regional Development Councils are now deputized 
to perform and police the “community” for their transnational donors, who in turn now 
have a direct body of leadership to call on should problems occur.  
It is important to note that, while sold as a more organic model than the host 
community system, one that suited the needs of delta cultural groups, the Regional 
Development Councils were originally adapted from a model designed by an 
international NGO (working mostly in South America) to assist failing public health 
sectors. While at times consulting community leaders, the bulk of energy and financing 
for the Chevron team in charge of outlining the GMOU programs was spent in months of 
researching and then inviting NGOs to present models that had proven “successful” at 
creating development structures to fit with new global business trends. Chevron then 
purchased the rights to the model from the organization of their choosing and adopted it 
to suit what they thought would be appropriate for the context of the Delta, before 
seeking approval from the community.  
Implemented in 2005, the same year that MEND’s sabotage campaign crippled 
production outputs, the freshly tweaked model was soon proclaimed as a breakthrough. 
Mr. Trust was not alone in his insistence that the GMOU program, with its neatly 
arranged relationships, built-in oversights to ensure transparency and clear 
communication, did wonders to help “community” and company interests get on the 
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same page. Indeed, a published statement from the Gas to Liquid project’s quarterly 
publication, a project director explains, “the way we work with the communities is to tell 
them the entire purpose, sharing the pains and sharing the gains” (echoes, 22). A stated 
enthusiasm for the GMOUs seemed par for the course when raising questions with 
Chevron staff about their development programs. Mr. Trust hailed it as “a breakthrough 
in conflict management.” Similarly, his counterpart at KBR claimed that even the 
Harvard Business School should study the Regional Councils. As evidence of its 
overwhelming success, the Ilaje Regional Council Chairmen is quoted in yet another 
publication describing GMOUs, in magical terms: “this project [EGTL] fell from the sky, 
like Manna from Heaven.”  
There are, of course, a number of obvious problems with calling the GMOU 
programs “new”. Although working to undo ranking systems between individual 
communities, GMOUs reinforce other forms of difference. Instead of calculating the 
value of small satellite communities, the GMOU now places entire ethnic groupings 
under an assigned “dollar value,” meaning that the Itsetkiri kingdom and the Ijaw 
Gbaramatu Kingdom are given different percentages, essentially reinforcing the very 
identitarian splits around which the Warri Crisis (1997-2003 see chapter 1) took place. 
Additionally, while espousing the novelty of giving communities their own development 
funds to manage, there are written into the contract conditions attached to the dollar 
amount. If, for example, there are no disturbances within a given year the council will 
receive a “peace bonus,” and additional payment of 60 million naira (46% of the 
development budget in some cases). Meanwhile any illegitimate disruptions will result in 
deductions from funds based on the cost of damage to the company. In other words, the 
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GMOUs set the value of the community based on its co-operation, as if the responsibility 
falls exclusively to community to foster an environment of peace and security that can 
lead to development. 
In spite of the GMOU program’s lauded ideas of “sharing”, from another position 
it is easy to point to how this arrangement, promoting individual initiative and collective 
community responsibility (through reward and punishment), allows the oil companies to 
shrink their own. The agreement, loaded with no agency clauses, organizes Development 
Councils as legally independent entities able to floating themselves on the development 
market and to solicit more funding from outside donors through leveraged buy-ins. In this 
sense, the GMOU model essentially makes “community” into a NGO organization itself. 
As one promotional slogan exclaims: “Community is not only in the driver’s seat, the car 
is parked in the compound.” And yet, the claim that communities somehow now own 
their own development is unfortunately (sadly but aptly) contradicted by this very 
metaphor, where they rest mute and enclosed behind the walls of their own home.  
From the perspective of the company, the GMOUs offer a better-organized 
system for monitoring and anticipating potential unrest around their projects.114 Yet 
Chevron’s Regional Development Councils, seemingly designed to the advantage of the 
corporation, do not always result in ideal arrangements. The first time I met with an 
EGTL Project manager, I asked him how the GMOU programs had changed their 
relationship to the communities. He boasted that during the last offensive by the 
government, “raining bullets on Gbaramatu communities,” his project did not lose one 
single man-hour: “We could hear the RPGs firing all around us, but we kept on going. No 
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114 In Shell’s “Global Scenarios 2025,” A report subtitled: The future business environment: tradeoffs and 
choices,” the company describes “the force of community,” as one of three main determining factors in 
future business environments, alongside, market incentives and Coercion. 
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one came to mess with us, we stayed in touch with the [MEND] leaders.” Evidently 
lacking concern for the communities of those leaders, his view was also remarkably 
restricted to a particular techno-spatial arrangement. When I reminded him that MEND 
blew up Chevron’s mainline at Chanomi Creek as a reprisal for the attack, he simply 
shrugged and said, “that’s not my project. Here, we have the GMOUs and they work.”115  
 
 
“Sharing the Pains and Sharing the Gains”: 
Towards the end of our interview, I asked Mr. Trust what is at stake in the idea of, 
“sharing the pains and sharing the gains” used in their promotional materials, as opposed 
to simply viewing the development monies and services as an exchange in the form of 
compensation for extracting the oil. He answered that the imperative is to make the 
operation inclusive; that the community feels their own future is tied in with the success 
of the company’s: 
community cannot destroy what they are benefitting from; if you have this house 
and you know you are making money from this house, you cannot destroy it. So 
there is partnership, the community are carried along. So they are part owners of 
this project and because they are part owners of this project they cannot disrupt 
the activities because they too are enjoying the house. 
 
To all appearances then, everyone’s mutual benefits can be aligned through the 
GMOU Regional Development Councils, free of pollution from government or 
community-based corruption, ensuring peace. Yet, as is evident from the statements 
given by the manager above, boasting about the safety of his own project during a 
government siege, the engineering of consent in the making of the Regional Development 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
115 As will become important further down, the project manager here worked for KBR in charge of 
Chevron’s construction. Although an executive from Chevron might be more apt to worry about the 
company’s infrastructure are a whole, the fact is that the KBR manager was the most present and active 
senior staff on the project. 
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Councils was also part of a larger material engineering taking place. The manager who 
made the comments actually worked for KBR, the main contractor in charge of 
construction, rather than Chevron—and this is a revealing distinction. Although the 
GMOUs (like the host community system that preceded it) are signed with Chevron, the 
contractors on the project are responsible for immediately securing the infrastructure and 
distributing development monies of their own.  
Thus, the everyday management and maintenance of the technical infrastructure is 
also part and parcel of how these shifting institutions and apparatuses managing 
“community” are implemented. It is perhaps significant that while going over the GMOU 
agreements with me, Mr. Trust gave scant attention or pause to the fact that having 
“community content” also involves providing contracts and employment in the oil fields. 
However, within many other divisions of the Escravos Gas to Liquid offices, community 
contracting and labor provision were perhaps the most discussed issue regarding the Gas 
to Liquid project at large. And in fact, although most critics of corporate social 
responsibility programs choose to focus on the more obvious discursive hypocrisies, or 
simply point out that programs often don’t provide the development they promise, I want 
to consider here how these failures manifest. Indeed, it appeared to me, throughout my 
research that one of the central problems in ailing corporate social responsibility and 
development models in the Niger Delta is rather the way they are enmeshed in an 
enormous sub-contracting system. Here cost cutting trends within industrial practices 
have bled into efforts to manage and contain the problem of community. Indeed, I would 
argue, as the most dynamic dimension to the overall GMOU programs, sub-contracting 
has acted both as remedy and poison, and made a double bind out of “community unrest.”  
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Around the same time that community liaison officers were touting their 
ingenuity and innovation, for example, Fenog, the indigenous sub-contracting company 
building Chevron’s pipelines was descending into a morass of problems within the 
Gbaramatu communities where it was based116. At the time, half the community was 
living off Fenog paydays: small suppliers, grass cutters, boat drivers as well as bar and 
restaurant owners depended on tabs getting paid at the end of every month. When 
Fenog’s project manager, greeted excitedly by all, would arrive with bags of cash, a camp 
immediately formed outside his lodgings as residents hoped to get their tabs, bills and 
salaries paid before his stack of money ran out and they had to wait until the next 
(sometimes unforeseen117) arrival. And yet, the onsite logistics manager received daily 
threats that the community would occupy the worksite, as the community felt that the 
company was not complying with the terms of the contract they signed to provide the 
community funds and opportunities to development. 
Here, it is important to understand how the cultivation of ever-new instruments 
and objects articulated in the idiom of local development, remain in tension with larger 
forces organizing production. Like many transnational industries, oil production ventures 
work through a wide-ranging set of partnerships. These partnerships, sometimes required 
and other times used for finding loopholes in requirements, can be vast. As I mentioned 
in the last chapter, the construction contract for Chevron’s Escravos project, was awarded 
to a consortium of three international contractors: Japan Gasoline Company (JGC), 
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116 One such incident was related in chapter 1 
 
117 Since the paydays had schedules, sometimes the manager would arrive a day early or late to avoid being 
predicted and potentially robbed on the way. Sometimes, particularly when money was thin, the manager 
would skip a month. 
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Kellogg Brown and Root (KBR) and Snamprogetti. These companies likewise are 
required to partner with Nigerian companies to comply with local content regulations. 
Thus, KBR, the main contractor, has partnered with the Southern Gas Company of 
Nigeria (SGC)118 to establish Nigerian affiliation. Yet, in order to avoid paying taxes to 
the government, they then also partnered with a third party, the company Mangrove 
Netherlands in Madeira, a free-trade zone and offshore tax haven.  
This dividing up at the corporate level to meet obligations while avoiding any real 
investment or contribution was somewhat echoed in KBR’s spiraling sub-contract 
practices on the ground. Contractors like KBR already subcontract to third-party national 
and indigenous companies, like Fenog, for parts of the construction. Contracts could be 
simple and small concessions such as those given to women protest leaders for food 
provisions or to youth leaders to supply a boat or barge119. Coveted fuel or labor supply 
contracts tend to be reserved for senior males, chief’s or younger militant leaders, those 
whose status and power in the community could potentially threaten operations. Or, they 
could include larger, more sophisticated indigenous Nigerian companies like Fenog. Such 
practices, again, were long in use under host community programs from the ‘90’s, but 
they greatly expanded under the terms of the GMOUs120.  
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118 It should be noted that when KBR began the project, it was still a part of Halliburton, this all changed in 
2007, when Halliburton was fined by the SEC after loosing a highly publicized bribery case over its LNG 
contract in Bonny Island, Nigeria. Hoping to remove itself from this stain KBR spun off from Halliburton 
and returned to being its own entity.  
 
119 Companies would lease or purchase from suppliers in Warri, Port Hartcourt or Lagos, add a little on top 
and then bill the company as a middleman. This would, on the one hand, end up costing company’s more 
that if they secured their own food and equipment, however, on the other, it fulfilled a quota impressed on 
them by the government to make their contracts 80% local content. 
 
120 Although there is no space to fully discuss it here, this coincided with the Nigerian Government’s 
attempts to enforce local content rules. 
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With the introduction of the new GMOUs, production sub-contracts had to be 
further divided. Jacob, who I first met while he was putting together the book on 
communities for Chevron (chapter 1), was also in charge of organizing sub-contracts. He 
had to make sure that each of the Regional Development Councils had the correct balance 
of contracts. And while working to neatly package culture inside the oil blocs and pages 
of his book, the dry-erase board on the wall of his office, charting community 
subcontracts, was wildly fanning out in all directions. Indeed, it seemed to grow more 
serpentine every few months, each new line a trace of a renegotiation of terms. Contracts 
initially distributed to companies owned by Nigerian politicians, were broken up into 
three or four sections and assigned to additional “second tier” subcontractors, many 
owned by Regional Development Council board members using their new connections to 
Chevron as a spring board to enter the oil industry. By 2011, EGTL had further divided 
these same contracts into smaller pieces to accommodate what was now referred as a “3rd 
tier” order, mainly to have pieces of construction to award new groups of power brokers, 
many connected to former militants (these arrangements are discussed in more depth in 
chapters 3 and 4).  
In this sense, sub-contracting became part of the stated efforts to empower the 
community along the lines Mr. Trust had advocated, where the company provides 
opportunities for community to help themselves. Community leaders seeking to acquire 
production contracts were thus encouraged and sometimes even guided on how to 
formally register themselves with the government as private companies. Having a 
company became a marker of status all its own across the Niger Delta, and I hardly met a 
youth leader or traditional leader who did not have or soon expect to have his own “Llc” 
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(Limited Liability Company) and stack of business cards. In this sense there was a kind 
of entrepreneurial-ization taking hold of the Niger Delta communities, on both the 
collective and individual level.  
However, in actual practice, the proliferation of subcontracting in Nigeria is part 
and parcel of industry-wide trends for offsetting expenses, costs, and liability by 
outsourcing to small, independent companies.121 Moreover, contracts were limited and 
hard to come by. Besides a piece of paper or a business card many licensed contractors 
had never been given a job. The majority of contracts on Jacob’s wall are only awarded 
to those who already have connections with a particular company or project. Therefore, 
they often simply prop up the same wealthy chiefs and leaders already holding power. 
Meanwhile, most youths looking for work find themselves vulnerable to body shops—the 
industry term for cheap contract labor. Since a great number of subcontracts given to 
local leaders are for labor supply, and there are many applicants it is common to ask 
desperate families to provide a dash before taking on a son or daughter as an employee, a 
practice derided by most community members as “selling your brother.”   
Subcontracting creates a set of secondary complications as well as it overlaps with 
the succession of material development initiatives set up through shifting Corporate 
Social Responsibility practices and programs. Since the early MOU system was set in 
place, each new construction, repair or maintenance job, regardless of whether they are 
run by transnational, national or indigenous companies, are required to provide a local 
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121 In Nigeria, as many as nine out of every ten workers (regardless of skill) in the oil sector work as 
temporary or casual labor. They are hired by subcontractors who bid for jobs at the lowest possible cost—
with worker wages and benefits shrinking as a result (Solidarity Center Report, 2010, see chapter 4). 
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development component.122 Multinationals like Shell or Chevron with vast resources are 
often able to complete the commitments it undertakes directly. Not so, however, with 
their contractors. Because they are largely meant to serve a limited purpose, abating 
unrest while finishing a job, many contractors pick up and leave as soon as the technical 
side of their agreements are fulfilled. This is often due to constraints of the sub-
contracting system itself. It is particularly hard for indigenous contractors without the 
resources of transnationals. They have very little wiggle room in their schedules and 
funding. Thus they are always struggling to meet milestone targets and often opt for fast 
and quick fixes to community unrest. A leaked internal report on Shell’s own community 
policies in the Niger Delta, explicitly names “short-term production targets [that] 
supersede long-term perspectives” as a contributing factor to community restiveness and 
notes that 70% of conflicts in the oil fields relate to contract work for which Shell, even 
while providing the contracts, is not legally liable (SCIN, 2004:13).  
The effects of messy contracting practices are everywhere evident in the Niger 
Delta. There is hardly an oil producing community whose landscape is not littered with 
hollow concrete blocks, electrical poles without wires, water tanks without water, schools 
without desks and hospitals without roofs situated next to rust-eaten signs announcing a 
never to rise development. Moreover, with the GMOUs standing as a new agreement, this 
has meant the abandonment of previous agreements. Those companies who shirked their 
development obligations will no longer be legally pursuable. When I asked the project 
manager about the legacy of previous MOU community engagement programs, he 
attempted to sweep all concerns aside, insisting that earlier programs with subcontractors 
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122 Like the town hall meeting in Ogula, when a new pipeline is built, or a company has to come in for 
repairs they have to either hold a town hall or meeting with community leaders not only to explain the work 
but to agree on a development component to be provided to the community. 
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had been superficial, “they lacked meaning” and employed “mostly ghost workers” and 
promised white elephant projects. The new ones, he says, will make sure workers will 
work and that developments are completed. And yet, given that contract work is only 
becoming more pervasive, further fragmenting production, the problems will likely 
continue under GMOU. 
Fenog, for instance, had to suspend its operations twice in 2010 because it did not 
meet its milestone on time. Here they were acting as a subcontractor to a company owned 
by former military president Babangida (who had the initial contract with Chevron and 
NNPC). That company took a large cut of contract money and (according to Fenog 
managers) were stingy with payments to their subcontractor working on the ground. 
Meanwhile, Gbaramatu residents, upset about previously unfinished community projects, 
told Fenog workers that community men were coming to scatter the work site. Fearful, 
the workers fled. Returning towards evening with some military detail, they found their 
worksite occupied with women and children who refused to leave until the company 
scrounged up some funds. In the end, the company lost a day and half of work. 
Meanwhile, the community as a whole hung on Fenog’s paydays, as the workers, 
embedded in their communities, ran up tabs with traders and bars and market women. 
Eventually, almost everyone in the community, though they might not be formally 
employed, knew how many days remained until Fenog’s payday. As production funds 
grew thin, however, the project director stopped taking trips to oversee the project trying 
to avoid questions over missed payments. When the money eventually dried up, 
operations were suspended (while they renegotiated the terms of their contract). Fenog 
simply packed up and left. Returning six months later, they quickly finished the pipeline 
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project but failed to complete the promised community water project, leaving behind two 
empty water towers with taps drilled only a third of the distance to the ground water. 
During my fieldwork it was evident that the problems around subcontracting did 
not go unnoted by the central staff on Chevron’s Escravos project, who, with their 
construction schedule massively delayed, complained bitterly about lazy Nigerian 
workers and greedy contractors. Yet having provided ‘manna from heaven,’ with the 
GMOUs they could not seem to pinpoint where they were going wrong since all their 
internal indicators suggested they were addressing the demands they had constructed. 
Steven, a former used car dealer from Texas turned frustrated accounting and finance 
manager for KBR, went so far as to suggest the threat he felt for his life during a previous 
posting in Iraq paled in comparison to the anxiety he experienced trying to set budgets for 
projects in Nigeria. Setting up KBR’s military kitchen and canteen during early days of 
the Iraq war, Steven describes how his ‘accounting job’ required him to parachute into 
the green zone with duffle bags stuffed with dollars in order to pay contractors, local 
authorities and suppliers there. And yet, he complained that in Nigeria he found the work 
much more stressful, “I mean, in Iraq, ok, they might want to kill you, but you know what 
needs to get done. But here, it’s like, [pause] it’s like impossible, you never know where 
to pay the money so you can never feel sure of anything.” Although perhaps an absurd 
comparison (most obviously given his neglect to recognize that operations in Iraq had the 
full weight of the American army behind it), according to Steven, Paul Bremer’s state 
building enterprise was a much more orderly set-up.  
In the Niger Delta, by contrast, conventional wisdom seems upended, he explains, 
“we thought we were doing the right thing by people, giving them some money and stuff. 
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But I guess then we learned it was causing problems for them so we had to be trying to 
give them GMOUs, contracts, but they still want more.” This demand for “more”, 
however, that Steven references tends to be envisioned as being somehow detachable 
from the way extraction is practiced, the recession of the state, the attempt to create legal 
distance from the programs corporations sponsor. The community relations and liaison 
offices and institutions thus describe their primary role as simply re-authoring the terms 
of exchange, introducing a popular format of “sharing” and inclusion, as part of new 
(proven) trends in corporate social responsibility platforms at large. Yet as a growing 
tangle of programs aimed at stabilizing “community” and establishing its well being 
requires blurring responsibility between the state and corporation, between the 
organization of production and development schemes, it is clear that the subject positions 
being offered to residents in the oil creeks are likewise left unfilled.  
 
Ordinary Water:  
In July 2011, Chevron held a graduation ceremony for a team of youth from the 
Escravos riverine that it had sponsored for a welding training program. Present, was the 
entire management team at EGTL, the chairmen from each of Chevron’s community 
development councils and a liaison from the governor’s office who delivered a message 
on behalf of the Delta State Governor. The master of ceremonies they hired opened the 
event in a rather reverent fashion: “I want to thank God for Chevron and SGC [KBR], for 
training our children and adding value to their lives...let this evidence be accepted by 
Jesus and we pray that they will always be blessed.” Chevron’s EGTL Project manager 
then took the stage to clarify the company’s goals and thought process:  
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We chose to provide a multi-site certification process because we wanted 
it to be real…We have problems but we solve them. We work through 
them and finish them. In this we are setting an example that things can be 
done…I’m proud of you for putting yourself in a position to help yourself, 
your family, your community, your nation.  
 
 The congratulations were addressed not only to the graduates but also to the 
company itself. The Ilaje Regional Development Council Chairman rose and explained, 
“We didn’t know that Chevron was serious, we thought they just wanted to calm nerves. 
But now we know, none of these graduates will be among kidnappers and armed 
robbers.” Mr. Trust, present at the awards agreed, “Chevron has really tried. We have not 
just come to build a plant, we want to look back and see how we have touched the lives 
of those communities…It’s a joy to us! A joy! Capacity building is decided by 
government as the way to empowerment. And now your capacity is built!”  The 
graduates were then invited up to the podium to receive their degree certificates and a 
handshake from a member of Chevron’s management staff. The MC, adding a more 
savory spin to the tone, concluded the ceremony by announcing, “The food is on your 
table…how you are going to eat it is up to you.” 
Stressing its commitment to leaving a legacy behind when it finally demobilizes, 
Chevron paints a picture of idealized corporate/community/state collaboration. Still put in 
terms that stress the notion of the company as giver, putting the food on the proverbial 
plate, the company has bestowed upon the community the free will to consume it. Here, 
Chevron’s gift is as much to the community as to the state, as it is determined that 
government approves this path to capacity building to boost the workforce of Nigeria. As 
Mr. Trust suggests, the company has produced necessary subjects of labor with the skills 
needed to protect and expand the infrastructure, a project now designed to benefit both 
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the communities and the nation at large. Escaping the merely crude logics of energy 
security, the company is described as having amended its former wayward ways, and 
now seeks foster social and political modalities that are thoughtful, generous and of 
course, “real.”  
This term, ‘real,’ however, is a bit troubling, suggesting that the years in which 
communities were subjected to less thoughtful offerings was somehow not real. Indeed, 
the twenty-five years of its earlier ‘partnership development’ programs has left behind 
legacies (and the material ruins and damages they have fostered) that remain only too 
real. For one it has turned security rackets into development rackets. These programs 
have animated a thriving civil society industry in the Niger Delta far outside the 
boundaries of oil communities. A range of actors, professionals and con men ready to 
train welders, offer mediation skills, microcredit and teach the value of trust and 
partnership.123 People like Joel have left their jobs in the cities and set themselves up to 
capture international oil money by partnering in such programs. The emphasis on peace 
and the allotting of new funds occurring after the amnesty as the GMOUs are put into 
effect has also led to an expansion in this ‘mediation’ and development business. A 
former human resources director at NNPC Warri refinery I knew was spending his 
retirement selling conflict resolution workshops to multinationals. I even met a former 
419 fraudster who, after a declared crisis of conscience, decided to retire from his career 
sending solicitous emails posing as a Nigerian prince to western mugus (the word for 
marks) and form his own NGO to break into the oil development funds. Trainings like the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
123 Exploring the NGO community in The Niger Delta and Nigeria would perhaps necessitate a second 
dissertation, I only wish here to point out the great number of institutions with funding and affiliation to a 
host of international organizations are operating here, some since the 1990’s but especially since the 2003 
Warri Crisis.  
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one offered by Chevron to community youth wanting to become welders drew a large 
pool of willing participates. Both men and women in oil communities lined up to take 
advantage of a few weeks lodged in a hotel in the city and a cushy per diem paid to 
participants.124 Meanwhile, hotel owners in Warri lined up to host them. 
To arrive at something like the welder’s graduation, these trainees had already 
been sifted through a network of NGOs and workshops. Participants, selected for skill 
training spent the first week of their program in what were called “mindset change” 
workshops. Largely funded by transnational companies and/or in conjunction with the 
UN or EU, mindset change modules are designed to target and break down what are 
labeled, “bad” beliefs and understandings of work, community and conflict. Participants 
are then reoriented toward steps that help them make ‘informed’ choices and decisions, 
understanding how they impact a larger whole. The modules titled: Vocational Skill 
Guidance, Civic Education and Human Rights, and Conflict Management try to highlight 
key words like “Reconciliation” and “Co-operation.”125 These lessons, however, although 
a precursor to a corporate-sponsored job skills program, emphasizes the challenge of 
living in a democracy. Using role-play exercises, participants are broken into groups and 
asked to imagine themselves as part of a community who “wish(es) to convince others to 
agree with them in a community development project plan.” As they discuss their options 
the imaginary implementation of a water project or the imaginary erection of a primary 
school, participants are introduced to the “key elements of democracy,” which the 
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124 It is not incidental that following amnesty as similar programs were given to former militants, the 
number of former militants, estimated at 3,000 suddenly exploded to 30,000, as many militant leaders took 
money to add young men’s names to the list. There was, of course, an infrastructure already there for them. 
However, the particular programs I refer to in this chapter are not affiliated with the amnesty program but 
are part of Chevron’s GMOU programs. 
 
125 Although I never attended the trainings, I was provided copies of the modules used by the Nigerian 
NGO (funded by the EU and Chevron) in charge of the mindset change workshops. 
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facilitator distributes as a handout: free choice, rule of law, periodic elections, 
fundamental human rights, political institutions, broad-based participation, and a healthy 
civil society. Drawing on these elements they are encouraged to devise the best way to go 
about creating agreement. Here development programs become a way to learn how to use 
communal challenges to make one’s individual voice to be heard within a democracy.126  
There are, however, a deep irony and some painful contradictions being promoted 
in these programs following the amnesty. For one, they encourage participants to act as 
self-managing democratic subjects even while the only way to access benefits and 
recognition like the training program, is to identify oneself as belonging to a particular 
cultural (rather than civil) “community” hosting oil operations. Additionally, the right to 
development and security is presented as contingent on the “community” entering into an 
agreement to safeguard the company’s infrastructure. But perhaps most critically we may 
note that in the jostle to participate in these programs and access development monies, 
the language for asserting rights and demands of the “oil community,” must conform to 
the idioms that the corporate social responsibility programs have themselves co-opted, 
defined and worked on. “Community” under such terms becomes a kind of hall of 
mirrors, a maze-like puzzle of distorted views, reflecting and replicating different 
versions of possible appearances. At the same time, confusion is rampant as, managed by 
corporate-sponsored NGO structures and funded by a conglomerate of state and non-state 
actors, promoting civic behavior and the desire for development, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to view from which angle such reflections are emanating from.  
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126 Such performances followed openers such as beginning each day’s activities began with “trust 
exercises” where participants were asked to either fall backwards, blindfolded, into the arms of their fellow 
participants or to reveal something about themselves to the group. 
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Yet this blurriness and uncertainty between the corporation, the state and business 
interests, according to perhaps the single largest holder of Niger Delta development 
monies, the Niger Delta Partnership Initiative, is precisely the point. Dennis Flemming, 
the director, notes in an article promoting the organization, that the Partnership Initiative 
“intentionally blurs the line between donors and implementers” (Flemming, 2010). 
Dennis, a former member of the Peace Corp, had been part of the assembled team of 
experts that researched and developed the model for the recent GMOUs. However, the 
GMOUs turned out to be only one part of a wider ambition now represented by his later 
work with the Partnership Initiative.  A relatively new organization, the Initiative was 
first implemented by Chevron in Angola in 2002, before being introduced in the Niger 
Delta in 2010. Like the GMOUs, the Partnership Initiative preached the virtues of finding 
compatibility between corporate, state and community interests. However, what 
distinguishes it is an enormous budget, 50 million USD contributed from Chevron, plus 
another 25 million from USAID. Whereas the GMOU Community Development 
Council’s (self-development) budget of around 800,000 USD went to building town halls 
and footbridges, Dennis’s Initiative’s 75 million dollars would easily be enough to build a 
road or to connect the creeks to the state’s electrical infrastructure. However, when I sit 
down to meet with Dennis during his visit to Warri from Abuja (where he is based) he 
describes how the Initiative is less focused on minor reward projects, but instead, 
endeavors to remake the landscape of governance in Nigeria at large.  
“Community,” he explained “is merely a brick in the larger construction.” The 
Partnership Initiative strives to find “new forms of collaboration between private sector 
and development organizations that also provides assistance to local and regional 
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government in order to reduce conflict and strategically capitalize on companies core 
business interests…finding a harmony between good business and good governance.” 127 
Their programs support business trainings and micro-credit schemes for local 
entrepreneurs. However, the initiative, based in the capital at Abuja, far from the oil 
producing delta, applies much of its funding with a view effecting wider shifts in the 
political worlds and business practices of the nation at large, working to erase or “blur” 
the line between the civic and private sphere. For example, training is offered for 
Nigerian politicians and functionaries as well as supporting industries outside of the oil 
fields. Touting both the successes of the previous Initiative project in Angola and the 
current progress with the GMOUs reducing altercations with Chevron, Denis points out 
that they’ve increased his budget hoping to make a much wider impact in Nigeria. In an 
excited tone he describes an imaginary Nigerian public (much like he described the case 
in Angola), where political, local and private interests are equally accommodated, a path 
that can eventually lead to Nigeria “taking back control of their own future beginning 
with the Niger Delta.”  
His portrait, of course, ignores the work of geography and subcontracting, the 
ways in which histories of divisions and power knitting the Niger Delta, the state and 
transnational capital into a volatile cocktail are already blurry and also constantly 
reproduced. However, what makes Dennis’s vision for Nigeria appear operational and 
achievable is that these development initiatives and programs now set their own 
parameters for success: lowering rates of disputes that the company deals with directly, a 
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127 Of course, it is likely no coincidence that the Partnership Initiative has increased its budget as 
transnationals like Chevron have been fighting against the enforcement of new local content laws and 
regulations and the declaration by the Nigerian Government that they are developing new provisions on 
taxation in a new (but still delayed) Petroleum Industry Bill.  
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relatively peaceful Presidential election, a Nigerian government and public welcoming to 
international business participation. Yet, such programs, gaining ground both in the delta 
creeks and within circles of state politicians, produce particular representations of a 
democratic Nigerian future.  
It is therefore not surprising that certain frustrations begin to erupt around claims 
about trust, “shared pains and gains,” and the harmony between “good business and good 
governance.” Throughout the speeches at the Welder’s Graduation, for example, the 
Chevron reps were interrupted by cries from the graduates: “no give us ordinary water,” 
“we want chop (to eat),” “I no see work, give me money-o.” On the one hand, the 
complaints refer to the fact that organizers for the event distributed only bottles of water 
to the graduates, rather than soda, malt or snack foods, as is common courtesy for 
celebratory events.128 On the other hand, lodged within demands for chop and money 
from the company they invoke the legacy of development’s other: deve. 
 
From Development to Deve: 
Deve, is a pidgin play on the word and concept of “development.” It originally 
referred to the practice of dashing money to young men in oil producing communities. As 
the organs of community power were weakened and disorganized, as chiefs used 
community funds to enrich themselves, and as “community” itself became a claimable 
object of power, many youth caught on to the potential for exploiting corporate 
“stakeholders and partnership participation” ideologies themselves. After Saro-Wiwa, 
corporations targeted unemployed youth as a vector of unrest and began to offer them 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
128 As if to add insult to injury, after the ceremony the graduates were loaded back on a bus to their 
lodgings, while the company managers, community council board members and government reps were 
invited to a luncheon provided in the hotel’s restaurant. 
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stand-by payments. Although nominally described as “community workers,” this money 
was distributed in hopes of discouraging protests or vandalism. These distributed 
payments were bundled into budgets as funds that contributed to the development of the 
community (Omeje, 2004; Ikelegbe, 2006). However, realizing that more interruptions 
often brought new repairs and new contractors with more development money (and since 
the money paid them was often small), these youth sometimes organized to interrupt 
operations to increase payments to the community. These payments now called deve were 
themselves transformed through the ironic slang. Deve refers to an action that does the 
very opposite of what it claims, loading the language of “development” with a subversive 
double meaning, as it is appropriated and re-signified as a form of bribery, extortion and 
the antithesis of the promised progress.129 When new contractors arrive and leave villages 
they now might find themselves jeered by shouts of “where’s my deve!” 130 The term is 
used to demand funds (which are desired) but in a way that is meant to shame those who 
are giving them.  
Deve points to more than just how direct payments over the years have backfired. 
The efforts to make ‘development’ the backbone of a certain future by both the state and 
their transnational partners, becomes ‘deve’ the practice of holding power and bottom 
lines for ransom, both marking and mocking the limits of the dynamics working to 
confine the articulation of demands, identities and politics—to bind them (or, according 
to Dennis, blur them) within the channels of foreign-sponsored investment and 
development. Yet, deve also indicates how this has not necessarily been a passive 
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129 This is a common practice in the delta. Pidgin English often makes wordplays out of foreign 
economically-oriented terms. 
 
130 Deve is used almost exclusively with a possessive 
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position to which Niger delta residents fully submit. At the welders training session the 
participant’s response to the corporation’s self-congratulations, complaining about 
serving only “ordinary water,” like ordinary promises, is, given the history of clashes 
around such programs, one that recognizes and warns managers of the shallowness of 
such offerings. While the company works to perform its role as beneficent “sharer,” 
theatrics around notions of reciprocity and the politics of development in the delta, as we 
have seen with the series of kola ceremonies above, are not played only one way.  
Leonard, a Nigerian community liaison officer for Intels131, a security/conflict 
resolution company engaged by Chevron, explained how he finds himself constantly 
suspended in the bind between development and deve and, in one particular instance, at 
the center of a very different circuit of exchange between the company and the 
community. As liaison officer, Leonard acted as the go between for the company and 
various communities, trying to hammer out agreements over the development funds and 
services they would receive. He described the relationship between the company and 
community as a cat and mouse game. In great contrast to the arsenal of program 
figureheads and developers at transnational companies that I interviewed, Leonard’s 
observation was that corporate social responsibility initiatives were contingent on mis-
trust. “Its like that cartoon, Tom and Jerry,” he explained. “They will always settle, they 
always will mistrust. They may be fighting but they are working towards the same thing, 
they are both forces of progress. They can’t live without each other.” His stories, 
however, present corporate-community negotiations since the amnesty took effect as a 
kind of burlesque. Leonard describes how he was kidnapped by Okere community youth 
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131 Intels is a largely Nigerian-owned security company. However, during my field research many 
European’s that had been hired to manage larger security facilities insisted that Intels was actually a 
division of Erinys, the British private security firm. 
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just nine months ago. Chevron had concluded that Okere was at too great a distance to be 
essential to the company’s operations and cut them from the list to receive development 
monies. Angered, men from Okere arrived at the Intels offices in Warri, armed to the 
teeth and shooting into the air. According to Leonard, there were a number of guards 
present, but instead of clashing or firing shots, the armed group let the office know that 
they had come for Leonard and that he “should be given up for kidnapping.” Leonard, 
feeling little choice in the matter, anxiously entered their vehicle.  
His captors took him to their shrine where, according to Leonard, they had all 
manner of charms dangling from trees and the blood from a sacrificed goat lay freshly 
sprinkled on the soil. His captors told him they planned to kill him for his role in trying to 
strip their community of their rights. As Leonard explains it, “they wanted their deve.” 
Yet by evening, Intels assembled its own men, armed them to the teeth, and it was they 
who now arrived at the shrine shooting into the air and asking that Leonard be brought 
back out. Again, without any shots exchanged, Leonard’s person changed hands and from 
that day Okere became included in the list of host communities. Leonard remained their 
designated liaison officer. He is still invited to attend community masquerades, holiday 
celebrations and funerals. His boss has been offered an honorary chieftaincy title in the 
community. He now sits and jokes, warily, with his former kidnappers, who any time 
questions about their payments emerge exclaim, “you, eh, you’re starting again,” and not 
so subtly hint that they’d have no problem coming for him again. And while Leonard’s 
story is certainly not the norm, it points to how the stakes of these performances staged 
between the company and community are ever increasing. With violence threatened at all 
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the nicely phrased edges about reciprocity, sharing and mutual interests, development 
begins to become synonymous with deve. 
 
The Plan: 
Less than a year after the Jubilee Celebration I found myself once again visiting 
with the General Manager of SPDC who had, within the year, risen in the ranks to Vice 
President of both Shell Nigeria, and Shell Africa. I arrived at the palatial executive 
guesthouse at Ogunu accompanied by the Chief with the cowboy boots who had procured 
the kola. The Chief, assessing Shell’s now nearly complete pullout from the Western 
Delta, used the meeting as an opportunity to pitch himself as a prospective buyer of the 
wellhead in his community.132 He brought along to the meeting his bank manager and 
myself, whom he introduced as an American researcher.  
Although for years he held various fuel and equipment supply contracts as one of 
the beneficiaries of the host community system, the chief had absolutely no experience or 
equipment for producing oil. Nevertheless, he put forward an arrangement wherein his 
company after acquiring the wellhead, would provide a 10% profit sharing clause for the 
community from the sale of its oil, put into a trust managed by the chiefs in the 
community. Having, according to him, worked hard to organize a bid for the wellhead, he 
was outraged to discover that Pan Ocean had already (secretly, according to the chief) 
purchased the wellhead (with a chunk of infrastructure around Olomoro) right out “from 
under my people’s nose.” The chief, reminding the Vice President of all he personally 
had done to support him in his career by bringing the community to his side, insisted 
rather definitively, loudly, and not very politely, that the sale be reversed or the youth in 
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132 The chief had actually gone so far as to travel to Holland to complain and try to plead his case to 
officials there. Clearly an embarrassment for the Nigeria Shell management, this meeting was being held 
because of the fuss he’d made. 
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the community would make trouble for the company, “for the people of Olomoro 
community, I beg.”  
The Vice President, declaring his utmost respect for the chief—and knowing that 
dealing with future community unrest would soon, no longer be Shell’s responsibility—
replied that he had no power to cancel the sale of major oil installations and that the bids 
were taken in a very legal and transparent process. He then escorted us to the door. The 
chief, visibly anxious over the outcome of the meeting, struggled even in that doorway to 
get a foot back in. “But what about my dredger?” he asked, describing how he recently 
purchased a dredger, perfect for the Deltan terrain and ready for any available contract 
work. “We’ll see, we’ll see,” replied the VP as he held out his hand to the chief and 
wished him a safe journey home. 
Whether the chief ever received contracts for his dredger, I do not know. 
However, it was clear that since Shell would soon no longer have a stake in the 
community, the relationships it was at pains to cultivate with local leaders for so long 
were being quickly brought to an end. Yet this interaction, the beginning of a 
disinvestment, also underscores the limits, intersections and slippages that have 
developed over the years within the networks and institutions used by transnational 
companies to mediate between the state and Niger Delta residents. Although often cited 
as “ungovernable” these spaces of community are intensely governed by a host of 
sometimes competing, sometimes collaborating institutions. These entwinements have 
produced a number of categories of community, citizenship and belonging that can be 
taken up and used strategically, but that, at the same time, remain empty and hollow 
subject positions. 
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In this chapter I have attempted to demonstrate how as corporate social 
responsibility programs became involved in governing the space around the oil 
infrastructure, “community” became an instrument to bridge a range of fragmented 
institutions and policies, often operating only via bold contradictions. Part and parcel of 
the divisive politics established within and between the state and the Niger Delta region, 
successive host community and regional development council configurations work to 
break apart certain affiliations and establish others.  
 
Towards the end of the Ogula town hall, a resident in the audience stood up, 
frustrated by the thin responses of the company representative’s assurances that Shell 
keeps watch over their future as they complacently dream, and complained, “You talk 
about plans, but what really is your plan towards our people? These are the areas I want 
you to really explain to our hearing, what do you have planned?” In the following 
chapter, I follow how as these ever-renewed promises and plans, grow increasingly 
vague, a set of other actions, desires and possibilities are opened up, and suddenly move 
to the center of the stage.  
Through programs like the GMOUs with their Regional Development Councils, 
the promises of development come to appear only accessible piece-meal, through 
localized non-governmental community programs around the pipelines. However, they 
must also contend with unintended effects, the proliferation of doubled meanings and 
actions (the kola and deve) working to exploit what in fact are often messy, and poorly 
implemented development practices. The chief’s interactions with Shell’s General 
Manager turned Vice President, the Ogula town hall, the welders graduation and the stage 
! 159!
managed kidnapping of the liaison officer thus point to the corresponding practice in 
which both parties work to perform and also slip in and out of certain roles and ascribed 
positions. For as the efforts to ascribe economic rationality—by collapsing notions of 
reciprocity with private investment—to proliferating “development” initiatives, multiply 
and blur the lines between nodes of authority and authorization, these moments become 
brief and critical battles over legitimacy. As residents are caught within recalibrating 
designs to manage community life under various abstract matrices, so too are the 
endeavors to control them increasingly overloaded with multiple meanings, values, 
















Chapter 3: Black Oil Business 
 
 
What, don’t tell me you never heard this one before? (laughs) For years my people were 
complaining to federal government, ‘see, our water is poison, see, our youth are jobless, 
and you, you are growing fat.’ And federal government always replies, ‘be patient, our 
plans for you are in the pipeline.’ We wait and wait. We see no government, we see no 
plans, nothing but these pipelines. It is flowing over ground in this place and 
underground in that one. So one day my brothers say, “come now, why wait, these things 
are right here. Why don’t we open the pipelines up and look for government plans 
ourselves?” (laughter) 
 
--Comedian performing at a wedding in Warri 
telling a joke about the origins of bunkering 
 
 
A creeping network of white mangrove roots obscures the entrance to a tiny waterway 
near Olero Creek. Guwor and his companions have to cut the motor and push carefully 
against the incoming tide to move us safely and discretely into the hidden waterway. 
Inside, the roots give way to muddy, barren banks, with vegetation cut back to a line of 
smoke-blackened palm trees. “Welcome to our plantation,” they announce. A row of 
jerry-rigged iron basins boiling crude oil on an open flame sat nested in this swampy 
quagmire, distilling forms of kerosene, gasoline and diesel. The smell of sulfur and 
smoke suffused the air. Plastic and metal buckets were being shuffled back and forth 
between a set of young men. Some of these containers were emblazoned with a giant 
shell or a flying red horse or a six legged dog breathing fire—mythological figures used 
as branding for the multibillion dollar transnational petroleum companies whose wells 
have been pumping oil and gas on the other side of the river for over 50 years.  
Known as “local refineries,” these volatile and illicit cracking units are supplied 
by a small crude flow line belonging to Chevron’s Escravos Pipeline Network. The line 
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had been soldered into under the veil of night, outfitted quite expertly with a nipple and 
tap so refiners can siphon raw supplies for their “ovens.” Filled to the brim, a dark liquid 
spills over the sides, soaking into the soil. The color of crude oil is surprisingly as 
mutational as its chemical composition. It runs clear and yellow off your hand, turns the 
river water brown, but it glows a luminous black where it touches the ground, coats the 
side of a bucket or the roots of the mangrove tree. As we pass, Guwor shouts orders to the 
men attending the flame that they should reduce it, “for safety.” Turning to me he asked, 
“this is what you wanted to see, right? This is the real black oil.” 
The term “illegal bunkering,” is used to define operations, like Guwor’s refinery, 
of breaking and siphoning hydrocarbon flows into alternate networks of production and 
circulation. Initially a play on the common industry word for loading oil into a tanker 
vessel, “bunkering,” the illicit double became so pervasive that it is has over-grown its 
referent, and is often referred to as just “bunkering” itself. Only 50 miles upriver from 
Guwor‘s makeshift refinery sits the vast and sprawling Nigerian National Refinery in the 
city of Warri. At the back of this massive state-owned infrastructure are a pair of freshly 
erected signboards addressed to “Pipeline Vandals.” Sponsored by the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Company (NNPC) one reads: “What will you bequest to your family and 
children who are watching you steal.” Another: “what will you do at your old age if you 
cannot stop stealing now that you have the strength do to legitimate work.” At the bottom 
right hand corner, written in deep red, is less of an appeal then an order: “vandalism is 




 The signboards, with their fresh coat of paint glowing white against the sky, 
immediately raise a set of questions. What makes it possible to collapse vandalism, a 
term that denotes defacement and damage of property into an act of theft? Why is a 
potential threat to national prosperity and social reproduction raised as a matter of 
technical and personal integrity? And to whom are these utterances addressed? Guwor 
and his companions running their bunkering and refinery operations upriver? The 
employees at the Warri Refinery monitoring pressure levels and processing commercial 
fuel? Or the naval guard stationed at the security checkpoint next to which the signs are 
posted, his service rifle hanging loosely about his shoulder? What activity is it that the 
signboards insist must be avoided?  
In the last chapter I suggested the ways that MOUs and GMOUs to secure 
assurances of salary from some organized around the pipelines reconfigure and set the 
legitimate channels in which communities are offered access to oil monies and 
development. However, in this chapter I suggest that perhaps the dynamic forms of 
access and integration arises from illegitimate reconfigurations of the infrastructure itself.   
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Branded the scourge of the Nigerian oil industry by energy experts, politicians 
and the popular media, bunkering is estimated to have captured as much as 20% of crude 
production over the past ten years (Energy Economist, 2012). These practices are often 
rendered under rubrics of illegitimate accumulation—as theft, and those participating in 
its trade as “oil thieves” or “pipeline vandals.” The inflating incidence numbers have 
been matched by inflationary rhetoric. Since 2003 Shell and Chevron have each declared 
force majeure more than ten times, placing interruptions by vandals and bunkerers on par 
with natural disasters and warfare, allowing them to suspend their production contracts 
without penalty.  Meanwhile, government officials voice concerns that oil thieves are 
embroiling the country in a crisis that threatens not merely its fiscal solvency but also its 
sovereign authority. Sounding the alarm over what he terms “oil pipeline marauders,” 
Austen Oniwon, the Managing Director of NNPC warned that “we may as well wake up 
to discover that they [oil thieves] have taken over the entire country.” (Vanguard, 2012)  
High-level military officers and industry insiders began organizing large-scale 
illegal bunkering in the late-1980s. However, the practice achieved notoriety (and 
response) when militia groups from oil-producing areas, sabotaging key infrastructural 
sites, began to sell bunkered oil to fund an armed social movement against the 
government and its transnational partners between 2002 and 2009. In 2008 “oil militants” 
(as they became known) were said to have either stolen or shut-in (deferred production) 
about a quarter of the nation’s daily output at a time when the price of oil was rocketing 
from $35 to over $100 per barrel on the global market.133 By September 2009, however 
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133 During the price hikes of 2008, the exploits of Niger Delta militants were often reported in connection 
with fears around global shortages and are sometimes cited as a contributing factor to the exponential rise 
of the price of crude on the market. 
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the majority of militant groups had signed a cease-fire and Amnesty accord offered by the 
government to combatants. The Amnesty agreement requested that weapons and 
allegiance be offered up by militant leaders in exchange for skills training, employment 
opportunities and increased development projects for their communities. Setting 
conditions for a fragile peace, amnesty was widely viewed by the state and industry as 
essential to stabilizing production numbers and to reassuring citizens and investors alike 
that the state could maintain control over the circulatory system pumping “the lifeblood 
of the nation.” 
However, in the following two years, as more and more former fighters left their 
villages for Amnesty Program trainings, the number of pipeline breaches rose 
astronomically, by 224% (NNPC figures), suggesting that bunkering activities were no 
longer clearly identifiable with the oppositional politics with which they had for many 
years become synonymous. Since this also happened to be the period of my fieldwork, I, 
like others residing and moving through the oil producing creeks witnessed the morning 
sky increasingly streaked with black plumes of smoke, noted as ever more cloudy ribbons 
of crude floated along the waterways. Tankers anchored just offshore waiting for 
shipments to carry to Lagos or neighboring West African countries would double in the 
night, the whir of pumps filling their cargo hulls humming in the darkness. During the 
day drivers piloted massive wooden boats loaded with plastic Gee Pee tanks of locally 
refined diesel plied the river ways nonchalantly. Local refiners often hitched their load of 
contraband to a jetty in a community referred to as “Back-of-fence,”134 quite literally, a 
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134 This area is considered part of the village of Upomami at Ugborodo, but it is relatively new settlement, 
one that initially developed as a nightlife center, with bush bars for Texaco workers when the tank farm 
was under their control in 1980’s, and then again, for Chevron workers when they merged with Texaco in 
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village situated just behind Chevron’s tank farm and new Gas-to-Liquid plant. Company 
workers in blue and red coveralls shuttling equipment across the worksite would allow 
their gaze to wander between the razor wired, security camera-outfitted fence, some even 
snapping pictures of the casks of the “missing” oil.  
 
Idiomatics of an illegal oil economy 
The common moniker given by those living in the Escravos river area to the trade in 
crude and refined contraband is “black oil business.” While used interchangeably with 
“bunkering” or “bunkering business,” and sometimes with a negative connotation, the 
term is not associated with acts of theft and seizure but with a network of relations. Those 
undertaking bunkering and refining in the villages must collaborate with military 
officials, oil workers and international tanker captains. Interrupting the insulated and 
modular universe of steel pipelines these networks divert oil through intimate rhythms of 
life at the periphery of industrial oil hubs. Maximizing their connections to various 
sectors of the commercial industry, black oil business generates funds that have been 
critical to rebuilding and sustaining communities destroyed and emptied after decades of 
intercommunity fighting and raids by government soldiers.  
Yet these arrangements forged between pipeline breachers, soldiers and oil 
workers have also become a central motif in the representations of risk factors to 
Nigeria’s national body and to global oil supply markets. During the militant period, 
activities like interrupting production by local militias were accompanied by demands for 
compensation, environmental rehabilitation, greater resource control and political 
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1998. However, after two employees were shot during the 2002 attacks the company forever sealed its 
gates from “back-of-fence,” freeing up its banks for black dealers. 
! 166!
recognition from the state, combining sabotage and bunkering with an explicit political 
agenda (Watts, 2005; Ifeka, 2006; Frynas, 1997). Thus, bunkering was read as a symptom 
of wider state neglect and as part of a struggle to recuperate losses by those marginalized 
by larger hegemonic powers. Yet in the post-amnesty moment bunkering is often 
mistaken—to rather strategic ends—as a causal agent of violence itself. Legaloil.com, an 
industry sponsored website that has created an archive of hundreds of news clippings and 
academic papers to define, track and treat the rash of theft, explains in its mission 
statement that:  
Theft of oil costs oil companies, governments (and the communities they 
serve) hundreds of millions of dollars each year in Nigeria alone. In addition 
to loss of revenue, oil theft fuels violence and insecurity, feeds corruption, 
finances the purchase of weapons, corrupts youth, escalates youth 
unemployment, causes environmental pollution and destabilizes communal 
life. 
Like the proverbial dominos, oil theft activates a cascading row of losses, from corporate 
and state revenue streams to the safety and security of small fishing villages. These losses 
are figured as part of a causal chain where oil-producing communities are merely pawns 
in a larger criminal enterprise. As Anna Zalik has observed, such statements work to 
insure “that ‘abusive’ relations of extraction— those that cause pollution, contribute to 
corruption, and eruptions of violence—come to be associated with bunkering activities, 
rather than the (state sanctioned) operations of multinational oil companies” (Zalik, 
2011). When the UNEP launched an investigation into Shell’s liability for decades of 
pollution in Ogoniland in 2010, these types of arguments became more pervasive. Shell 
even began to fly journalists in their seaplanes and helicopters over local refinery areas to 
report on the deep destruction they caused. They have used bunkering as a defense in 
multiple ongoing legal cases, claiming that oil theft is responsible for the majority of 
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spills.135 A series of videos posted to YouTube by Shell around the time the UNEP 
investigation began underscores this point. In one scene we meet a Nigerian oil worker in 
bright orange coveralls walking through a blackened oil spill explaining to viewers: 
It’s fair to say that [oil theft] is being run by highly organized criminal 
gangs….I feel very sad, not just because of the economic sabotage but 
because of the environment, because of the fact that some unscrupulous 
person decided to get rich destroying our environment which we should be 
leaving for our future children.136  
Echoing the signboards above, social and environmental dissolution is again linked to 
“economic sabotage.” While legal oil operators have spilled between 500,000 and 2 
billion barrels of oil, the implicit suggestion is that ending oil theft is key to rehabilitating 
the Nigerian environment, economy, and future—returning it to a state of verdant 
reproductivity. The figure of “theft” therefore provides the vehicle against which a future 
tied to economic tenants of transparency and accountability must be safeguarded, “a 
metaphysics of order,” wherein the state as legitimate owner guaranteed by transnational 
capital can be projected as a moral endeavor (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2006, 279).  
And yet, in shaping the boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate oil 
infrastructures and accumulations, the thief remains a mysterious figure, one that seems 
intentionally vague and unnamed. The actual beneficiaries of bunkering are masked as 
“criminal gangs,” and “corrupt elements,” untraceable and apolitical actors like “pipeline 
marauders.” The explicit political claims made by militants using bunkering as an 
instrument of protest are conspicuously absent. Indeed, they are replaced with claims that 
the community members who do participate do so in order to eke out a living, becoming 
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135 Lawsuits of individual communities against Shell and Chevron regarding their refusal to clean oil spills 
are growing largely in part to the efforts of grassroots and international NGO’s like Friends of the Earth 
and Platform. Bodo v. Shell, recently heard at the London high court, turns around this issue of how to 
detect and prove the provenance of a spill when an area has endured not only massive slicks from leaks and 




the prey of merciless bands of pipeline marauders. The interruption to flows of oil is 
criminalized whereas legitimate accumulation is represented as responsible and 
accountable, protecting the integrity of the pipelines and manifolds that make the 
Nigerian economy. And yet, this imaginary of the way in which illicit oil activities relates 
to “National Economy” writ large operates on a negative, visceral, messy blackened 
ground precisely where any identifiable agitator is missing, displaced and unnamable.  
 
A loud peel of laughter from Ebi.  
It is November, 2010, just over a year since the amnesty. We are sitting in the bar 
of the Izoko hotel in Warri. The hotel provides lodgings for former militants attending a 
three-month welders training program sponsored by the government amnesty 
rehabilitation program. On break from the day’s session young men are sipping bottles of 
Stout and Star and playing music on their phones. Ebi, whom I’d met during my 
fieldwork around Gbaramatu, was a former fighter with the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). Having “written his name down” alongside 
his fellow freedom fighters, he was still waiting to receive his training assignment. In the 
meantime, other opportunities had presented themselves. We were meeting at the Izoko 
because Ebi had travelled from the creeks to the city to share the free accommodations of 
his comrades while making arrangements for what he referred to as his ‘business.’ This 
was an illegal bunkering operation he was organizing for a man described only as a 
“Northerner” and an “Al hajji,” a man he was connected to through a Nigerian soldier 
from the north, posted to a military checkpoint at Ogulah (his community) “the Land of 
Liquid Gold.” After giving up his weapon at the Amnesty ceremony in 2009, Ebi 
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travelled all the way to Kaduna to meet with the Al hajji and set the terms for his venture. 
When I ask why he would risk so much, going into bunkering now that the amnesty deal 
is finalized and the military has set up checkpoints at former militant and bunkering 
strongholds, Ebi bursts into laughter, “there is no amnesty for the pipeline!” he exclaims. 
Moreover, he continues, all black oil business is being allowed a one-year grace period 
by the president himself. He had given instructions that no government troops should 
disturb black oil operations until the time was up.  
I’d heard this claim from a few market women and petro-dealers in Oporoza some 
weeks earlier, yet it was the first time a black oil practitioner, whose security and 
livelihood depends on anticipating the shifting oil security policies, explained it quite this 
way. “See, ah, see” Ebi explains shaking his head at my ignorance, “bunkering costs 
money. Big, big money. You will pay for someone to crack the line, pay for the pump, 
the barge and the boat. You will give these community boys something for protection and 
the military [at checkpoints] something to smooth your passage.” Tallied together it 
comes to around 6 million naira (40,000 USD) for moving 2,500 tons of crude, which 
includes the million he expects to receive for himself. “Its not just anyone that can have 
this kind of money,” he continues, “it is these big Ogas (bosses) in government who can 
go to the bank and take a loan.” According to Ebi, many such ventures were already 
active, customers had been arranged, the interest was mounting, and participants like 
himself had set out expenses for the job. If the government were to stamp out bunkering, 
he explains, not only would black oil dealers lose their expenses, but the elite class of 
debtors (said to include the president’s wife) would default on their loans, and would, 
according to Ebi, “crash the Nigerian economy.” 
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This seemed a rather exaggerated conclusion, suggesting that bunkering is, to 
apply the well-worn aphorism of America’s financial crisis, “too big too fail.” Despite a 
few cases and reports it is impossible to verify the extent to which the Nigerian central or 
commercial banks are financing bunkering.137 40,000 USD, while clearly a lot of money, 
hardly seems a sum difficult for a highly placed political official to obtain loan-free, and 
certainly the President made no public declaration of amnesty for the pipeline. Yet, 
whether true or false, this vision of an oil-fueled national economy overleveraged to 
black oil business suggests other idioms for bunkering. Ebi maps out a set of 
engagements with venture capitalists, banks, officers of the state and contracted bodies to 
provide labor and security—a web of relations that recalls the modalities of the oil 
industry itself. Black oil is here neither parasitic on national modes of accumulation nor a 
perversion of global economic market logics, but in fact, essential to them, keeping oil 
and money circulating. “Black oil business” is viewed as working within the material 
pathways—building, breaking, repurposing and reassembling them. Notions like risk and 
returns are calibrated through multiple forms of knowing and knowledge. Ebi, for 
instance, pays attention to when the price of oil is high and when it is low. He views 
bunkering as a form of short-term accumulation, authorized by power, in the oil fields 
where agreements are often temporary and unstable, where longstanding political 
violence has ruptured the fabric of daily life for oil workers and oil community residents 
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137 In 2007 naval officers arraigned on charges of oil theft were said to have financed their ventures through 
Nigerian banks. However, as no public investigation ensued, there is little direct evidence that banks are or 
are not heavily leveraged to bunkerering ventures (the officers themselves got off with little more then a 
wrist slap.) The language of potential economic collapse that Ebi uses, however, is mostly likely related to 
the heavily publicized “Nigerian banking crisis” in 2009, when it was revealed that bank managers had 
given out extraordinary unrepaid loans to powerful politicians and were now in jeopardy of crashing. Many 
of these accounts employed the language that emerged to describe the 2008 meltdown in global financial 
institutions and following bailouts. My discussion with Ebi took place in 2010, and it is possible he was 
referencing this event in the story. 
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alike. Such work is facilitated through a slippage of identities: a “freedom fighter,” turned 
“repentant militant” turned “black oil businessman.” 
The general guiding principle to this chapter is that bunkering cannot be 
approached as a single thing. Part menace, part pastiche of the idea of “the oil economy” 
itself138, it engages a range of practices, circuits, social worlds, and institutions and is 
taken up within varying discourses. Therefore each section considers bunkering within a 
different constellation. I am interested in illegal bunkering as both practice and as 
something that enables, perhaps even necessitates, the rendering of such practices as 
“theft” as an empty placeholder.  
 
Black oil Business 
 “Black oil business,” as an empirical category, refers to the enterprise of selling 
hydrocarbon products on the black market, and to the blackness of the oil itself, whose 
hue is intimately familiar to Niger Deltans having endured half a century of spills and 
leaks from faulty oil pipelines that saturate the soil and blacken the salty white roots of 
mangrove trees.139 Not all black oil and black oil networks are the same. The kind of 
large scale bunkering of crude Ebi is undertaking requires links to well-established cartels 
who sell the crude to refineries in Brazil and Rotterdam.140 Crude moves through the 
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138 And here I am thinking with Tim Mitchell’s notion about the problematic and historic emerge of a range 
of practices, interests, actors and actants that get reworked to huddle under the nomenclature of “the 
economy”. 
 
139 Black oil is sometimes differentiated from “white oil” used to describe the clear color of commercially 
refined products that are siphoned from the National Refinery. Black oil and white oil are also, however, 
the official terms used in the industry to distinguish between flows of crude and refined oils, mostly as 
regards the pipelines used to transport one or the other. 
 
140 This is based on speculations published in energy security reports. Refineries in Brazil and Ecuador are 
said to be owned by prominent politicians like Banbangida and  Alameseigha.  
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pipeline under a pressure of 600 pounds per square inch, and with such pressure it takes 
only a few hours to fill up a 1,000-metric-ton barge. Local refineries like Guwor’s, 
however, became popular black oil trade only following the Amnesty Agreements as 
young men, no longer tied to a tightly coordinated militant structure and free to move 
about the region began looking for opportunities for work and forged their own 
connections to local politicians141 and nationally based petroleum distributors.  
As I described in Chapters 1, I first arrived in the Escravos area a few months 
after the Amnesty, as villages were flooded by oil-servicing companies tasked with 
getting production back up and running, repairing punctured lines and replacing mangled 
well-heads that had suffered severe damage during the militant period. Then, life in the 
communities largely revolved around the schedule of workers and their paydays. 
However, as certain jobs were completed and others stalled by financial trouble, life in 
Escravos turned rather rapidly towards the more nocturnal orientations of black oil 
business.142  
Young men hired to supply water or to cut grass for the company were now going 
out to work in the bush. In more remote villages of Egbema where the trade was its most 
rampant, rows of fishing camps were transformed into vast and extensive production 
lines, with grandmothers and small children ferrying crude and refined product back and 
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141 Politicians in the Niger Delta are said to be positioned to link local refinery operators with potential 
customers. However, they also have taken on many former militants, using their influence and arming them 
to help them take elections. 
 
142 It is important to note that bunkering and local refining ventures benefitted greatly from the repairs that 
had been undertaken right after the amnesty, as this allowed oil to flow again in areas where pipelines had 
not been working for, in some cases, 7 years. The area was now flush with crude. I left Escravos briefly 
with Fenog workers when they were recalled due to funding problems. Bunkering was taking place before 
this period, however, when I returned a few weeks later there was already a striking surge of activity and in 
the following months black oil business became increasingly visible as the oil-servicing companies and 
their payments and jobs dried up.  
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forth in hand pulling canoes. After two months, local diesel packed into dented steel 
drums began to crowd community jetties. Worn and discarded rubber hoses used to 
transfer crude littered the riverbanks like the discarded entrails of some slain hydrocarbon 
beast. Sometimes the outgoing tide would leave inexperienced bunkerers and their booty 
stranded on a sand bar, their containers of crude open to the air. I once watched a 
fisherman row his small canoe in the shallow waters to an abandoned barge and fill a 
bottle full of bunkered oil for his child suffering from seizures—something crude was 
commonly believed to treat. As he left, he had to steer around Chevron’s sign warning 
ships about the hidden dangers of oil production: Crude Oil Pipelines, Do Not Anchor. 
Underneath were phone numbers to call in case of emergency, a numerical sequence that 
hadn’t been used in Nigeria since the turn of the millennium. 
As its presence grew nearly ubiquitous, I was pestering the black oil dealers I 
knew at Escravos with requests to visit a local refinery. Guwor, who had been running 
this particular ‘plantation’ (as he was fond of calling it) for two months finally offered to 
take me. To obtain permission we had to first meet with the big boss, the “Oga.” Often an 
important community leader responsible for the security of a particular area, the Big Oga 
receive a percentage of every shipment.143 Tall and gangly and wearing a red felt Santa 
hat with white tassels in celebration of the current Christmas season, this particular Oga 
referred to himself as “the Local Refineries Chairman.” He had been a prominent 
community youth leader and a fighter with MEND. Now he likened his role to that of a 
“union leader,” ensuring the safety of the boys running the refinery, making sure that if 
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143 Many Oga’s also hold ‘legitimate’ security contracts from the government and oil companies. In fact, 
these contracts were awarded to them specifically because they have the authority to manage, to a certain 
extent, the area around the pipelines, a position which is then increasingly solidified with increased 
payments. I have touched on this dynamic in the previous chapter. 
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caught by security forces he would get them out of jail, or if injured or worse, make sure 
their family received their share of the next shipment.  
Before departing, we shared a bottle of ogogoro Guwor had brought as a gift for 
the chairman. Ogogoro (also known as kai kai in eastern parts of the Delta), a strong, 
locally brewed gin from delta palm plants was also once a popular unsanctioned 
commodity. In the 1930’s, duty taxes for imported European spirits were raised to try to 
discourage and limit alcohol consumption, labeled by the colonial government as a threat 
to public order.144 The price of European gin, a staple in delta ritual, exchange and social 
gatherings since the late slave trade period, quadrupled. To increase supplies and cut 
prices, delta residents began fabricating local distilleries, which they set deep in the bush 
to avoid tax collectors and the police. Although not longer illegal, Ogogoro remains 
today in high demand. Meanwhile its distilleries have provided the knowledge and 
technology for local refineries. Many ogogoro “ovens,” were simply repurposed to boil 
crude instead of palm, and to produce an array of illicit fuel products. Ogogoro, like fuel, 
is associated with heat and energy and is a popular drink among men working the 
refinery circuit, said to “give the body power.” Perhaps it also accounts for why local 
refining employs such an alimentary language as processes of refining are described as 
“cooking” in “ovens.”145  
After agreeing not to take pictures—as photographs of bunkering and local 
refining were quickly becoming commodities themselves, visiting journalists paying as 
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144 Spirits were listed one of the main controlled commodities considered a threat to public order in the 
colony.  Along with guns and cars and it required a license to be sold. (Heap, 2008) 
 
145 The consumer of ogogoro is said to be, “putting fire in the body,” “giving the body power.” The shared 
properties of power and energy in ogogoro with oil and gunfire also comes to feature large in certain 
Egbesu practices used by militants. These will be addressed in more detail in chapter 5 
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much as 20,000 USD for a shot—we piled into Guwor’s fiberglass boat, chairman and 
all. Nigeria’s oil is known in the industry as a “sweet crude,” a particularly coveted grade 
of petroleum as its light sulfur content makes it cheap and easy to refine. These properties 
likewise make it possible to simply heat and boil it over an open fire, passing the steam 
through a pipe to water coolers where it is condensed into liquid kerosene, gasoline or 
diesel (depending on the cycle—kerosene is boiled off first, diesel, which constitutes the 
bulk of by-product, is last.) At the refinery, grunt workers, known as boboer’s, ran back 
and forth from the oven, managing the flame, pouring tar to keep it high and using Omo 
(a popular brand of detergent) and water mixtures to quench it. The boboer’s life is one 
of heat and sweat, they develop dark lines beneath the fingernail that never wash away. 
The boboer is also the most dangerous position. If the flame licks the escaping gas “all 
your product and even your own life, sef, can burn up in an instant, pow! Gone!” Guwor 
is referred to as the “bossman,” the on site manager who oversees the everyday running 
of things and, critically, holds the money for paying workers and the military if they 
should try to disrupt operations.  
In the creeks, everything moves on water. Rather than pressure levels, viscosity 
and meter counts, the metrics of local refining are organized around the “GeePee tank,” a 
5,000 liter plastic basin, and the “native boat,” a large wooden vessel initially crafted to 
move large quantities of palm oil during the colonial period.146 In a single “cooking” 
cycle, one oven can produce 2 GeePee tanks (1 GeePee tank = 40 barrels of diesel) and 
each native boat is built to carry 8 GeePee tanks. The going rate at the time was 4 million 
naira (27,000 USD) for a native boat carrying a full load of petrol. But all this could be 
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146 Native boat craftsmanship has remained in demand since even early oil prospecting days, as oil 
companies often rent them to move equipment through the waterways, since they are cheaper to acquire 
than barges and can carry a great amount of weight. 
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spoiled in an instant. No one is paid unless the shipments go through and capsized boats 
and refinery explosions are not infrequent.  
As black oil business expanded, the Escravos area became outfitted with new 
depots, hideouts, loading and diffusion points. Since fighting between militant youth 
groups and the government erupted in 2002, activities not connected to fighting in the 
riverine had been steadily declining. Many residents fled to urban areas like Warri as 
successive raids by soldiers and neighboring militias destroyed their villages. Market 
women abandoned traveling down river, fearing ambushes by both the military and 
militants. Oil companies erected high, electrified fencing and restricted the movements of 
their workers. But now, new vendors and fortune seekers were arriving from across 
Nigeria, hoping to get a foothold in the black oil boom. They filled bars, restaurants and 
guesthouses formerly used to accommodate subcontracted oil workers from Chevron and 
Shell. Men in new leather shoes, untarnished by muddy riverbanks, could be seen 
lingering in remote bush bars, potential buyers waiting for their ‘guy,’ the refinery 
bossman with whom they’d negotiate for supply and delivery arrangements. Young men 
sat anxiously on wooden benches next to market stalls, waiting for news that a bossman 
was looking to hire.  
This was not the first time bunkering was taking place in Escravos. However, 
during the early 2000’s most of the bunkering activity was controlled on the ground by 
militants and by one particular group, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger 
Delta (known as MEND).  Now, as one black oil participant explained, you no longer 
need to carry a gun to make your business. A number of (mostly) men who had grown up 
in urban areas and never visited their villages or others seeking a connection arrived to 
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offer their services. Many were drawn by rumors and stories and they often cited the 
national and international media as proof of the incredible riches that bunkerers made 
during the period of militancy. Now that the fighting had abated and the waterways had 
calmed, they hoped to find a place for themselves. Godwin, a young man just arrived 
from Benin City was optimistic, “I finished school at Ekpoma, in electrical engineering, 
but for two years now, no job. At school I knew a boy from this side, who said that his 
people here are getting rich…so maybe they need someone like me?...This is the Niger 
Delta, as you know, where they have oil. There is money here.”   
At Ugborodo, just across a narrow creek from Chevron’s rising Gas to Liquid 
plant, new jetties were built to accommodate the influx of boats and ovens being 
fashioned and acquired for sale or rent. Native boats storing their product while waiting 
customers were so dense they choked the passageway, once a main capillary for 
fishermen entering the community to sell their wares. An elderly women returning with 
her morning catch of fish knocked her canoe against the side of a fuel-loaded vessel 
blocking the waterway, nearly capsizing. Sucking the air through her teeth and shaking 
her head in disapproval, she muttered, “black oil fever.” 
Many who participate in black oil business, even as grunt labor, consider it just 
this, not employment, but business. Samuel was a boat driver who had been employed by 
an oil servicing sub-contractor building a pipeline in his community. He described his 
employment there as “work.” When the company’s contract finished a few months later 
he shifted job markets and became a ferryman for a local refinery ring. He referred to this 
as his “business.” When I asked him the difference, he explained, “before, I was a just a 
worker for the company, not even staff. I moved people from here to there. They’d just 
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yell at me, ‘go to this place, pick that person.’ This one is business, na real black oil 
business. Now, I am like a cable, like the pipeline. If you want something, I am the one to 
connect you to it.”  
Although his duties were very similar, he merely exchanged carrying people to 
carrying hydrocarbons, and he was still under the orders of a “bossman,” who referred to 
Samuel as his employee, black oil business is imagined as not simply exchanging work 
for remuneration, but an opportunity to build and engage strategic relationships. In black 
oil business, as Samuel explains, the government soldiers, the company worker looking 
for side pay, the politician trying to fill his pockets, must connect to you. Rather than 
being an employee, one’s personal benefit is tied up in the entire operation itself. Each 
successful shipment of black oil could give Samuel between 200,000 and 300,000 naira, 
rather than 40,000 naira he earned per month as a boat driver for Fenog. He 
acknowledged the work is clearly more risky, but had the advantage of large potential 
returns, enough to send his children to secondary school in Warri. 
Describing a form of income as ‘my business’ is common in Nigeria, where even 
if one has employment or a salary, one is often also ‘doing business’ on the side. 
“Business” can be selling phone cards to your neighbors, hairdressing, running a small 
taxi or transport company, selling air fresheners brought back by a relative from a trip to 
Dubai or Shanghai. But ‘doing business’ is likewise a way in which security and success 
is often imagined in Nigeria, not as steady employment and salary, but as having realized 
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the social connections to obtain access to luxury goods, government contracts or centers 
of power.147 
However, at Escravos, the kind of hedging and entrepreneurship required in the 
black oil business is particularly informed by the organization of oil infrastructures and 
the way in which they are built and managed. It is important to recall that situated at the 
mouth of a major river network emptying into the Atlantic, residents in Escravos had a 
long history of trading (See Chapter 1). Yet, as foreign companies and subcontractors 
arrived and erected work camps and permanent stations in the early 1970’s, these trading 
circuits were increasingly centralized around the everyday support systems of the oil 
industry. For example, kitchen workers at Chevron’s tank farm have, for years, sold 
unused and leftover imported food items like frozen chicken and tin milk to community 
traders who will then vend the (often) expired items in nearby villages. As pollution 
depletes fish stocks every year, a number of fisherwomen around the Escravos area 
supplement for lost income by purchasing diesel and gasoline toppings allotted to 
company boat drivers moving workers and equipment through the rivers. They then resell 
it to the public or, in some cases, to other company workboat drivers. As large-projects 
like Chevron’s Gas to Liquid plant expand, long-established fishing camps increasingly 
act as recycling bazaars showcasing the sundries skimmed off production inventories. 
Here, dwindling daily catches are displayed alongside discarded cuts of beef, a box of 
cheerios from Chevron’s canteen and jerry cans of fuel pinched from a Shell contractor.  
Local refining is certainly part of these networks, that have, for years tried to 
blunt the boom and bust of economies in the creeks where one month an oil servicing 
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147 Andrew Apter (2005) has referred to this in his book as Nigeria’s “contracting culture,” wherein the 
performance of one’s connections to the state or business world has become a way of generating 
respectability and even financial prospects (419 scams form the primary example here). 
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company pumps cash and services (deve148) into communities as they build or repair a 
section of infrastructure and then disappear the next. However unlike these smaller scale 
markets, black oil business has become part of a massive credit system emerging across 
multiple villages hosting bunkering and local refining participants in a relatively short 
period of time.149 When a bunkering or refinery shipment is successful cash in the 
communities is abundant, bush bars are full, boats moving between communities and to 
and from the city of Warri increase. Yet if there is an explosion or a crackdown by the 
military money is suddenly scarce. Black oil dealers wrack up huge tabs and debts and 
the fate of their shipments affects a great majority of people, from bar owners and market 
women to a group of manicurists polishing nails for the girlfriends of black oil dealers by 
day while cleaning and clipping those of their lovers returning from their bush refineries 
in the evening.  
Turning Escravos into a perpetual frontier town bunkering also becomes a skill set 
invested with mythologies of magical possibilities capable of bringing windfalls of 
wealth. The Kaowei, the chief priest, at Oporoza, for example, is a legendary “cracker.” It 
is said that during the militancy period he used his divinatory power to break pipelines at 
precisely the right joint, that the powders in his medicine pouch protected his venture so 
that the entire operation went off without spilling a drop. His siphoning abilities were so 
adept that Chevron was rumored to have paid him millions of naira to retire. And yet, the 
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148 Deve, which will have been more fully explained in preceding chapters, is the pidgin term for the mix of 
cash payments made directly to community coffers by transnational companies who euphemistically label 
them, “development money.” 
 
149 Although this most likely has to do with the fact that credit systems of a certain kind were already in 
place during the time when subcontractors like Fenog were present and their paydays would provide 
assurances for credit and tabs to be taken out. As I allude to later in the chapter credit also has to do with 
kinship relations and designations between indigene and stranger. My research unfortunately did not look 
too deeply into local credit systems which, as I write this, I realize forms a bit of a hole in the project. 
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Kaowei himself was amazed when, as we sat on the porch of his unusually large home in 
Oporoza, he was visited by a new crop of black oil businessmen who recounted a 
bunkering tale of their own. This man, they said, managed to steal commercial fuel 
straight from the national refinery in Warri (making him technically, a white oil 
businessman). He had built his house just next to an enclosure of the pipeline and a run 
tapline into his parlor. For four years, tankers would come in the night and fill up from 
his compound and be gone by morning. After four years, he said, it finally came to the 
attention of the National Refinery management150 and soldiers were sent in to burn the 
man’s house to the ground—a rather easy feat as the foundations by this time were 
steeped in oil.  
“A tap like that, the man is chanced.” Explained the storyteller 
“ 4 years! Even six month, that man would be a billionaire!” Exclaimed the chief 
priest. His comrades listening to the story also chirped in, 
 “Kai! See money-O, four years.”  
“The man was swimming in money.”  
“With that kind of product the man will be able to have his own filling station,”  
“More than one, sef.”  
Money and oil are in constant exchange here, but it is the body of the pipeline itself that 
appears as the medium of this transformation, a direct mainline to sources of otherwise 
obscure value that moves oil and oil revenues away from the delta to the capital at Abuja 
and to cosmopolitan elsewheres. And yet, it is a brief and highly speculative venture. Six 
months, let alone four years, was considered an incredible amount of time to keep a 
tapline open. Most of the black oil dealers I spoke with were young, and like Ebi or the 
visitor from Benin, anticipating fast and large windfalls of cash. Hardly anyone imagined 
their ventures would last up to a year, although, at the same time, many expressed hopes 
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150 It is rather difficult to imagine, given the dynamics of bunking business in Nigeria that someone related 
to the National Refinery did not already know this was going on. However, the idea, in the story is that the 
once the information became too widely know, management was forced to act. I actually asked three 
different workers I interviewed at Warri refinery, including a manager, about the incident, but all denied it. 
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that the government would legalize local refineries (this explained further below). This 
story told to the chief priest ends in the way all stories about black oil ventures end, in 
fire, military interference and deeper destruction of the rivers, forests around which 
communities live. Black oil business describes a certain configuration of lack, surplus 
and risk, contributes to existing and generates new fantasies of wealth.  
 
Adulteration and Copies  
Samuel’s, metamorphosis, from company boat driver into a (metaphoric) cable, echoes 
Ebi’s earlier evaluation of black oil business and black oil participants as a connecting 
thread, a critical stitch in the mysterious machinations at work behind the figure of a 
“national economy.” And indeed these dealings in illicit oil with their attendant fantasies 
and ruins, have, like the term bunkering, overgrown their place at the margins and have, 
in fact, become part of the practical and symbolic topography of the Nigerian oil industry 
and economy itself. In Fernando Coronil’s historical ethnography of Venezuela he points 
to how the objectification of oil is constitutive to the objectification of state power in the 
shape of two bodies: political and natural. On the one hand, “as the oil business became a 
state business, the politics of oil became the business of politics”  (Coronil, 1997, 84). On 
the other, “the wealth of the nation came to be identified with its natural body” (Coronil 
1997, 97). The production of Venezuela as an “oil nation,” entailed a process of 
domesticating value produced by transnational capital with a relatively small and 
specialized workforce. In the case of Nigeria, Andrew Apter has similarly suggested that 
large windfalls of profit from oil in the 1970’s became the figurative “life-blood” of the 
national body and the political became a theater in which the state could produce wealth 
from the magical power of oil business (Apter, 2007, 48). As I mentioned in the last 
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chapter, Apter insists that national development under oil capitalism generated an 
overproduction of signs, an “illusion of growth” whose referents were always spectral, 
and whose signifiers, ephemeral, were staged through appearances: new buildings with 
only facades, roads that end around the bend (Apter, 2007, 248).  Both authors’ 
arguments rest on the transformation of wealth produced through rents into a symbolic 
register of power that obscures the fact that its foundations, anchored in the subsoil, are 
unstable and vulnerable to erratic international pricing mechanisms (Guyer, 2015). 
  However, Apter and Coronil do not address the ways that oil partakes also of a 
more quotidian imaginary in which oil products are purchased and consumed by its 
citizens. Although a major crude producer, Nigeria struggles with constant fuel shortages 
and a faulty national electrical grid. The country is one of the world’s largest generator 
markets and citizens and businesses depend heavily on personal fuel supplies. The 
national refineries, like the one in Warri where the signboards admonishing oil thieves 
are posted, operate at reduced capacity, their equipment failing and outdated, reliant on 
an unreliable coterie of middlemen importing fuel funded by government subsidy 
payments. Much of this fuel never materializes and a large portion sits collecting 
demurrage due to poor infrastructure at Nigerian ports. Meanwhile, over the years, an 
estimated 30 billion dollars has disappeared from the State’s excess crude fund—draining 
from public coffers into private pockets.151 These dalliances with capital and state 
funding, what Mbembe has called in the Cameroonian context, “private indirect 
government,” also, are rendered by the Nigerian press as forms of thievery. Need for 
lacking energy supplies, and its cost to the Nigerian public, is spectacularized in reports 




areas. Residents and passersby will flock to a spill armed with buckets, bottles, cans—a 
rush that often leads to a stray match setting off and engulfing harried foragers in a 
gigantic inferno.  
 As the price of oil increased and availability decreased, locally refined diesel, 
gasoline, and kerosene began being sold and distributed through roadside vendors and 
licensed commercial petrol stations across Nigeria.152 Black market products are 
generally sold at a third of the price of commercial products and are therefore sought 
after by wholesale distributors and transport companies using them to gauge prices and to 
stave off shortages. Locally refined products, however, must be mixed with commercially 
refined fuels, as their chemical chains are unstable, and can destroy engines and cause 
explosions if not properly balanced. Many end users are not aware if they are buying 
local product. At the same time, there is a general awareness and suspicion that mixing 
takes place. In the long petrol queues in Warri waiting customers sometimes swap tips on 
where to get the best, by which they mean, least adulterated, fuel. A Nigerian logistics 
manager whenever he receives diesel supplies for his company’s vehicles explained to 
me that he makes sure to ask the fuel supplier, “Bross O, I hope you no over-mix ‘em?” 
There were even a series of tests “experts” could use to determine the provenance of fuel, 
the difference between “real and fake”: 
One, shake it. The real one will not foam out, while the fake will be everywhere. 
Two, smell it. The real one will smell sharp, like chemicals, the fake one will 
have a burnt smell from cooking. Three, put some on your hand. Only the real 
one will evaporate immediately. 
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152 They were also rumored to move into the northern regions where resources are scarce, and become part 
of the cross border trade to neighboring Cameroon and Chad. There is no definitive data or study on where 
such products end up. Indeed, gathering “figures” for a practice that not only works to evade detection but 
which funnels its illegal products back through the very same channels as the legal ones sets a rather 
difficult task.  My information for this chapter then mainly comes from observation and personal 
communications with those involved with selling and buying local refined product in bulk. 
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 In spite of its visibility and the increasing number of Nigerians purchasing it, 
bunkering and local refining were still often viewed as a parasitic network, not dissimilar 
to the general view on fuel importers embezzling government money. An angry 
petroleum marketer who had travelled from Lagos to pick up a load for a bridging 
contract was furious to discover only black smoke coming from the refinery chimney153 
and tanker drivers striking over an alleged bunkering accusation leveled at one of their 
union members. He launched into a diatribe, “I will tell you,” he shouted, addressing the 
group of onlookers (which included myself) “those people bunkering oil and those 
stealing government money, they shouldn’t even get a trial, they should be taken out and 
hung on the spot. They aren’t stealing oil, they are stealing Nigeria’s hope.” Far from a 
singular opinion, bunkering often stood as a figure for registering a sense of upset and 
dread about the political. Following the return to democratic electoral regime in 1999, the 
explosion of bunkering in the Niger Delta seemed a dark premonition of an emergent 
politics formed through collaboration between politicians and unemployed youth (see 
Pratten, 2008).  
 This theme resounds in stories like the popular Nigerian film Lover’s Creek. Shot 
in 2008, the movie follows a pair of lovers—the daughter of a wealthy senator and an 
aspiring journalist, as they embark on a picnic by the river. Here they encounter a group 
of belligerent, charm-wearing bunkerers. The film quickly turns from innocent love story 
to horror flick as the young couple and their friends are chased and one by one brutally 
gunned down by the bunkerers. In the final scene, it is revealed that the man for whom 
the bunkerers are working is a wealthy senator. It is the very same senator who is the 
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153 According to tanker drivers and Nigerian marketers stationed daily around Warri’s refinery, black 
smoke from the refinery chimney means they are burning the tarred tail ends of their products to give the 
illusion that the refinery is operational. White smoke, however, means the refinery is actually functioning. 
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father of the young woman, and who spends the first third of film trying to thwart her 
affair with the lower class journalist. Breaking down into tears at the sight of his beloved 
daughter’s corpse, the link between bunkering and the senator points to a rottenness 
behind the surface of middle class inaccessibility, a poisoning effect that literally kills 
your own children. The figure of the ‘oil thief’/bunkerer, here manifests a direct 
connection between the vulnerability of infrastructure and the vulnerability of the larger 
system of relations subsumed within it.  
And yet, in an odd turn of events, suspicions that local refining was 
supplementing national oil supplies appeared verified and awkwardly venerated when the 
newly elected president, Goodluck Jonathan, in 2011 recommended legalizing local 
refineries as a solution to dwindling national energy capacity: “Until we as a nation are 
able to have enough petroleum products, we cannot be proud of ourselves as a nation,” he 
stated at a press conference in Abuja, “We are even contemplating community-based 
private refineries. Rather than indulging in illegal bunkering, why not micro-community 
based refineries.”154  
The proposition suggests that legally enfolding the refineries into the larger 
machinery of production would not merely increase national supplies, but return a lost 
sense of national wellbeing. The statement itself speaks to the growing amount of 
leverage oil producing communities were seen to have over the state by virtue of its 
placement. At the same time, this gesture did little to offer communities some sort of 
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154 Amodu, Taiwo. “Jonathan plans community refineries.” Vanguard News. March 11, 2011 
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legitimate access to power. It essentially sought to turn their connection to national 
energy markets into part of a larger scheme and logic of privatization.155  
On the one hand, this reversal of an imminent threat into positive solution must in 
part be understood in view of Jonathan himself, as the nation’s first major politician from 
an Ijaw oil producing village (the largest ethnic group occupying the oil producing 
creeks), rising from relative obscurity to Aso Rock after Ijaw militants shut-down nearly 
25% of production in 2005. The ruling party, PDP, nominated him largely because of his 
symbolic connection to the delta region and his actual relationship with militant leaders. 
His statement thus seeks to reaffirm the central importance of communities and the 
militant leaders to which his power was beholden, by appearing to uphold popular 
demands by the oil producing areas to retain control over what takes place in the oil 
fields.  
Yet, on the other hand, this statement is a part of a larger speech on reforms aimed 
at expanding privatization programs of the national oil industry that, after years of neglect 
has been significantly incapacitated. The president anticipates that private financing will 
rejuvenate Nigeria’s infrastructure. And yet, previous deregulation and privatization in 
the petroleum sector have led to massive lay offs of Nigerian workers who were 
employed in the legally sanctioned oil fields. Shell Petroleum Development Company 
(SPDC), for instance, through a series of cost reduction exercises approved by the 
government and given the insidious name “Securing our Future,” has reduced its number 
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155 And in fact, in January, 2014, the director of Petroleum Resources Department announced that it was 
going to begin providing new private legal “bunkering” licenses to Nigerian applicants. This is not at all the 
same as the notion of legalizing refineries that would have been establishing an industry. However, the 
public response to the announcement by the government was telling, as it was interpreted as legalizing 
former illegal bunkerers and therefore a continuation of corruption. When in fact, it was part of a much 
larger privatization scheme that government sold as a form of stopping corruption (particularly by those 
who held lucrative fuel subsidy contracts).  
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of Nigerian staff by almost 40% since 2003 preferring to rely on cheaper sub-contract 
labor. As a result, a number of former Nigerian oil workers began to offer their services 
to black oil networks, helping to improve the technical aspects of cooking crude and 
siphoning the pipeline.  
Given the deflated hopes following the return to democratic electoral politics, as 
wealth bloats the pocket of a new political class wooing joint venture partnerships and 
multi-stakeholder models, black oil business becomes about fastening connections to the 
production infrastructures around which forms of life and livelihood are organized and 
recognized. As Samuel points out, black oil business does not just insert itself into 
infrastructural pathways, but becomes a critical passage point itself. While “oil theft” 
becomes a public sign of anxiety, the tangible pathways and material universe through 
which black oil business is organized create new possible linkages to shifting sites of 
power. In this way, black oil business begins to alter the fabric of what constitutes the 
legitimate and active “national oil economy”, both thickening the sets of connections and 
multiplying referents associated with work, wealth, accumulation and redistribution. The 
anchoring point becomes the pipeline itself. According to Samuel unless the companies 
offer him full employment, he was finished with settling for their pittances and would 
earn his “chop” (food) from the pipeline, directly. Fond of wordplay, he would return 
from the bush, bathe, and settle in for a drink, entertaining his circle with a little poem he 
constructed himself, “wed me to the pipeline156, O! Pipeline go last. Pipeline go last past 
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156 Describing the welding together of pipelines as a wedding is a popular wordplay among Nigerian oil 
workers, as the pipeline parts that get threaded together are themselves sexed, the narrow point is the male, 
and the larger opening, female. Inserting one into the other for welding then becomes referred to as a 
wedding. 
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marriage, go last past my own life, sef. Even the life of my pikin (child) it cannot last past 
the pipeline.” 
 
Naming the thief 
 
Black Oil depot (author’s photo) 
 
Returning from the refinery with Guwor, we pick up Timi, a counter, whose job is to 
ensure that each batch of cooked product is loaded in the right drum so that he knows 
exactly what figures to present to purchasers. Aware of the public statements by the 
government and the oil corporations—as well as of the signboards posted in Warri—that 
condemn bunkering and local refining as criminal activities, there was always an effort to 
make it clear to me, as a foreigner and as someone who would take the stories they were 
giving me, “abroad,” that black oil business is not theft or vandalism. Timi describes how 
he was detained by joint task officers while moving a shipment through Opuede creek. 
After discovering that Timi’s pockets were empty the officer subjected him to severe 
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beatings, threatening to throw him into the vat of his own diesel. To add insult to injury, 
he explained, they dared to call him, a son of the soil, a thief. 
 “This is our land,” Timi insisted when I mentioned that legally speaking, the 
government had nationalized all mineral resources, making them their property. “But we 
are the people who have the land,” he said, “this is our wealth. You say somebody can 
come, take something for your ground and not give you anything, ah, no, I no go gree. It 
makes me so angry, you cannot go like that, it is not correct… is it your children who will 
be feeding you? They have been tapping the oil here since 1965 and we never even saw 
lights in this community until 2004. Is that correct? What about their profits? Does it 
make sense we should be treated this way?” 
Timi insisted that bunkering could not be theft, because the oil already belongs to 
the community. According to him, the community had to first consent to the companies 
and the government to use their land for drilling oil and building pipelines.157 Yet, he 
explains, they did not honor the exchange, they gave the community a small token sum 
and proceeded with their drilling and spilling, “as if we the community, who owns this 
place, were not even there.” This, according to Timi, licenses him and others to seize, not 
the land, but indeed the oil itself, the substance used to enrich the state and company at 
the expense of the community. When I ask him what is a thief, he replies, “It is those in 
the hierarchy who don’t want to develop the society, those who cause pains and poverty 
to the people.” He sings a line from Ijaw musician, King Robert “Many Days for the 
Thief,” 
furu fé ké furuméne oweí ikpo nimio,ikpo fúrú oweí fè ke piré ba mènèó. 
Kenebai, kenebai, ayuba ikorimené. 
(remember that if you are stealing, you will die by stealing. 
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157 These legal instruments and the successive memoranda of understanding are discussed in chapter 2 
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One day, One Day, God will apprehend you.) 
On the one hand, this statement is a familiar one, it recognizes the state’s alliance with 
transnational capital as a vampiric draining of the subterranean lifeblood of the nation, 
and it very much draws from the language of human rights used by armed and peaceful 
activist movements in oil host communities since the 1990’s. (see chapter 2) On the other 
hand, Timi is citing a difference in the experience of those living in the crosshairs of 
extractive infrastructures, which in the absence of roads and electrical gridding formed 
the only architectural link between residents in the mangrove swamps and the state. 
These communities were disconnected from broader infrastructural developments taking 
place in urban areas during the oil boom in the 1970’s, marginalized from the windfalls 
of petro-modernity and its referents. At the same time, they were nested within those very 
pathways of production and its malfunctions. 
Many describe their participation as one which they have been driven to because 
of limited options: oil spills had significantly crippled the fishing and crayfish business, 
and with the exception of poorly paid, temporary stints with subcontractors for the oil 
company, there was no other available work (see chapter 2). Black oil business, by 
contrast, was a thriving market in which residents were able to get a foothold.158 That 
bunkering and local refining only exposed communities to greater risk from spills and 
explosions was generally recognized. However, it was not a deterrent. For me, this was 
always rather difficult to grasp, as most everyone at Escravos agreed that black oil 
business had contributed to the pollution and insecurity of their communities and yet, as 
we saw above with the chief priest, participants were not condemned, their successes 
were even lionized. As one black oil dealer answered when I asked, “why do you 
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158 And no young person I met had any desire to become a fisherman. 
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continue if you know what these things are doing to your community?” “because it is our 
time to chop,” he answered, employing the pidgin word for “eating” and “food” which is 
the common term for ‘corruption.’ “To chop” and “to chop, finish” are also employed 
metaphorically in descriptions of gratification in the form of excess of either a sexual or 
monetary nature. However, to follow such explanations it is necessary to know more of 
the history of bunkering itself. 
Oil smuggling rings and black markets for energy have emerged alongside oil-
producing networks in fields as vast and differentiated as those in Mexico, Columbia and 
Iraq and even the US. Bunkering in Nigeria was first practiced by the Biafran army in the 
late stages of the war.  Barricaded from supply routes, commanders broke into crude lines 
and cooked diesel to fuel their beleaguered war machines. (Nnabuife, 2008) Industrial-
scale bunkering, however, emerged at the confluence of processes in the 1980’s. Steel 
pipelines laid in a humid, brackish mangrove swamp corrode quickly. Companies are 
required by both industry-wide standards and the Nigerian Pipeline Acts to replace the 
lines every 15 to 20 years. Given that the more than 7,000 km of lines are built across a 
vast muddy maze, companies had little incentive to do so. The practice was to wait until 
spills were reported or a major pressure drop was detected on a line before moving in to 
repair it. (Frynas, 2004) As I’ve touched on in the last two chapters, farms and fishing 
outposts were inundated by spills and many communities, unable to get the attention of 
the government, marched on transnational work camps demanding compensation, often 
occupying work sites, sometimes taking entire camps hostage. Naval officers were 
commissioned to safeguard multinational workers and infrastructure from social unrest. 
These postings, to quell unruly villagers, came with an added benefit as Military 
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personnel collaborated with industry insiders and developed a side income pilfering 
pipelines. Selling crude secretly to international tankers, illegal bunkering would have 
been a convenient way for Nigeria to get around OPEC’s quota system which in the 
1980’s, following a sharp drop in the price of oil, required OPEC nations to reduce their 
output159 (Fattouh, 2011). 
However, as OPEC lost control of pricing mechanisms the international crude oil 
trade shifted away from private arrangements between national oil companies and the 
system of long-term contracts to spot and forwards-trading markets—ostensibly to help 
hedge and reduce risk for crude purchasers160 (Parra, 2002, 76). According to Michael 
Watts, these new markets were “designed to establish uniform pricing for more than 160 
different crudes around the world. The new system was sufficiently transparent and 
flexible to react swiftly to short and medium-term changes in the supply and demand 
situation.” (Watts, 2015) In an era where financialization was reshaping commodity 
markets, the spot and futures markets for oil grew rapidly.161 The expansion of the spot 
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159 Limiting the output put great strain on the national budget in Nigeria as the fiscal deficit rose by 24% 
from 1980 to 1984, generating a scarcity of foreign exchange necessary to meet import needs. Bunkering 
sponsored by the state provided an additional off the books income. Although I have looked for any kind of 
hard evidence to support the idea of getting around sanctions, most of this evidence comes from interviews 
I conducted with longtime employees of NNPC and a retired naval general who, although they were not 
involved in deals themselves, insisted that this was a known practice taking place in the late 80’s and early 
90’s. In a footnote of his own, Timothy Mitchell has pointed to the fact that there were often unnoted 
activities taking place to subvert the pricing and production limits within contract systems for oil sales. 
Pointing to one such example, he mentions how Marc Rich an oil trader, helped assist the Israeli pipeline 
oil evade controls of the oil majors, and relates this to part of the generation of oil spot markets. As oil 
majors and national companies were competing for control of the market, it is highly possible that these 
smaller, sabotage-based, markets were used to open up new space and possibilities by remaking flows and 
connections. 
 
160 It has been argued by some that the shift to financialized markets greatly improved the position of 
multinational corporations who were losing control to the rising national producers who cut the exclusive 
and cheap access arrangements. See Parra, 2002 and Yergin, 2000. 
 
161 Today, the oil and gas market is estimated at $3 trillion USD and accounts for the largest component in 
world trade (Watts, 2013). There is a great deal of new literature seeking to track how oil’s transformation 
into an asset class (more specifically oil’s conversion into ‘paper barrels’) played a large role in recent 
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markets meant that for the first time trading in refined products took place. Although 
there is no definitive study as to where the illegal crude ends up, it is generally accepted 
by those who have written and researched bunkering that the involvement of independent 
refineries is central to facilitating a market for smuggled oil as the provenance of the 
crude sold to market after it is processed into by-products becomes easily hidden.162 
However, there were other volatilities taking shape around newly liberalized 
systems of oil trades. In addition to becoming an asset class, raising volatility within the 
market and oil assemblage as a whole, the increased reliance on the spot market and 
futures market for pricing, actual oil transfers and deliveries were now made available to 
new buyers, like independent refiners and national companies (particularly Asian 
companies in Japan and Korea). Within this liberalized field of transactions hydrocarbon 
products became increasingly difficult to track, and the Atlantic coast around the Delta 
crowded with a cortege of new and old tankers, moving oil from one location to another 
with fabricated waybills. 
According to my interviews, in the Niger Delta creeks during this period 
bunkering flourished. New arrangements and new rumors proliferated. Young men found 
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financial and commodity “crisis” such as the 2008 surges in oil price. However, I am concentrating here on 
an earlier moment, in the late ‘80’s and ‘90’s when early market-link system developed alongside the 
collapse of the OPEC pricing system. These replaced the former long-term contract system with a market 
designed to be more flexible and comprehensive. It is important to distinguish this moment from the rapidly 
expanding Over the Counter Trades (OTC) made possible in the 2000’s after the introduction of the 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of December 2000 (Watts, 2013). At this time, the system was still 
largely tethered to the actual movements of crude and refined product around the globe, and most contracts 
traded were taken for delivery—or storage. While eventually this practice would facilitate the emergence of 
speculation and multiple forward selling, even during the earlier shift to market-based trades in the 90’s, 
new systems significantly obscured the origins, producers and buyers and pricing mechanisms that it was 
developed to regulate.  
 
162 While earlier reports cited Rotterdam refineries as the main recipients of bunkered crude, Platform 
recently reported that a number of Nigerian politicians also own oil refineries in Brazil and Ecuador and 
have more recently become large purchasers of bunkered crude. There is, however, no definitive report as 
to where black oil ends up. 
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employment clearing bush, hauling materials and driving boats for these bunkering rings 
while naval officers organized for barges and connections to oil smugglers. At this time, 
it was rumored that the big Oga was a single Lebanese man. Nearly everyone I spoke 
about this period with mentioned this and yet, no one could name him. Godfrey, a 
resident in Egbema explained how,  
At that time we would see these naval men passing us in the villages, they 
would pass often. Ha, if you see them then, with their fine boats, we never 
saw boats like those ones. There was one general, we used to hail him, 
“Oga!” the big man, as he passed by our side. “General Oakley” we used 
to call him, because you never see him without these big shades. I was a 
small pikin then, but some of our boys knows him because he’d be giving 
them small small money for the job. Then again, at that time, you also had 
some Lebanese men doing the business. One in particular. But we would 
never see these ones. The general, I think he was from Katsina, 
Yar’Adua’s place, but I wouldn’t know him again, all those times he 
passed through our side I never saw his eyes. But those navy men, they 
like it here. Even when we were fighting them, they wanted to come here. 
Here is Niger Delta, there is money in this place. 
The multiple referents to the North, to the Lebanese who had close business and personal 
relations to the late military ruler, Sani Abacha, and to the last late President, Umaru 
Yar’Adua, also a northern leader, are here coupled to descriptions of luxury items and 
displays of wealth, such as sunglasses and large boats. Yet, as Godfrey describes it, this 
Northern hegemony stems from control of the pipelines through which the wealth of the 
land is siphoned. This spout is a seductive fount, even the soldiers are said to desire being 
near the oil, at the cost of their safety. “Here is Niger Delta, there is money in this place,” 
mentioned earlier by the black oil aspirant, indeed, heard repeatedly throughout my time 
in the delta, re-emphasizes the way in which oil as a form of extractable wealth was 
naturalized as part of the landscape itself.  
As I have touched on, as the delta thickened with drill sites, pipelines, security 
operatives and increasingly organized protest movements, so too did a number of 
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relationships between various state, local and corporate operatives. Bunkering began to 
define these arrangements, their dynamics of accumulation and boundaries of enclosures. 
Stress was often laid in highly moral tones. “See, see, let me you tell what happened,” 
says Kingsley, who is pulling on a pair of worn yellow rubber work boots and a blue rain 
slicker, preparing to depart for his “plantation” as the rains roll in. Kingsley describes 
how he viewed his own involvement in black oil vis-à-vis his experience living in the 
creeks during the late-military era of Sani Abacha: 
Bunkering and companies, it was like the same problem. If you walk 
towards where the oil company was living, from the fence you see the 
grass is velvety, the light is perpetual, water runs, and everything is 
silvery, silky, stainless steel. You know that life is milky, really lush like 
the green the grass is. But just across that divide to the other side, I have to 
use palm kernel oil to light my stove, everything is black and brown like 
the earth itself that has been so much polluted.  Then I take my canoe and 
paddle down the creek to catch fish, and there is some man from the north, 
who never saw oil in his life, who never even knew the black color of oil 
and he is chopping (eating) from the pipeline too, taking his own. So I 
begin to ask where is my own?  
He cites a popular myth that the moment of recognition for Niger Deltans of their raw 
deal occurs 1998 when a large group of youth were transported for a celebration of the 
ruling military leader, Sani Abacha, in the capital of Abuja known as the “two million 
man march.” “Here again,” he says, imagining the young men from his village as they 
gaze upon the shiny, modern capital, “are the clean roads, the green grass, here are the 
constant lights, and it is not oyibo (white) man enjoying, it is that same general from the 
north getting bellyfull from the pipeline at both ends…Before this time, we didn’t know 
Nigeria could make a place as fine as Abuja, we didn’t know that oil could build a place 
like this.” He asks, “who is the rascally one here? How can government call me a thief?”  
Whether or not the experience of the two million-man march was the catalyst for 
such a perspective, here the question of legitimate oil wealth is posed as a question about 
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locality, and specifically about the resource whose power to produce wealth lays beneath 
the feet of those living amid its wastelands. The great value generated from oil is 
projected into the space where something is believed to be missing: the glittering city of 
Abuja with its neat roads and bright streetlights. Kingsley adds, “They [meaning the 
Northern leaders] had this country for forty years, and look at what they did. Government 
and Shell, they knew we are suffering but they blocked us from participating in the 
development of our own resources. So we started our own business.” He paused and then 
with a faint smile added, “If you can’t beat them, join them.”   
To engage in black oil business is not figured as simply taking back what is owed 
in the sense of an unpaid debt, but as reclamation of what is retroactively cast as already 
belonging to the community, something already stolen from them. “This place should 
look like London,” Kingsley explained, sweeping his arm across the horizon towards the 
village of Oporoza. “And what about Kurutie and Benikrukru? [neighboring villages]” I 
asked. “They too, all. This whole area should be like London.” Within this narrative 
Kingsley, like Timi, become the victims rather than perpetrators of a theft committed by 
the state and their transnational partners. The dilapidated condition of their communities, 
the lack of infrastructure and employment are put forward as evidence of this lack. 
Participating with oil workers and state security operatives in bunkering then, is unlike 
being in the subject position designated by corporate social responsibility programs, and 
‘gifting’ practices in chapter 2 (even though the language used to describe this position 
often echoes the discourse of corporate-sponsored participant development programs.) 
Instead, bunkering appears as a way to subvert the terms of exchange authored by the 
corporations and licensed by the state.  Kingsley’s complaint about the government 
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perhaps expresses less a desire to be enfolded into the state apparatus than to become a 
site of sovereign control, reversing the colonial legacy that favored Northern centers of 
power. And indeed, many Niger Deltans hoped Jonathan’s presidency and the amnesty 
program would lead to exactly this outcome, a faith that was quickly eroding in the 
months after the amnesty. At the same time, the aspiration is not a secessionary one (as it 
is sometimes framed). “If you can’t beat them, join them,” suggests that to participate in 
bunkering is to enter this arrangement like a market competitor, not, through any radical 
action. 
And yet, amidst this language of “developing resources,” “making business,” the 
question of the political lingers. At one point control of the bunkering industry was a 
critical tactical and symbolic part of political militancy movements. In 1999, as military 
regime was dissolved, naval officers were rotated out of their Niger Delta posts by the 
new regime and monopolies on bunkering began to loosen. As I mentioned in the 
previous chapter, the return of local elections and grassroots movements, also meant 
these areas quickly became flooded with arms from elites contesting for office. Militants, 
accessing arms and patrons were able to wrangle control of the territory around the 
pipelines from the grip of multinational corporations (many who evacuated worker camps 
when the fighting began163) and the state armed forces. It is the Naval officers who now 
roam the creeks seeking out the black oil networks, an irony evident to many on multiple 
levels. A Nigerian oil worker told me of how his crew ran across a boat of joint task 
officers scouring the mazy creeks. In a tone that conveyed deep frustration they asked the 
oil workers, in the process of laying a new pipeline, if they’d seen any local refineries 
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163 And in fact, the central MEND outpost for members in the Western Delta became Camp 5, the site of a 
former worker camp built by Julius Berger in the late 1990s. 
! 199!
operating near their work site. The workers asked in reply if the military men were 
looking to catch the local refiners. They responded that yes, of course, after all, they had 
seen their smoke and knew they’d been cooking for days now and yet no one had come to 
give them their cut. 
 
Sowing confusion 
 Months after visiting Guwor’s refinery, as black oil became ever more present 
around Escravos, I met with SL, a former militant general in the corner of a bush bar in 
the former MEND stronghold called, Asokoro—the name of the wealthiest district in 
Abuja where the central government buildings are located. The bar is placed at the edge 
of the waterside so that patrons can not only enjoy the cool breeze but keep their eye on 
the movement of cargo and people in and out of the waterside. A large portrait of Bob 
Marley is on the wall, his face serene. Bottles of cheap cognac are brought to the table by 
admirers wanting to entertain SL. “My General, I hail-O” one calls. SL hands a bottle to a 
colleague who taps it firmly on the cap acknowledging its receipt. Then the buyer opens 
the bottle and pours it for SL and the people he indicates he wants to share it with. The 
giver also take his glass full so he cannot be suspected of ill will. The music is so loud 
that the praise songs of SL’s bravery and character are difficult to distinguish from the 
popular Naija song, about a man who woos a young woman by offering to make her the 
screen saver on his phone. SL replies with a blessing: 
Ah Izon, Ah Izon, Ah Izon  
Let the Ijaw receive independence, let us have a good life  
 
Eh Yea, replies the table in unison.  
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Drops are sprinkled on the ground in memory of those who have been lost in the 
struggle. SL is very slight and only 28 years old but his comrades refer to him as 
“General.” A mid-level operator, he directed his own group of fighters for MEND from 
2005 until they laid down their weapons in 2009. SL’s body is a patchwork of scars: the 
flesh on his lower lip and chin has turned white and pink from where he was burnt in a 
boat fire, a line across his forearm traces the graze of a bullet, and a splattering of deep 
scar tissue sprawls like a firecracker up the entire right side of his body from when a box 
of ammunition exploded beneath him during battle. He can no longer stand the rain, he 
says it pricks his skin like acid. SL has also started a local refinery, but he complains that 
his customers refuse to pay upfront and his cooking is going very slow. Because of his 
status as a fighter and a known person in the community, he is able to collect crude from 
the bunkering tap on credit.164 Unlike Guwor or Samuel who seek to provide for their 
families, SL’s responsibility extends to the care for those who fought under him. But for 
the moment he is cash poor and is embarrassed that he cannot meet the demands of his 
former fighters, who after finishing their amnesty trainings and not finding work return to 
besiege him with requests for assistance. “This kind of thing,” he says, when you cannot 
help your own, “it makes you feel bad.” 
SL believes that black oil business is now only a shade of its former self. 
“Before,” he explains (meaning before amnesty), “our boys were not just doing this thing 
for money. At that time, we were fighting for the Ijaw people, for freedom.” Bunkering 
oil helped to fund their activities, but it also, he says, was “sowing confusion” into the 
system. For SL, the amnesty agreements were a bitter arrangement in which the 
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164 Those who control the pipeline taps are normally quite strict about refusing credit to local refiners 
because there is a substantial risk of fires and losses that can occur during cooking. It is the same reason 
that purchasers of local refined oil also insist on paying only on delivery. 
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government’s promises to deliver wider development and increased autonomy would 
never materialize. He shakes his head at the prospect of having to now hustle for black oil 
customers in the creeks. He wants to move into more official distribution capacity as a 
licensed petroleum vendor, and even takes trips, when he can afford it, to Abuja where he 
spends days waiting for an appointment with the oil minister that is never set. “Before, 
you know, everyone would pick our calls, we were MEND, we were the freedom fighters 
of the Niger Delta and you must listen to us.”  
As SL’s comment on “confusion,” references, siphoning pipelines was part and 
parcel of strategies that included sabotaging critical infrastructure and kidnapping oil 
workers. It was as an instrument used to destabilize centers of authority in the creeks and 
to help them wrest control of the territory around the pipelines. Marking the difference 
between being an opportunist and participating in a libratory struggle against state and 
corporate agents and agendas, SL gives an example from his own life. In 2001, with a 
group of friends from his village at Ogbudugbudu, SL began robbing banks using arms 
provided by local politicians to secure victory for that year’s LGA elections. Between the 
ages of 17 and 26, the group modeled themselves on the famous thief, “Anini the law,” 
who ran a string of high profile robberies in Nigeria in the mid 80’s. Their one and a half 
year streak took them to Warri, Sapele and Benin City until the navy chased them into the 
mangrove forest behind their village.  
Cornered by the military, SL and his companions continued to live in the bush for 
three years, as their numbers dwindled from eleven to seven, succumbing to snake bites 
and illness. They snuck into to the village at night to take or receive what provisions they 
could find but were otherwise trapped with nothing but their firearms and left over 
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ammunition. Meanwhile, the military, unable to apprehend them, extracted its vengeance 
on Ogbudugbudu community, burning to the ground entire sections of the village. When 
the military commander tracking them was transferred to a new post in 2005, SL emerged 
and joined MEND, too ashamed, he explained, to stay in the place where his actions had 
turned his family home to ashes. Within MEND he explains he was no longer a robber, 
but became a freedom fighter and the gun was transformed into an instrument of another 
kind. Here, he says, he was taught the difference between acting “from the belly” and 
being a freedom fighter for your community. He explains,  
you have to be careful when you are having gun. When you hold the gun, 
you will be feeling like the most powerful person on earth. We didn’t 
know this then. But when we did gun training [after joining with MEND] 
they tell you that you have to be careful not to let the gun master you. Just 
as a person can get hungry, so a gun can be hungry too and if you do not 
control the hunger of the gun it will control you. If you are not careful you 
will be hungry one day and your gun will speak to you and tell you to use 
it to get fed. And that might be a very wrong place for you to go. Its 
possible that this way will get you killed. It is not the gun that should 
decide. See all the money we had at that time (while robbing banks), what 
is it now?165  
Although some of MEND’s own financing was also linked to bank robbery, as a part of 
MEND, “fighting government,” SL explains that they were subjected to strict discipline, 
regarding their weapons, their movements, and their appetites. He worked his way up the 
hierarchy quickly acquired his own set of fighters. Although never directly involved with 
bunkering during the period of militancy, he was part of meetings strategizing over which 
parts of the infrastructure to explode in order to maximize exposure. According to SL 
such decisions were based on which breakages would wreak the most havoc, and what 
parts of the infrastructure they were able to access. It was most desirable to attack the 
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165 The discipline and ideology SL is referencing has to do with the rules of the Egbesu war cult that strictly 
forbids firing first and using weapons for theft. However, many MEND leaders amassed personal fortunes 
and the violence was not always retaliatory. SL himself brings this up during discussions we had some 
months later. 
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export terminal since this would bring extraction activities to nearly a halt, as in 2009 
when MEND managed to explode Shell’s trunk line feeding Forcados Export Terminal. 
At the same time, as the fighting grew stronger and bunkering larger, MEND (at least in 
the Western Delta) created sets of agreements around the practice to help defuse old 
rivalries between communities, so that they might collectively focus on their struggle 
with the state and corporations. For example, an agreement was brokered between 
MEND fighters based at Oporoza and residents at Ogidiben166 in which the former would 
pay the latter a fee for each barge of bunkered crude that passes through their waterways 
to the sea. Additionally, the leadership of MEND in the Western Delta, agreed that as a 
show of solidarity, they would purchase a set amount of fish from Ogidiben fishermen 
every week.167 
Around the same time the Forcados Terminal was exploded, the government 
launched a joint task force (JTF) to subdue militant activities. Riding at breakneck speed 
through the streets of Warri, the task force were often seen crammed into their Hi-Lux 
trucks, their Kalashnikovs gripped tightly, with the logo: Operation Restore Hope168 
(indeed, the actual name given to the mission) printed in large letters across the sides. 
Describing the activities of oil militants, government officials labeled their actions neither 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
166 Ogidiben, which controls access to the sea is an Itshekiri community, whose fight with the Ijaws at 
Oporoza in 2003 resulted in high causalities on both sides, as well as the death of three transnational 
workers. Both Shell and Chevron shut down their operations completely for two weeks. However, over the 
years MEND, unlike other militant movements, increasingly tried to unite multiple oil producing 
communities rather than letting the corporations divide them, as they had for so many decades. 
 
167 This is not to say that MEND was not also involved with transnational smuggling rings and shadowy 
government operators. However, I am suggesting that one does not nullify the legitimacy of the demands or 
the constructiveness of the other aspects. 
 
168 Operation Restore Hope was also the operative name of the United States-led military and humanitarian 
intervention in Somalia in December 1993, although I am unaware of any connection. 
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as an act of war or dissention but what it often referred to as acts of “vandalism” and 
“sabotage.”  
The word, “vandal” is important here. The 1990 Pipeline Decrees, (Articles 12 
and 21) requires companies to award compensation for any damage to local communities 
resulting from their operations. In particular, “payments are to be made to chiefs or local 
headman, as a collective payment.” However, in the agreements they signed with oil 
producing communities, corporations have added a loophole to the law in which they are 
relieved of legal liability and responsibility for clean-up if it is determined that a spill has 
been caused by “vandalism” rather than operational failure or accident (Watts, 2004; see 
also Frynas, 1997). Thus, as many have documented, it is common for oil companies 
solicited or sued by oil host communities over pollution, to counter-accuse communities 
of intentionally creating spills to receive the compensation money, and to even delay 
reporting in order to maximize their claims (Zalik, 2004, 2011; Courson, 2007; Watts, 
2004, 2007; Frynas, 1997).  Likewise, descriptions of the activities or motives of militant 
groups often employ tropes of hooliganism and of petty criminals (like “pipeline 
marauders”). From even the earliest moment of the armed struggle, the figure of the “oil 
militant” was worked on, made to be interchangeable with the vandal and saboteur. For 
example, although bunkering long predated the militant movement, intense public 
dialogue about pilfering activity only began around 2001 when the government set up the 
“Special Security Committee on Oil Producing Areas.” The report, pointing to the 
correlation of rising rates of pipeline vandalism and the burgeoning of militant groups, 
suggested that militant youth “could be enjoying the patronage of some retired or serving 
military and security personnel” (SSCOPA Report, 2001).  
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Given the long-standing practice of trying to frame social unrest in the creeks as a 
problem of managing derelict youth engaged in criminal enterprises (rather than a 
legitimate political movement), the 2009 Amnesty agreements were steeped in the 
rhetoric of rehabilitation and behavioral modification. Former militants acquired the 
nominal title by politicians, the Nigerian media and wider Nigerian public of “repentant 
militants.” They were sent to nonviolent training programs at DDR camps where over 
14,000 militants attended workshops on “Kingian (as in Martin Luther) Principles of 
Nonviolence” provided by the Center for Non-violent and Peace Studies at the University 
of Rhode Island. These workshops promoted non-confrontational engagement and a 
sense of collective responsibility to “re-orient the members of the community  toward the 
activation of civil behavior and dialogue” (FEHM website). Amnesty programs were 
likewise trying to reframe political concerns and demands voiced by militant groups as a 
problem of employment and employability. They sent former militant leaders to business 
management and business ethics courses in South Africa and Scotland (Eze, 2012, see 
also FEHM website). Those who had fought under them received training as welders and 
divers. Eschewing demands made by militants to convene a sovereign conference, to 
redraft the constitution, and clean up the waterways, Amnesty programs focused 
exclusively on the demand for “work.”  
Emphasizing the opportunities for Niger Deltans to participate in wider market 
economy itself, the newly labeled “repentant militants,” were issued ID cards entitling 
them to a monthly salary of 18,000 naira (120 USD) in addition to a three-month stay in a 
hotel for training with a per diam. As they left to attend these programs in urban areas, 
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government troops set up new checkpoints in the waterways, building barracks in the war 
camps MEND had now renounced and abandoned. 
SL shakes his head, “We were not finished with this fight, O.” SL said the money 
and the contracts offered by the government to MEND leaders proved too tempting. Long 
before the cease-fire, SL and other former militants described how the same JTF 
commanders authorizing attacks around Escravos were visiting leaders at their camps to 
make private arrangements concerning the illegal oil and gun trading networks that were 
growing in the delta. While “the struggle” was somewhat dismantled by the Amnesty, 
however, these organized markets burgeoning around the pipeline proved more difficult 
to dissolve. After the trainings were finished, after complaints start to mount that in spite 
of receiving occupational training former militants found no one interested in hiring 
them, and the agreed upon salary for reformed fighters begins to dry-up somewhere 
between Abuja and the coast—as former MEND leaders are accused of embezzling the 
funds—it doesn’t take long for bunkering to explode across the riverine area. Yet, I 
would argue, this has far less to do with a problem of scarce opportunities or of some 
struggle for survival and subsistence, than of maintaining control of the pipelines. This 
seems somewhat implicit in SL’s depressed account where the promised rewards of 
MEND’s struggle turn out to be a spot on the couch of the outer office of the petroleum 
minister, waiting endlessly without his gun, his wounds still flaring up in the rain, thrown 
back to the end of the line in the bureaucratic morass of the state. Reluctantly, he 
purchases an oven, a native boat and a pump and heads back out into the bush, back to 




A few months after my visit to the local refinery, I heard a quite different account of 
bunkering from inside in Chevron’s Prodeco worker’s camp in Warri. Workers lives are 
tightly scheduled, 12 hours on and 12 hours off, 7 days a week. Because Sunday’s have a 
later start time (9am rather than 6am), on Saturday nights the company bar fills steadily 
with workers and managers and other expatriates, journalists, NGO workers. At 8 
O’clock prostitutes from Warri lining up behind the gate are allowed access after 
undergoing a security check (and often an aesthetic assessment.) While visiting the bar 
one evening I ran into Greg, a Texas native and onsite financial manager for the project. 
Greg was bouncing around the room in a state of excitation, buying rounds of drinks for 
friends. He and three other upper management officers from Chevron and KBR had just 
returned from a clandestine (because the company does not allow them to make social 
calls) dinner party at the house of Ayiri, a man they described as “a renowned militant 
and kidnapper,” but who was known by most in the delta as a conflict profiteer rather 
then an agent of insecurity. Ayiri never belonged to nor commanded any militant group. 
 Greg and his colleagues were relatively new to Nigeria, brought onto the project 
in order to reduce production costs that had grown astronomically since the project broke 
ground in 2005, the same year MEND launched its most intense campaign of 
infrastructural destruction. When I interviewed them in their offices, they spoke mostly of 
their frustration with local communities, who they feared might occupy their worksites in 
the event of any dispute, thus losing them valuable man hours, and delaying the reaching 
of their targets (and their target bonuses). Greg joked that when he arrived in Nigeria, his 
hair was honey blond, but after only a few months, it turned a bright sheen of white. 
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However, this night they appeared uninterested in mulling over the distinctions between 
former armed factions and communities that crowded their daily meetings. Instead, with 
the aid of a great deal of foreign imported beer, they allowed themselves to be swept 
away by their transgressive night out with “a Niger Delta warlord.”  
Apparently, someone in the “warlord’s” company had pointed out a small-set man 
among the diners and whispered to Greg and his companions that he was a famous 
kidnapper. One of Greg’s colleagues explained, “he made it known that a few months ago 
this guy would be seeing dollar signs all over us. Can you imagine? He was just looking 
us up and down and thinking how much money this American guy could bring him.” 
Most expressed amazement at the decadence of Ayiri’s compound, but nothing attracted 
as much attention, it seemed, as the doghouse. It was two stories tall, freshly painted, 
outfitted with a tiled roof and could accommodate “probably a family of five.” Greg 
approximated, it was the same size as his house back in Houston. Although impressed by 
the number of jaguars parked in the driveway and the gargantuan swimming pool, they 
kept returning to the doghouse comparing it to their own middle class suburban life, 
captivated by the incredible display of wealth read as accumulation of spoils, the kind of 
gains and luxury that oil can bring.169  
Here seemed a fantastic narrative reversal, of the middle management taking a 
peek inside the fence of the oil bunkerer. Dollar values which companies assign to 
communities to designate their productive capacity (see chapter 2), are here imagined as 
dollar signs, in this case price tags for the life of the oil worker. Rather than Kingsley 
looking at lush green through the fence, here the oil workers were marveling at the 
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169 This accumulation, was, in their minds, achieved by gunpoint, through violent extraction they not only 
read about everyday in their reports but, in fact, were real events they had managed themselves behind the 
safety of their desks only a few months previous. 
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spectacular riches accumulated by the local oil thief while the good, salary man lives in a 
house designed for dogs, as if the fictions the company produces about the community it 
fears, had been locked in with the stories the community have about the company. 
Among a great number of misrecognitions here, we might point to one critical one, Ayiri, 
the so-called “bunkerer/warlord”, was in fact an accredited contractor with Chevron, one 
of their main fuel suppliers. 170 
Transnational oil workers and security operatives were fond of fantasizing about 
bunkering and during my fieldwork I heard countless desires expressed related to it. 
David, a KBR worker from East Texas was certain you could earn more than a million 
dollars for helping to arrange a shipment, “just one time and you can change your life, 
man. I could retire.” He complained that even with his danger pay things were hard at 
home as his daughter was about to start college in the Fall. He had invested his savings in 
a mini golf project that went bust after the recession started in 2008 and leaving him 
thousands of dollars in debt. “No luck,” he says. “Who wouldn’t do it if they got the 
chance,” a British security manager and former casque blu mused when he (not I) 
brought up the issue of bunkering. “Of course,” he added, “we can’t engage in that kind 
of thing. We have too many people watching us.” A crane engineer from Louisiana (not 
Chevron staff) who had been working in various oil fields on independent contracts for 
over 20 years, had gone so far as to inquire with his Nigerian co-workers about any 
opportunities to get involved with bunkering. Like David and many other American 
workers I met working in Nigeria he was crippled with debt. In his case, he had fallen 
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170 Although I know very little of its details, I was amused, although somehow not surprised, to find that 
when I attended the Offshore Technology Conference (the world’s largest oil and gas conference, with 
attendance upwards of 70,000) in Houston in 2012 I met a group of black oil business dealers related to 
people I knew at Escravos. We spoke very briefly, they were anxiously waiting for a meeting with a high-
level manager at SPDC with whom, they explained, they had, “some business.”   
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victim to predatory lending schemes, purchasing a house in Florida just before the 
housing bubble burst. Now that the cost of the mortgage outstripped the value of the 
property he had to file for bankruptcy and move his family back to Louisiana to stay with 
his sister. When I asked what happened when he tried to find a way into bunkering he 
sighed and said, “Ah, its all a game for these big wigs.”  
 Greg, still desperate to convince his audience of the size of the doghouse, left to 
retrieve his computer into which the pictures had been recently downloaded. Opening up 
the picture files, he had trouble locating the doghouse. In the meantime, we toured the 
compilation of photos Greg had amassed during his tenure in the Niger Delta. These were 
work photos, he explained. The majority were photographs of trucks, cranes, and welding 
machines. Each piece of equipment was snapped individually, at a rather alluring angle as 
if they were posing for their portrait. As onsite financial manager he described his job as 
“making sure we know where the money is going.” He had to ensure that every-thing that 
was budgeted for existed on site and be able to prove it to upper management back in 
Houston. Smuggled between the portraits were a series of shots focused on a native boat 
that was on fire. The boat is loaded with large GeePee plastic tanks, the size of the fire 
clearly indicates that they are full of hydrocarbons.  The boat is tied to one of the 
Chevron’s contractor’s jetty, suggesting that the product was in the process of being 
purchased when it caught on fire. “Oh that,” Greg said in an off-handed manner, “that’s 
quite a funny story, imagine they take this stuff from our pipelines and here is our 
contractor buying it back to complete our own project.” He quickly closed the file and 
with a few brushes and taps of the finger pulled up the picture of Ayiri’s doghouse. “Ah 
ha!” he exclaimed, “there it is.” It was, indeed, a very large doghouse, outfitted with a 
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front door, a second story, and a lovely red tiled roof. Inhabited by three canines, it had a 
vacant look about it and eerily recalled those made to order homes in now abandoned 
neighborhoods where the American housing market boomed and busted.171 
As for the sale of locally refined fuel to Chevron’s contractors Greg mentions, this 
too was spoken of rather matter-of-factly around Escravos. Sale was not organized 
directly between black oil businessmen and logistics managers but rather through oil 
community subcontractors (like Ayiri) who had been awarded fuel supply contracts for 
Chevron’s gas to liquid project. This provisioning meant that rather than import their own 
energy supplies, Chevron agreed to purchase fuel from intermediaries. Such 
arrangements were mandated in the new Global Memoranda of Understanding (GMOU) 
signed with oil producing communities. It was part of new policy which Chevron’s 
project manager stated in its glossy new literature as, “no work, no pay,” part of the 
corporation’s supposed duty to help communities build their local capacity and to 
contribute to the local economy. Of course, the fuel was meant to be purchased from 
licensed oil marketers, not from black oil dealers. Yet, much like the existence of black 
oil business itself the purchase of locally refined diesel via subcontractors was hardly 
hidden. Like Greg, a number of oil workers had documented in personal photographs, as 
an exotic keepsake, the large native boats laden with GeePee tanks, offloading illicit 
diesel at the company jetty. When I inquired with one of the project managers during an 
interview he neither denied nor confirmed this, saying instead: “We need a lot of diesel to 
run the generators, and well, all our equipment. I mean, a lot of diesel. That’s my ‘official 
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171 It is perhaps worth mentioning that I personally do not believe this was a doghouse. In the photographs 
it appeared unfurnished and there were three dogs wandering around the structure. However, it also looked 
freshly built, and it is very common for wealthy Nigerian’s to construct smaller “guest houses” in their 
compounds for visitors or for relatives (and even for multiple wives). I did raise this possibility to Greg, but 
he said that this is what Ayiri’s men told him and he fully believed it to be the case. 
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position.’ Under the terms of the GMOU that we signed with the communities, we are 
required to provide a certain number of contracts. Some of these are fuel contracts, so we 
pay community contractors to provide us with diesel, and where it comes from, well, we 
don’t ask.” 
Certainly, buying back crude can be seen as the continuation of engaged 
contingency planning on the part of transnational producers, whose production is 
characterized as all too often vulnerable to community unrest. Contractors and individual 
project managers have to maintain a certain number of completed man-hours. They 
struggled during the militancy period to stave off the occupation of their worksites from 
protestors, kidnappers, and pipeline saboteurs, those whom, SL, described as “sowing 
confusion.” Such actions not only stalled progress on their projects but also generated 
negative press and shareholder anxieties. The project manager mentioned numerous times 
how far beyond budget and over time the Gas-to-Liquid project had already gone. Its 
scheduled completion date had passed long ago in 2008 and at the end of 2010 was only 
30% complete. Required to demonstrate to corporate headquarters a lowering lost 
incident rate, it might have been to the contractor’s advantage to hedge against 
interference at the work site by looking the other way.  
However, this stated lack of interest in the fuel’s provenance seems important 
given the great amount of attention and ink given to voicing fears about missing oil, of oil 
money draining away corporate profit margins and state budgets. Why are certain things 
accounted for and not others? According to Joe, an accountant for Chevron, the company 
already adjusts its projected output by a certain percentage to allot for losses to 
bunkering. He explains that bunkering has long been considered a cost of doing business 
! 213!
in Nigeria and thus in order to meet projected outputs circulated to shareholders (and in 
the company’s SEC filings), the corporation anticipates the missing oil months in 
advance. These seemingly odd actuarial practices, leveraging oil’s potential as industrial 
commodity and financial asset against the corporation’s stock value points to a gaping 
hole not only in the pipelines but within the metrical instruments and bureaucratic 
arrangements supposedly governing the Nigerian oil economy. Nigeria’s own national 
petroleum company likewise has no functioning independent metering system—meaning 
they must rely on the figures put out by their corporate partners—to verify what level of 
losses to bunkering are or are not taking place (Bassey, 2011). Regardless of whether you 
read the figures published by NNPC, global economists, prestigious media outlets, 
estimates of just how much oil is lost to bunkering jump from 40,000 bpd to 400,000 bpd 
to 100,000 bpd with no definite, published source. During a Nigerian Senate meeting in 
November 2013, the head of Nigeria’s Central Bank asked how the government could 
claim to know the exact quantity of oil that is produced when the only metering system 
belongs to transnational companies, and those companies refuse to provide their 
figures172 (Bassey, 2013). The oil, the very substance around which claims of ownership, 
national imaginaries, and political contestations are said to be organized, appears here, 
not unlike the oil thief, unlocatable. Yet missing oil is increasingly represented by other 
media: in published accounts of the fear of oil thieves, in photographs of busted pipelines, 
the palaces built in the creeks, or in Warri and Abuja by wealthy bunkerers, native boats 
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172 Many major corporations like Shell and Chevron do not circulate the details of their metering and 
accounting systems to their Nigerian partners and they have the discretion to release whatever numbers 
they wish. This has led to deep suspicious among certain members of the Nigerian government (such as the 
Lamido Sanusi—head of the central bank—who, only months after asking this question about meters 
publically was removed from office) and public that in fact, the rash of illegal bunkering reports enables the 
corporations to skim a large portions of rents owed to the state off the oil they produce, as they can 
manipulate the production numbers and blame oil theft for any discrepancies.   
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and barges overloaded with crude trailing oil slicks on the water, in the dramatic images 
of local refinery flames engulfing a tar stained village.   
Yet, paradoxically, as the ability to regulate the space around extraction grows 
increasingly difficult and necessitating immediate response, Black oil Business appears 
as an instrument for managing risk. For the project mangers, what matters is only the set 
of outcomes that purchasing illicit diesel enables: “Buying from them [bunkerers] means 
less disruption by the community, less lost man hours,” Joe explained. And in a sentence 
that seems to recall a predicament similar to the one Ebi described at the beginning of the 
chapter, he added, “its not something we state publically, but see, the thing is, it just helps 
make our project more secure. We call it the cost of peace.”  
 
“Copy Pass Original” 
SL describes how bunkering acted as an instrument of disorder, “sowing 
confusion,” during the period of militancy. However, increasingly bunkering, as black oil 
business, seems to have transformed into an instrument of order in an arena where 
establishing price, volume and stability is a slippery and sometimes illusory play. As 
participating in black oil business becomes a way for project managers to stem possible 
threats to the oil industry’s everyday operations, black oil business has also become a 
way for oil producing communities to navigate the widening field of uncertainty 
produced by large-scale extraction and political violence. However, I do not wish to 
suggest that black oil dealers and the systems of credit, commerce and exchange that 
have grown up around them create stability, rather, they generate new channels of 
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appropriation, communication and power within a limited set of arrangements that are 
already recognized as temporary, contingent and leading inevitably towards dissolution.  
And yet, this raises the question of the multiple narratives of the thief and the 
persistence of these fantasies about oil and its illicit double, in which a doghouse is 
transfigured into a middle-class American home and the blackened mud banks of a long 
neglected fishing village can conjure the (still very much anticipated) hope of a day when 
the Niger Delta will be transformed into London.  
Illegal predation and its association with state-legitimized political economies and 
global circulatory regimes has long been part of thinking about emerging forms and 
practices around capitalism.173 In her ethnography on the couper des routes in Northern 
Cameroon—labeled as bandits by authorities— Janet Roitman suggest that these 
activities of organized armed robbery, can be seen as both illegal but licit. Moreover, 
rather than any radical opposition, acts of seizure do in fact participate in “recognized 
modes of governing the economy” (Roitman, 2005, 259). For Roitman, the state is 
identified with multiple sites and sets of transactions that can be reconfigured without 
necessarily losing its claims on power and even on legitimacy. Reading the postcolonial 
Cameroonian state as entangled in networks of debt associated with aid, privatization and 
taxation Roitman remarks that what is at stake in something like market crisis is, “the 
significance, or very intelligibility, of economic concepts” (Roitman, 2005, 77).  
Much like the Cameroonian bandits, the black oil businessmen and women are 
clearly operating within a field of the illegal but licit, relying on the modalities 
established by the state and transnational corporations. Black oil business participants 
even take up the language of business, “stakeholders,” “national refineries Chairman.” 
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173 See Hobsbawm, 2000 and Guha,1983 
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Black oil also presents residents of oil communities with the only form of accumulation 
that appears authorized (although not legal) for them to participate in. The signboards 
addressed to “pipeline vandals”, pitched like a scarecrow next to the refinery pipelines do 
not seem, therefore to have an addressee.  
The public sense of anxiety around oil theft and its supposedly being “bad to the 
national economy,” similarly point more to the difficulties involved with locating and 
defining the contours of a national (and perhaps even oil) economy itself.  However, 
unlike the bandits in Roitman’s text, who make no claims to the political as such, these 
actors also seek to distinguish their actions from those of the state and corporations. In 
part, this is due a sustained history of organized opposition, one that took place around 
the control of those pipelines that produce the oil. But it also has to do with the 
slipperiness involved with such designations, where acts labeled as “theft,” and even the 
reading given to the term itself, do not always have a singular meaning.174 Like the thief, 
who appears ever-present in the Nigerian oil fields, but increasingly unnamable, “theft” 
itself appears as something that seems to stalk (or haunt?) the everyday world of 
production and exchange of oil in Nigeria.  
This interplay of unlocatable thieves and constant theft gestures at a menace than 
can never be identified without naming “business” itself and the networks, relationships, 
tactics and performances through which the oil companies, engaging national and 
transnational actors, terminologies and institutions legitimizes itself. It is possible to 
suggest with Jean and John Comaroff that “crime itself is frequently the object of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
174 There is strangely little in the anthropological archive on the idea of theft. Of course “thieves” of all 
kinds populate ethnographic accounts, such as on the lives of smugglers (Taussig, 1993; Sant Cassia, 2006; 
Tsing, 2005) and bandits (Roitman, 2005). Also, it is notable that Geertz’s essay on Thick Description, 
takes as its central example, a story about theft and counter-theft in order to demonstrate the kinds of 
semiotic webs Geertz sees at the center of the ethnographer’s task. 
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criminal mimesis.” The Nigerian state has “erected an edifice of ‘simulated government,’ 
where the realpolitik of thuggery and profiteering is conducted behind a façade of formal 
administrative respectability” (2006,15-6). Yet, Black oil business suggests something 
more nuanced about the way activities labeled as theft operate. While not necessarily 
successful at achieving desired outcomes, when Ebi says that the national economy and 
all its debt relations are tied into black oil, the suggestion is that the national economy is 
something that is not a singular body but an assemblage of parts. At the same time, the 
ways in which black oil engage such an assemblage suggest that forms and forces 
connected with the idea of the national oil economy are not stable, but are rendered 
operational through specific engagements that disassemble and reassemble these parts.  
But this shifting field, acquiring ever more engagements, produces debris, an 
accretion of connections, relationships and material destruction that remains 
inassimilable.175 While black oil business flaunts the idioms and ideologies of “business,” 
the practices involved with black oil business, like the term, “illegal bunkering” itself, 
have overgrown their referent point. Even as transnational project managers and 
industrial PR machines work to incorporate them deeper into their own logics, the 
network of bunkering and local refining continue to somewhat exceed their control. 
Perhaps the point was put most aptly by an old man in Oporoza who interrupted a 
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175 The pure expenditure described here bears little trace of Weberian capitalism and its iron cage of 
rationality. As Goux has commented on Bataille’s genealogy of surplus, “no society has wasted as much as 
contemporary capitalism” (Goux, 1990, 199). Goux, argument is particularly salient here, as he points 
towards an adoption of the logic of the gift and social exchange that becomes compatible with risk and 
excess in the commercial world of investment and mass consumption. And indeed ‘oil business” itself 
involves a great deal of investment and loss without any assurance of reaping returns. Billions of dollars are 
poured into drilling wells that might all end up being dry. As such the industry itself is no stranger to 
useless expenditure, high risk and is highly destructive in spite of its equal obsession with calculation. And 
thus, as I explore more below, that their approach to fostering a social link between their operations and oil 
communities in spite of working so hard to capture and delineate roles is likewise characterized as a “pump 
and dump culture.” 
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discussion I was having with a known, but young bunkerer. He insisted on adding his 
opinion on the matter: “we don’t like these things our boys are doing. It is not good, not 
good for our environment. But they call us thieves, na who be thief? Our boys, they just 
do copy. But copy go pass original, and who dey complain now now?” This copy, 
surpassing the boundaries of its original is neither completely subversive because it 
always relies on the dominant networks yet, remaining a menace, as it becomes the center 
of discourse and tactics for the state and corporations.  
After the amnesty, while the oil companies, the state and the community’s 
struggle with the pollution, the uncertainty and the illegality of the bunkering industry, 
this reconfiguration of the infrastructure most succinctly embodies the paradoxical work 
undergirding representations of a national oil economy.  
 
The countdown 
The last time I visited the Escravos area in late-August, 2011, there remained only two 
months of free reign on the pipeline according to Ebi’s calculations. As the deadline 
neared reports of Joint Task Force soldiers making arrests and setting fires to local 
refineries spiked considerable. Guwor said he had already shut down the refinery site we 
visited to make his camp deeper inside the creeks hoping its labyrinthine twists and turns 
would shield him a little longer. Trying to get as much out of what little time they had left 
refiners began to cook day and night. “Getting careless” a boboer explained while 
describing how he barely escaped when the refinery he was working at exploded. His 
colleague was not so lucky, “you could barely tell he was a human being. Even the bones 
were melted.”  
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Market women were also worried. Because local refinery participants are only 
paid on delivery, local vendors often accept to wait until a shipment goes through. But as 
more and more black oil deals were spoiled and a number of youth were relocating to 
Warri, anxieties were high over the drying up of cash and the over-extension of credit. 
Mama J, one of the more enterprising boat suppliers in Oporoza complained that she has 
no recourse to reclaim any losses. Since many of those who rent her equipment are her 
people she cannot deny them when they ask her for more time, and those who are 
strangers can simply disappear.  
Although I had left Nigeria, those with who I remained in contact confirmed that 
after another few months, local refining in Escravos had disappeared. I called Ebi 
expressing my surprise to discover his readings were correct and asked what will happen 
now that black oil business seemed to have passed out of the area. He replied that the 
government would just have to re-issue another year. “Wait and see,” he said, “you 
cannot stop it.” And indeed, six months later, I heard that morning skies in the creeks of 






















In July, 2011, I met with Mac, a Nigerian offshore worker, at a strange new roadside 
attraction in Warri: a defunct short-range jet set in a patch of grass on (fittingly) Airport 
Road. Purchased by the proprietor it had been painted in bright colors with the words, 
“Buttke’s World.” A kiddy slide and swing were placed nearby. For a 100 (.65 USD) 
naira fee, it was meant to serve as a children’s amusement park, where Warri kids could 
take turns imagining themselves jet setting around the world. We, however, had arrived 
to make use of the plane’s still operational in-flight entertainment system. Mac, who was 
friends with the owner, wished to show me a video produced on the construction of the 
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Bonga Project, the offshore rig where he worked and he felt that this would be an easy 
and relaxing way to watch the film.  
Titled: The Deepwater Pioneer, the video followed the rig as it was constructed in 
South Korea, towed through the Bay of Biscay and up the English channel for some final 
touches, then back into the Atlantic. It reached teams of waiting and freshly trained 
Nigerian oil workers only a few months later, ready to permanently anchor the rig just a 
few miles off the Niger Delta coastline. Thick with technical details about how the 
floating production and storage production and offloading (FPSO) vessel integrates time 
zones and establishes systems of metrical commensuration, the video was interspersed 
with dazzling images of ocean view sunsets, the red hull of the FPSO backed by 
luminous clouds. The narrator re-iterated (three times) how the Bonga employed and 
trained scores of Nigerian workers, leaving behind an independent, skilled workforce 
ready and waiting to accommodate other foreign investors, “It proves that fabrication of 
this size can indeed be achieved in Nigeria.” The teenaged boy who had taken our tickets 
on the amusement park site appeared enchanted by the video. His attention was drawn so 
hungrily towards the screen that the ticket stubs nearly fell out of his unattended hand as 
he ignored the customers gathering at the plane’s entrance. When I asked him what he 
likes about the video, he said this is the kind of work he wanted to do and adds that the 
rig is “beautiful.” When Mac tells him this is the rig where he himself works, the boy 
sighs and replies, “it’s a beautiful life.” 
Employed for the past seven years as a Shell contract worker on the Bonga, Mac, 
like the young ticket taker, smiled widely as the camera panned across the glimmering 
contours of the FPSO, named after a fish famous for its similarly complex bony structure. 
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Mac, whose job is to monitor the water pumps that help maintain reservoir pressure in the 
subsea well, took care to reiterate the parts of the tale he found important: the unique 
single-point mooring system fashioned for the project in Nigeria and the reinforcements 
to protect the production unit from swordfish, a surprisingly common cause of punctures 
and accidents in the Nigerian offshore. Rotating on uneven hitches (shifts) for the 
Bonga176—four weeks on, two weeks off177—Mac spent the next hour reciting all the ins 
and outs of his semi-permanent home/office. He had carefully studied and was genuinely 
enthusiastic about relaying the technical aspects of the Bonga. He even gave me a dense 
Bonga Operator Handbook detailing every safety control system on the rig, so that I 
might follow along. Yet his delight in the technology was matched by a disdain for the 
conditions of living on the rig itself. He spoke extensively about the tensions between 
different groups of workers, the heat in his cabin, of problems with mounting anxiety 
when he was away from his family, and bouts of insomnia he’d suffer when returning to 
them on his R and R (rest and relaxation) breaks. Yet, he concluded, that the largest 
problem in the industry is the Nigerian government, their lack of regulations and 
protections for workers. 
Although the state oil company, NNPC, is the controlling member of SPDC 
(60%), the rig is covered in Shell logos, and workers universally recognize themselves as 
working with Shell, rather than with NNPC. Shell staff are in charge of making decisions 
about safety and security. So why are complaints about the relative segregation and 
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176 The Bonga was named for a plentiful fish in the delta, Bonga, famous for the great number of bones. 
 
177 The usual hitches for oil workers in the offshore allot for an equal amount of time off. For instance, one 
month on, one month off. But since Mac is a contract worker, the regulations are often not applied in the 
same way. 
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hierarchy between different nationalities of workers, operational failures and perils for 
workers linked to the state and not to Shell?  
In Nigeria, perils for workers and the act of managing them were greatly 
expanded when organized militancy began in the early 2000s. Workers found themselves 
caught in the crosshairs of military and militant fighting and also at the center of a new 
set of calculations and calibrations taking place in the energy security community as fears 
set in that production would be shut down. In 2008, Mac’s Bonga had been attacked by 
MEND. After an ordeal that lasted ten hours, with the militants trying to smash in the 
inner door before a naval ship178 arrived, Mac and his colleagues, each in turn, found 
themselves seated in a small room across from a representative from the company and 
security manager. Mac was offered two choices, to sign a non-disclosure agreement and 
return straight to work that very day or to resign. Although possible to maintain with a 
skeletal crew of 15, over 200 workers are necessary to maximize production on the 
Bonga and the clock was ticking since their airlift from the rig. Mac, like every other 
worker on the rig, chose to take the first option. 
While there is a dense archive of studies examining questions of labor, race and 
extractive capital in a number of mining sectors, the experience and position of the oil 
worker peculiarly absent. This absence is likewise felt in the literature and critical 
analyses produced on the impact of oil and the oil economy in Nigerian in particular.179 
Experiences like Mac’s, often serve as anecdotal reference rather than a point from which 
to think seriously about how the lives of oil workers are structured, the work they do and 
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178 According to Mac, the boat was captained by South Africans, a detail he said, that the workers were 
especially warned to keep secret. 
 
179 In spite of a few ILO reports and histories of Nigeria trade unions generally, there are very few critical 
studies on the organization of Nigerian oil workers. See: Ivhobere, 1998 and Houeland, forthcoming. 
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the hazards they face. On the contrary, noting that oil production is a capital-intensive, 
technology driven industry, oil workers have acquired the label, “labor aristocrats,”180 
and are viewed as a well remunerated specialized skilled force with accident rates below 
those recorded in shaft mining industries.181 They are often seen playing a secondary role 
to capital in the history of the oil industry, rather than seen as part of processes 
reproducing such capital. Nor, beyond a few notable studies, has attention been given to 
the role they play vis-à-vis the interests of state and transnational corporations.182 
Monographs produced on Nigeria’s industry are no exception. Here ethnic or cultural 
groups often become the assumed platforms of solidarity and the subjects of repression 
and political violence (see chapter 2). Oil workers, by contrast, do not appear to form any 
substantial subject linked with the history of Nigerian state power (as, for example, the 
gold miner has in South Africa.)183  
Moreover, there is no study of what has taken place to Nigerian oil workers as 
privatization and market-driven incentives increasingly become part of governing 
instruments. This is a relatively large blind spot, particularly as regarding the increasing 
social unrest, sabotage and bunkering. By ignoring the oil worker it becomes possible to 
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180 The term originates in Engels’s letters to Marx referring to the relative privileges that are enjoyed by 
certain members of the working class. The term was applied to oil workers in Nore and Turner’s book, Oil 
and Class Struggle. 
 
181 However, in the US this is not, in fact the case. Since 2003, oil and gas workers account for 73% of the 
fatalities in the private mining sector, and have accident rates seven times greater than the rate for all US 
industries (see US census of fatal occupational injuries, 2013). 
 
182 There have been a number of recent works successfully rethinking of the place and role of the oil 
worker. See: Mitchell, 2011; Elling, 2015; Appel, 2012; Shafiee, 2012. This chapter is greatly indebted to 
these authors for the questions they raise about labor in the oil fields and its relation to national histories of 
oil producing states and techniques employed by transnational companies. 
 
183 Although, as I discuss further below, oil workers have always been identified as the potential lynchpin 
to the most successful national strikes, a total oil worker strike has never occurred in Nigeria. 
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assume that conflict can be addressed purely as a question of inclusion, resolved by 
diplomacy, or the extension of greater political participation for marginalized delta 
communities. Even within this dissertation, focusing on the pipelines, I mainly drawn 
attention to the ways in which the oil infrastructure becomes part and parcel of the social 
world in the Delta. Meanwhile, I have written on the notion of “work” itself as remaining 
trapped in certain definitions packaged by NGO’s and corporate bodies, as a kind of 
promise of inclusion that is superficial. And yet, any ethnography on the reassemblages 
taking shape in the space of production would be incomplete without taking account of 
the question of labor.184 The lives, livelihoods, and imaginations of oil workers are also 
entwined with contests around sovereignty, control and networks of accumulation in the 
delta. Therefore, in this chapter I will examine the critical questions about oil work raised 
by Mac’s story. I argue for the need to include oil workers in accounts of oil assemblages 
and the politics emerging through it. Their accounts suggest an essential and missing 
dynamic taking shape in the aftermath of the amnesty agreements: how increasing 
discourses and instruments of risk become socialized within broader representations of 
the future. 
 
Injury and Incident Free: a safety culture 
In September 2010, Chevron’s EGTL project was conducting as series of safety 
induction programs at a hotel in Warri. The program was being provided for incoming 
Nigerian contract workers joining the project and was run by their main contractor SGC. 
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184 Although I have certainly touched on the issue in the previous chapters, most notably, 2 and 3, there 
remains a need to explore its connection more explicitly to the life of the infrastructure and the larger 
themes I have touched on. 
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The project manager for SGC (KBR), a rotund, heavyset engineer, dressed in jeans and a 
khaki top reminiscent of safari gear, stood at the front of the room holding a microphone. 
“Welcome to the Escravos Gas-to-Liquid Project” he began as the newly minted 
employees took their seats. Some were already wearing the freshly distributed neck key 
chains to hold their badges: a bright red band with “EGTL” printed in white letters and 
displayed next to the Nigerian flag. Reading from the PowerPoint presentation projected 
behind him he explained, 
The project management team welcomes everyone here today to the 
EGTL project. You will be part of one of the largest construction projects 
in the world. Our project management team is focused on your safety and 
security - we will not compromise either under any circumstances.  
 
Pausing here, he pointed at the remaining list of introductory key points. “As you see 
here, ‘You have the opportunity to learn and develop your work skills by working on 
EGTL – grasp the opportunity that has been given to you,’” and, as a kind of promise of 
such availability, he reads, “‘Management is committed to provide you a workplace that 
is free from any type of violence or harassment.’” 
 The induction proceeded by slideshow, each new frame displaying the various 
components and processing systems that were to be constructed within the EGTL plant. 
Narrating through shots of the turbine, compressor, rotors and barrel pumps the project 
manager explained how EGTL had grown from a small island to complex massive 
industrial plant with a workforce of over 5,000 employees housed within. The workers 
attending the presentation were Nigerians and joining the project as part of the newest 
wave of subcontracts. They were now awaiting their first deployment to the EGTL site. 
Most sat calmly in their seats, some scribbling notes on a notepad that had been provided 
to them, others, arms folded had a more relaxed air about them. This presentation is a 
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requirement for incoming workers. Yet, as the SGC manager toured the details of the 
project, I was struck by how little this “safety induction” presentation cited any specific 
safety rules or precautions. It was only when the penultimate slide of the presentation 
titled, “The SGC Way…” (ellipsis on the slide title) appeared on the screen, that any 
prescriptions were listed. However, rather than related to safety gear or equipment it 
addressed relationships between workers.185 “SGC is ultimately responsible for your 
safety and the safety of everyone working on this project throughout the world. We take 
this responsibility very seriously, nothing is more important,” the project manager 
explained. “We care about everyone’s welfare, security and safety. Every life is equally 
precious and is to be protected at all costs.” Then, turning his attention to the list on the 
slide he explained that these are the guidelines employees must adhere to,  
*Trust, dignity and respect for all we interact with. 
*Be your brother and sister’s keeper. 
*Set the example, lead the way 
*SGC demands a safe and secure workplace free from violence and any 
kind of harassment. 
 
Following this slide the manager exclaimed that following such precepts, the project 
managed to recently log one million uninterrupted man-hours, something that had not yet 
been achieved at the EGTL plant. 
The rhetoric and tone promoting joint company and worker responsibility in 
fostering a safe and secure environment, although it does not at first seem particularly 
unusual, is the outcome of a rather recently updated philosophy being implemented and 
instituted for laborers across Chevron’s projects in Nigeria. In 2005, Chevron hired JMJ 
Associates, a global management consultancy specializing in what it calls “Enterprise 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
185 Workers also did receive training and instruction on rules for working on the EGTL, but at a separate 
training given onsite by the safety officers. This was simply meant as a induction to the history of the site 
and the philosophy and ‘culture’ (according to the project manager) that they hoped to generate at EGTL. 
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Transformation”, to provide safety consulting services. This consisted of a series of 
Incident and Injury Free (IIF) trainings for not only Chevron’s management team and 
staff but also for its large number of contract workers on the EGTL project. IIF is 
marketed as a holistic management instrument for customers across the extractive and 
construction industries, focused on the “social side of safety.” As JMJ explain in their 
promotional materials, their trainings work to, “open communication among the site’s 
workforce, providing relevant tools and skills to bring the IIF commitment to safety into 
real life, practical application.” IIF is designed to re-orient the “culture of extractive 
industries” like oil, traditionally characterized as risky. To do so it focuses both on the 
language used by management and the responses and behavior of workers. Michael, a 
JMJ facilitator on the EGTL project explained that the program strives to “change the 
terms of address from that of a business investment, with incentivized hierarchies, to a 
relationship of care and concern.” 
IIF training has become wildly popular with transnational companies operating in 
Nigeria since the militancy period. In addition to multiple Chevron production sites, JMJ 
has been hired to provide IIF workshops for workers at Shell and Exxon operations in 
Nigeria. The company motto is “Making the Impossible Possible, Making the Possible 
Real.” As the company itself admits, IIF training is costly thus, more than merely a shift 
in rhetoric, Incident and Injury Free (IIF) promises its clients results, not just a lowered 
incident rate but the possibility of none at all. “Getting to zero,” is the slogan used by 
facilitators who run three different sets of trainings. One is provided to managers where 
they learn how to promote and foster IIF environment continuously, another to full-time 
company staff, and a third is designed for Nigerian contract or subcontract workers. 
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While I did not personally attend any IIF trainings, Michael, a facilitator I met at 
Chevron’s Warri headquarters, agreed to provide me a run-through of the training he 
performed for subcontractors186 along with the PowerPoint presentation he used and to 
answer any questions about the process. He described how, since the mid-1960s, 
industries have focused on preventing and reducing injuries and accidents by examining 
unsafe conditions. Today, he insisted, the remaining injuries, 9 out of 10 take place under 
safe working conditions.187 This remainder is, according to them, the “culture” of oil 
work itself. The company celebrates the program’s ability to provide tools to break down 
“down language, cultural, craft and hierarchical barriers.” Working to create “a common 
safety language.”188 Thus the task set by JMJ and its many competitors, selling similar 
services, has been to generate an interpersonal practice that can work towards 
anticipating potential accidents and forestall them.  
On the one hand, there seems nothing very unique about the adoption of new 
safety protocols intended to improve worker confidence, relationships, safety and 
security. Tackling “the human side of safety” is an industrial trend that has greatly 
expanded over the past twenty years. Surrounded by highly complex and volatile 
(potentially catastrophic) technology, “safety culture” has likewise become a term and 
concept that is all-pervasive in oil work: on rigs, in refineries or welding projects where 
everything from the way you are dressed to the way you must walk is prescribed and 
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186 According to Michael, all trainings are all similar. The divisions between groups, according to him, is to 
allow a space where workers will feel more comfortable and open about articulating their grievances. 
 
187 Here, I must note that its clear Michael is speaking rather exclusively about large and mostly publically 
traded companies. Although the fact that his statistics assume a world of overall safe industrial working 
conditions is, as I point out later, part of the work by which certain incidents manage to become excludable 
from the larger calculus. 
 
188 See http://www.jmj.com/about/our-firm 
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monitored. Signs on pillars and corkboards announce repetitious reminders (“safety 
first”), to workers in lunchrooms, bathrooms, and offices. Sometimes old and crinkled, 
other times freshly printed and decorated with didactic cartoons or with gory images of 
dismembered limbs, signs and placards endeavor at every turn to remind workers of the 
danger they navigate everyday and that “safety is a value.” Every production and 
construction site is required to have a safety officer on hand to catch inconsistencies and 
to inspect the work through each phase.189  
On the other hand, IIF training works to expand the meaning of “safety” from 
referring to physical and mental alertness into an instrument for addressing and managing 
issues of morality, responsibility and even justice. Michael explains that the training 
works to cultivate a good “safety culture,” by reconfiguring worker’s understanding of 
their needs and expectations. It helps them to not simply be better workers, but better 
parents, colleagues and citizens. Such practices follow business trends for industrial 
companies seeking to identify and correlate social or religious ethics with desired 
workplace behavior (see Rudnyckyi, 2009). Linking the task of managing life at oil 
producing sites to wider systems of representation and value production, these programs 
promote particular forms of communication, perceptions about accountability, hierarchy 
and acceptable forms of solidarity. Amid a highly complex and volatile technical 
configuration producing the oil, “safety” thus collapses the task of managing the pumps 
and monitoring pressure-levels with managing one’s intimate and personal worlds.  
The complications faced by building this platform of shared meaning and beliefs 
to safeguard against accidents, blowouts, and potential mortal endangerment, comes into 
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189 Regular surveys and audits of safety conditions are mandated every 6 months to a year to ensure safety 
conditions meet industry standards. 
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focus when the project manager flips to the final slide of his safety induction: a close-up 
of a black and white hand, knit firmly together in what appears to be a handshake with 
the re-iteration of the line, “Trust, dignity and respect for all we interact with.” The 
manager does not comment on this slide but thanks the group for their attention and 
announces that refreshments will be served. When I later meet with the manager and ask 
him about the image he explains that he personally made the decision to slip the photo 
into the presentation because he wanted it to be clear that “everyone here cares about 
their fellow worker, it doesn’t matter the color of their skin or where they come from.” 
For him the slide is meant to serve a very particular purpose “we need to prevent blacks 
from discriminating against the whites” he explains. Given that “white” American and 
European workers, whose ranks are comparatively small yet who, in general, hold more 
senior positions and are often awarded more pay and protections (see below) it was clear 
that the project manager meant “discrimination” to implicate the resentment that 
expatriate managers felt from (particularly contract and subcontract) Nigerian workers. 
And in fact, the JMJ facilitator Michael, whose team is based in South Africa, likewise 
points out that one of the team—whose last project, was in Anglo American’s platinum 
mines—goals is to help manage racial perceptions. Although, he adds, they are 
discouraged from raising the matter of race explicitly in their training sessions at EGTL, 
it is a consideration in the way the trainings were designed. Yet, these muted references 
to difference inserted into ‘safety culture’ presentations continue to reference the 
entanglements between race, labor, national and transnational capital, and point to how 




Oil field taxonomies:  
The dining room at EGTL cafeteria in Warri is a plain, beige colored mess hall with 
yellowing floor tiles and florescent lighting overhead. Although there are no assigned 
seating arrangements, each morning, afternoon and evening the diners sort themselves 
into very distinct national and class groupings. At the far end, the uppermost management 
class for Chevron and its main contractor, KBR, (with one exception all American or 
British) dine quietly by the windows. Contract engineers from Scotland and Colombian 
welders hired on for specialized services are seated towards the center, each around their 
own table. The Italian construction workers keep to a particular corner. Meanwhile, 
Nigerian workers on the job sit and eat from an entirely different end of the buffet, one 
that serves eba with egusi or banga soup. Among the Nigerian worker’s tables, one can 
also find seating according to rank and often language group. These configurations, 
echoed at the EGTL site at Escravos as well,190 are quite common on production sites. 
While workers certainly gravitate towards shared language and national groups, 
however, the divisions also reflect a much more ingrained segregation among the kinds of 
risks, rewards and benefits workers are exposed to and provided. In general workers are 
classed as either senior or junior staff. Senior staff includes engineers and managers while 
junior staff are the welders, fitters, mixers and other manual laborers. However, within 
these grades (and particularly the latter) there is a secondary form of organization, one 
that does not correlate with the type of job performed, but rather determines a worker’s 
status. Such secondary gradients belong to what is called contracting or sub-contracting 
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190 And although I never visiting the dining hall at the Escravos site, at three other production sites I’ve 
visited in Nigeria, the prevalence of self-segregation during downtime and mealtimes was striking.  
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practices. Here, privileges and protections are determined by whether you are a full-time 
employee of a company, an independent contract worker or a worker hired through a 
subcontractor. Contracts, on the one hand are often tied to nationality. Workers from 
Mexico or groups from Philippians are acquired through Chevron’s contracts with 
companies based in these areas. However, within Nigeria, contracts and subcontracting 
are often less about hiring specialized groups of laborers, and more about the shifting 
conditions through which major transnational companies are able to operate. Subcontract 
work, in particular, is related to efforts to cut costs, comply or maneuver around national 
legislation, appease local communities and weaken potential strike actions.191 EGTL, as I 
have mentioned, employed over 350 Nigerian contractors and sub-contractors.192 A large 
number of these were local labor suppliers, known as body shops, by far the most venal 
companies in the oil and gas labor markets.  
Moving between different ends of the Warri-Escravos axis I was struck by the 
sheer range in situations for workers employed at the project. To begin with, the majority 
of those who self identify as “oil workers” (whether Nigerians or expatriates) are in fact 
employed in the oil servicing industry. Oil servicing companies provide equipment and 
technologies to help build and maintain the oil infrastructure. The oil service sector is 
used to discover and develop crude oil deposits and to construct ways of circulating and 
processing them. They do not own any equity in crude production. They are instead hired 
for specialized support in niche areas such as rig building, drilling or pipeline 
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191 As I have mentioned contracting in general has a bad reputation in Nigeria. It is sign of corruption and 
embezzlement. At the same time, acquiring contracts is considered desirable, therefore, over the years, oil 
companies have found that breaking work into contracts and sub contracts provides a means around having 
to broaden their engagement in Nigeria. 
 
192 A little over 60 of these were community contractors. 
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construction. This also includes the provisions for janitorial services, kitchen staff, jobs 
generally not integral to construction, but to sustaining the workforce. Various contracted 
service companies employed workers in the field for the EGTL plant as well as those 
designing and constructing pipelines.  
Second, as I have touched on in earlier chapters, depending on which company 
you are associated with and which part of the project you are assigned to, worker’s 
housing arrangements varied a great deal. Those employed by larger contracting 
companies (or with Chevron) such as KBR or Snamprogretti were based within the Gas 
to Liquid site along with foreign and Nigerian sub-contractors essential for the 
construction and running of the complex itself. Junior and senior staff inside the plant, 
however, were relegated to different cabins and quarters. Everyone is required to wear a 
badge at all times signifying which company you are associated with as well as the level 
of access you are allowed—signaled by a number 1 through 4.193  Meanwhile those 
building and servicing the expanse of pipelines and wellheads were accommodated 
within the oil producing communities, either hosted directly by residents in villages, or in 
houseboats in the rivers anchored at the edge of them.  
Third, while the majority of workers were Nigerians, most were not directly 
employed by a multinational oil company (nor NNPC the national oil company) but were 
brought onto the project as temporary contract workers or worse, by labor contractors. 
However, it is important to recognize that the status of workers (i.e. whether they are full-
time, subcontract, or employed through body shops) is not necessarily indicative of skill 
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193 Being accommodated at EGTL certainly did not mean a better situation. Cabins were in poor conditions. 
Strict hierarchies enforced by color and numerical systems were often a source of tension and frustration 
according to most contract workers I spoke with posted there. However, it did (at least in theory) protect 
workers from threats of kidnapping, protests or sabotage associated with community unrest. 
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level or commitment. For instance, a subcontract worker might very well have the same 
skills and responsibilities as a full-time Chevron staff member. Some temporary workers 
I knew worked twice as much as a salaried employee with benefits.  
It is across this complex tapestry comprising the workforce in and around 
Chevron’s EGTL project that JMJ set its sights on reforming with its new brand of 
‘safety culture.’ And yet, in giving attention to the inner workings of this stratified field 
of working conditions, I wish to draw attention to what remains absent from the 
company’s celebratory mantras about safety (although I think implicit in its project), the 
fact that risks workers were exposed to were highly uneven. 
This was not a difficult fact to glean. Spending time with different categories and 
classes of workers, it was obvious to everyone (even expats themselves) that expatriate 
workers, even if they are not managers nor Chevron or Shell staff, occupy the most 
comfortable and secure position in the oil fields. Chevron and KBR workers, for instance, 
are generally housed in more comfortable accommodations. Chevron employees, even if 
they don’t go offshore, only work one-one hitches (one month on and one month off) 
allowing them ample time for rest and relaxation. Expatriate workers are paid base 
salaries according to their rank and the period of commitment but additionally, as Nigeria 
remains on the US State Department list of countries putting workers in harms way, they 
can earn as much as 300% in danger pay.194 Well protected, fulltime company employees 
for Chevron and KBR also undergo regular medical evaluations and have full access to 
all emergency medical services.  
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194 In fact, although initially foreign workers were targeted by MEND for kidnapping, workers also saw 
their danger pay percentage rise markedly. As threats increased so did their paychecks.  
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The lives of workers inside Chevron’s Prodeco camp in Warri as well as at the 
EGTL plant site were strictly regulated. Punctuated by mealtimes, telephone times, 
briefings, work orders and routine tests. Work was conditioned by rather mundane and 
repetitive structures. And yet, in spite of being the most protected, expatriates often spoke 
as if they lived their lives in constant peril. In part, this was related to real, if overhyped, 
threat of kidnapping taking place in the Niger Delta at the time. Although rarely harming 
their abductees, militant groups since the early-2000 had explicitly stated that they would 
target expatriate workers for multinationals. The kidnappings were symbolic as it drove 
home the sense of bitterness over their marginalization from employment opportunities 
by foreign nationals.195 However, expatriates brought a high ransom price (their 
company’s having had to insure their safety) and drew the most amount of media 
attention to their cause. By the time I was conducting fieldwork, however, abduction of 
expatriate oil workers on the job was very rare. Yet anxieties continued, perpetuated 
largely by a particular image of Nigeria as ridden with crime and violence. Moved from 
the airport to headquarters, to the rig and back again, without ever setting foot outside 
guarded company walls few of these workers knew anything about Nigeria.196 Their 
information came from browsing websites like “oyibos online,” where other expatriates 
posted horrific tales either as firsthand accounts or as acquired from tabloid-esque 
Nigerian news stories. These stories (which were mostly unsubstantiated) would 
sometimes show up in the security briefings that the company sent weekly to workers.197 
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195 Moreover most kidnapping were pre-arranged, and some, according to MEND members I spoke with, 
from inside a company by Nigerian workers frustrated with an expatriate boss suggesting that this sense of 
injustice around the racial policies of oil corporations was not limited within oil producing communities 
 
196 As I’ve noted, such enclosures have intensified over the years with the increasing practice of offshoring 
installations and in view of increased security threats. 
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One American worker, clung to an absurd belief that if he left the compound without 
security, as a white person he would be accosted in broad daylight, “I’d get stabbed! Just 
for the paper in my pocket, they would come at me.”198  
 At the same time, for many western oil workers I met, this atmosphere of fear 
and risk provided a sense of thrill. Many spoke of their rather mundane Nigerian posting, 
squirreled away behind gates guarded by Nigerian soldiers, as if they were the adventure-
seeking wildcatters of the early days of oil facing open frontiers and high risk-taking 
could equal high reward.199 Although risks for expatriates these days were rewarded in 
the form of percentage increases for danger pay and high securities walls blocked the 
view of the frontier, the workers at EGTL often painted a different picture. At weekly 
poker games at the Warri headquarters British and American expatriates coming off their 
hitches would meet in one person’s cabin, drink and gamble, trying to blow off steam.200 
At these events, older workers, who had spent decades in the oil fields, reminisced about 
sliding in mud covered cellar floors in Texas or running pipe in the Philippians. Younger 
workers spoke of the clever ways they defied bosses and recounted their misadventures in 
other exotic lands during their off time. The thrill of high-stakes tale-telling in fact has 
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197 One particular story that seemed to haunt the expatriate community during my fieldwork was an incident 
involving armed robbers who were said not only to have held up a bus of travelers on the Lagos-Benin 
road, but to have made their victims lay in the road while they rode roughshod over their crushed bodies. 
This story was cited (with gruesome photos) to me so often I finally began asking where it was heard from, 
and was surprised to learn that the tale, complete with photos, had been circulated to all Chevron and KBR 
staff through their official security update providers. 
  
198 In these imaginings race often played a major role. There is no shortage of truly racist remarks and 
jokes, made about Nigerians, as I describe below. 
 
199 Featured and popularized in films and novels and stories about the oil boomtowns, wildcatting remains 
alive in story-telling. Wildcatting refers to speculators who strike out in unproven territory. Such desires are 
also echoed in the fantasies about black oil in the previous chapter. 
 
200 Having spent time with workers on the job for interviews, I began to also be invited to participate in 
smaller, private gatherings where weekly poker games took place.  
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established its own genre, posted to oil worker sites and writings on their adventures now 
can also be found in self-published memoirs available online.201 Certainly, working in the 
oil industry and in offshore rigs comes with serious risks given the volatility of the 
materials and the number of complex moving parts. However, in these accounts, danger 
of technological dysfunction becomes part and parcel of the dangers of foreign 
environments.  
The games I attended were always catered with processed American fare: 
Pringles, bean cheese dips, chocolate cake, meat deep fried and covered in a Tex-Mex 
powder—all the comforts of home purchased at the company store at a 100% mark-up. 
Downing regular shots of tequila (usually smuggled in through personal items) workers 
sometimes played till morning, gambling away a little slice of their “danger pay,” until a 
single winner remained. Swapping stories, each worker strove to top the next in 
profanities and wildness, transporting listeners with stories of other jobs, other travels, 
crazy companions, beautiful, exotic women and near death experiences from blowouts, 
cable breaks and misunderstandings between armed and dangerous others the world over. 
Part factory, part merchant ship, both offshore rigs and oil construction sites rose up in 
these tales like a kind of Pequod, with her tall masts and salty characters drawn from all 
corners of the earth working to plumb the watery depths. With the air conditioner raging 
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201 The best example of this new trend is Paul Carter, a British author, has written a series of books 
performing with extraordinary whimsy the iron pumping thrill seeking genre, constructed as the 
autobiography of his life as an oil worker. His books, “Don’t Tell Mom I work on the Rigs: She thinks I’m 
a Piano Player in a Whorehouse,” and “This is not a drill: Just another Glorious day in the Oilfield,” retells 
the trials, tribulations and disasters (personal and material) that occupy the oil worker. In one moment he is 
being evacuated from an offshore rig in the North Sea, or taking a trip to Afghanistan with a private 
contractor friend, in the next he is in the South China Sea trying to talk down a driller dangling an 
unfortunate tool pusher by his ankles over the ledge of the rig for giving him a dirty look. Oil work is 
described as an addictive escape high in adrenaline, and those employed in the gritty parts of the industry as 
figures braving of the last untamed margins of the American oil empire.  
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full blast, the odor of ammonia and cigarette smoke saturating their cabins, the stories, 
growing ever more incredible, infused the life of the expat oil worker with an aura of 
violence, risk, and grit that follows the world’s global oil empires.202 Some went so far as 
to describe this as “access to the real world” which their friends back home would never 
see.  
And yet, this imaginary of risk, where actual dangers are transmuted into forms of 
adventure and endless exaggerations, obscures the fact that those most at risk from 
accidents, deteriorating health problems and external violence are those who labor on the 
spatial and institutional fringes of the oil complex.  
Attending the retirement ceremony of Shell’s vice-present of security operations 
for the western Delta, a comedian performing for the event seemed to me to aptly portray 
the dilemma of those other workers who comprise around 80% of the workforce. 
Speaking to an audience of mostly high-ranking Nigerian and expatriate managers, he 
explained that he too was once offered a position with Shell, in “access management.” 
Proud of his new status he bragged to his friends about big position “as an oil worker,” 
the most desirable employment prospect for any Nigerian. He therefore prepared 
carefully for his first day of work. He borrowed a suit from his cousin and purchased new 
leather shoes on credit that the shopkeeper was more than happy to extend given the 
words, “job at Shell.” The unfortunate comedian, however, appeared for his first day of 
work in access management, only to be given a seat under the hot sun alongside the gate. 
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202 Transnational workers, did of course, have to manage a number of serious and practical hardships with 
their work. Leaving their families for six month out of the year, many felt they had to pay for, as one 
worker put it, “a life I don’t participate in.” According to the doctor at EGTL alcohol and unhealthy diets 
are common. Nearly all the fatalities of American and European oil workers in Nigeria are from heart 
attacks. 
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He found himself as a gateman, sweating and exposed, outfitted with the wrong gear for 
the wrong job.  
There are, of course, a number of Nigerians who have fulltime employment with 
multinationals and with NNPC. However, while remaining a very desirable position, 
increasingly much of the work being undertaking in the Nigerian oil fields places 
workers, as in the case of the joke, outside the company gates. If perhaps designed just 
for a laugh, the joke in many ways seems to elude to the outcome of extensive 
contracting practices that have created a sub-class of workers whose jobs are temporary 
and whose working conditions place them in a much more precarious position. A recent 
report from the Solidarity Center suggests that as many as 9 out of 10 Nigerians workers 
struggle in precarious arrangements. In both my fieldwork in the delta and research into 
the history and current conditions of oil work, there is no single title given to this class of 
workers. Sometimes they are referred to as third tier workers, casual workers, simply, 
‘contract workers’ or indirect or subcontract employee. I will refer to them here, 
however, as subcontract workers and subcontracting arrangements.  
When I spent time with Fenog, a Nigerian contractor building pipelines for the 
EGTL plant, I heard very different stories about risk, work and the safety protocols than 
those from expatriates tucked away inside the oil camps. Almost all the workers for 
Fenog, about 80%, are subcontract workers. Aside from its top managers, the company, 
which prides itself on an all Nigerian workforce with a majority of workers drawn from 
Niger Delta ethnic groups, works strategically to keep its full time employees below 100 
people. Although they declined in providing any actual figure of workers, estimates from 
some personnel managers ranged from 500 to 1500 depending on the amount of jobs the 
! 241!
company was involved with. Fenog is not a labor contractor, but a certified service 
company (labeled as indigenous, meaning their workforce comes from the Niger Delta). 
However they relied heavily on subcontract labor for several reasons. Subcontract 
workers are cheap and easily dispersed when the workload is slow. Also, like any other 
company operating in oil producing communities they had to hire community workers, a 
task more easily streamlined through labor providers. However, one of greatest 
advantages of a sub-contract workforce for a smaller company was simply that it keeps 
the recorded numbers of employees low enough to escape union regulations.203  
The lives of Fenog workers were no less strictly regulated than those of their fully 
employed counterparts. Squeezed into tiny guesthouses fed (sometimes) by a meager 
generator, in the village of Oporoza, Fenog workers woke in the dark. Without exception, 
they ate Quaker oats and tea204 in the morning, eba in the afternoon and rice at night 
seven days a week. There remained an hour or two at the end of the day to take a beer at 
one of the local bars, although after workdays ranging from twelve to sixteen hours, 
many workers went directly to sleep. Rain or shine they must leave for site at the crack of 
dawn. Despite the heat there is one hour of break given in the afternoon. Managers 
explain that workers must remain onsite for lunch “so that they don’t lose focus.” A daily 
lunch boat makes the rounds to bring steaming pots—or sometimes already lukewarm—
containers of vegetable soup and eba to workers. At the time this covered roughly a 50 
miles range. The lunch boat often left at 10am and did not return until 2:30pm, if you are 
on the early end your food is hot, and if at the end, barely warm. 
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203 Unionization is only offered to employees at large companies, ie, those over 100 fulltime employees. 
 
204 In Nigeria, tea refers to any hot drink, either coffee, lipton tea, or popular chocolate drinks like Milos.  
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In spite of general similarities in the rigor and temporal cycle of work and rest, 
Fenog workers described their relationship to work and the oil industry quite differently 
from those of expatriates at Chevron. Ejiro, who has been a welder for over twenty-five 
years has oversized, dry hands, a scratchy voice and deep cough although he insists he’s 
never smoked a cigarette in his life. He referred to safety in the same terms the young 
man at the airplane amusement park used when referring to the image of the Bonga, as “a 
beautiful thing.” However, his meaning here does not revolve around a fantasy, but 
indicates the serious consequences he and others have suffered without it. Ejiro worked 
with Shell from 1999 to 2004 after which he was laid off during one of the largest 
retrenchment programs known as “Securing our Future” or Sofu, as it was nicknamed by 
its victims. Workers who came under the purview of the program were labeled as 
redundant or only needed on a part time basis and were let go. “We were plenty at that 
time.” He explains, “You get a call or letter and that’s it, ‘you’re Sofu-ed.’” After Shell, 
Ejiro moved between various jobs. For some jobs he was even hired back to Shell 
projects as a contract worker. “My duties were the same, only the pay was not there. 
When the work finishes, I have to pack up and leave and look for another.” Increasingly, 
however, he found the only jobs available were through third party labor contractors 
(body shops), which he described not as new work, but as being placed in an entirely 
different subject position,  
Ah, life is precious so anybody who is working with a bigger firm he 
knows he will get everything. His job is safe, himself is safe because the 
company, the bigger firm, will always think of the safety of the job. When 
you are working in bigger firms they take safety into consideration so you 
are always obeying the safety rules -you must always put on your goggles, 
you must always put on your helmets, you must always wear a hand glove. 
Before doing any other job, your safety boots, everything as regards the 
safety of your health. But in [subcontract] jobs there was no orientation, 
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we are just working locally because most of these small companies they 
don’t take safety into consideration. So if you are looking at it, a direct 
employee and indirect employee they are two different people 
 
Welding in particular causes long-term damage quickly, scarring lungs with poisonous 
fumes and causing a form of visual degeneration known as arc eye. It is advised that 
exposure to fumes and to the light be at a minimum.  
Being a fulltime employee also meant that treatment of workers was subject to 
careful regulations. When employed as a salaried employee for Shell, for instance, Ejiro 
was allowed time off to recover between jobs and had full health benefits through the 
company. With employment uncertain, however, he, like other independent welders are 
provided a flat rate for the whole job—rather than per hour. Therefore he simply rushes 
to finish jobs fast and move onto the next as soon as possible. Rarely having the means to 
pay for their own safety gear, workers employed in subcontracting arrangements often 
find (if they are provided equipment at all) that their boots leak, their helmets are worn, 
that the safety goggles are not always certified for the type of welding. The oxygen tanks 
worn to avoid inhaling chemicals are neither affordable nor provided by the contractor so 
if they cannot purchase or borrow them, workers often go without. When I ask him what 
occurs when an accident does happen he lets out a sigh and for a moment appears 
amused, 
Ha! If you have an accident? Who will help? Nobody. [They] will just give you a 
partial treatment. That is why if you are working with a [subcontractor] you have 
to be very, very conscious. You will not be fully treated like the bigger firms who 
will want to take full consideration of taking you to the hospital and make sure 
that you are being treated well and they will always give you a stood off for some 
time for you to relax. But in smaller firms they don’t have the money to do that so 
they don’t even remember these because the money is not there. 
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Ejiro’s critique of subcontracting always operated through comparison between his 
current situation and what he remembers about his position at Shell. He insists that since 
the end of his tenure there he hasn’t even seen a doctor despite a developing tightness in 
his chest. With three children, he doesn’t wish to pass up jobs because of health 
problems, “If there is work, I must work.”  
However, amongst all my interviews with subcontract laborers the most prevalent 
grievance expressed was missing paychecks and inexplicably reduced wages. Body shops 
are allotted a certain price per worker (or a percentage of the worker’s salary) from the 
contracting party. This percentage is not fixed and so workers are never clear on what this 
figure is. The labor providers were at leisure to distribute payments for whatever amount 
and at whatever rate they wish. Workers were often left in the dark about the actual price 
attached to their labor, giving way to an atmosphere of deep suspicion and mistrust of 
their bosses. An independent fitter I met, Moses, laid out the dilemma when describing 
(like Ejiro) his time moving across various jobs and work conditions: 
When I was working with OPI (Oil Pipeline International) it was a labor 
contractor. They write your names. You fill their forms. They send you to the 
company. If you pass the test, you are qualified. Now let me tell you, a labor 
contractor will not pay you. You will not even know your salary. It’s what he 
dialogue with you that he is going to be paying you. You will not have any insight 
about the management salary structure. He will not give you any detail, he will 
always want to tell you that you don’t have any relationship with the management 
because he has employed you on his own and handed you over to the company. 
Maybe you are being paid medical or house allowance [by the company] but he 
will not indicate it there. Maybe he is paying you fifty thousand [naira] for your 
housing and the company is paying you hundred thousand [naira], how do you 
know?  
  
Such conditions according to both Moses and Ejiro lead to increased accidents 
rates over time, particular—as I heard constantly complained about throughout my time 
with subcontract workers—it was not uncommon for these wages to be paid at all, and 
! 245!
very rarely on time. A myriad of personal problems thus arise due to the stress not only of 
precarious working conditions but precarious remunerations. As Moses explains: 
The people will not be working with their whole heart, the job will not be even 
moving the way you want it because that 100% of concentration will not be there, 
[the unpaid worker] will not be concentrating well. He will be saying to himself, 
‘ah I have finished work, I’m going back to my family and my salary has not been 
paid, my wife are hungry, my children too are hungry.’ This man will not be 
concentrating on the job; he will be concentrating on his salary or how you will 
pay him his money. If I were in the house of the government I will always advice 
all contractors pay your workers! Pay them when it’s due so that your workers 
will be working concentratedly, no interruption. 
 
The problem had grown so bad that many workers were writing anonymous 
letters to transnational managers, sometimes hinting with upper levels of companies that 
those they were employing were cheating them. Some even appealed to me, with tales of 
having not seen a paycheck in over three months and asking if there were anyway I could 
intervene on their behalf. Aside from the fact that hardly any of these workers belonged 
to a Nigerian oil union, directly confronting body shop owners was for most workers a 
more socially complex endeavor. It is common for body shop owners to recruit from 
within their own communities or ethnic groups. Oftentimes workers are taken on “as a 
favor” some even having dashed something to the owner to get their name included. 
Constrained by a sense of taboo, Moses explains this makes it difficult, “its your brother, 
so you cannot put mouth to talk (complain).”  
Perhaps resulting from the difficulty of holding open negotiations, rumors and 
suspicions about the diabolical dealings of labor contractors were common. Many had 
acquired the nickname, “brother sell brother.” Stories circulated of sons employing their 
fathers and making them work Sunday’s, of cannibal contractors belonging to cults like 
Ogboni rumored to consume the bodies of those who suffered fatalities in accidents in 
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order to obtain power and wealth.205 Here Marx’s metaphor of “capital as dead labor, 
vampire-like” (Marx, 1968, 233) is recalled as contractors are accused of “doing 
ritual”206. As Moses explains, “They [the contractor] themselves, they are having fifty 
thousand for themselves and he is not the person doing the job he doesn’t have the idea of 
doing the job –that is ritual…he’s living on people’s blood. That is,” He pauses and 
begins addressing the imaginary contractors, “you are living on people’s blood! The 
people is working for you, the percentage the company is paying you as a labor 
contractor, you are receiving it. Then you will now share this man’s salary into two. You 
are living on people’s blood!”  
Diabolical figures feature quite prominently in descriptions of oil work. Although 
I have here tried to distinguished subcontract worker as a condition of (some) Nigerian 
workers, there remain a small (but also growing) number expatriates who also refer to 
themselves as contract workers. Many of these operate as independent agents and are 
employed by transnational or Nigerian service companies who might be in need of their 
particular expertise and experience. These workers, who spend most of their time in 
Nigeria, belong to their own kinship networks. The American contract workers in Delta 
State, for instance, were all Cajuns from the area around Morgan City, Louisiana. They 
are oil worker legacies. Their families have been running pipe and constructing rigs for 
two and sometimes three generations. Many arrived following fathers, brothers, uncles 
and second cousins to the delta, bought land and have married Nigerian wives. They’ve 
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205 In anthropology witchcraft accusation has been at the center of a number of excellent studies exploring 
power, labor and the political. See: See Gesheire; Evans-Prichard; Comarroff and Comaroff, 2000; Siegel,  
 
206 Although in Nigeria, to say something is “ritual” or an individual is “doing ritual” is to invoke a 
common slur and does not mean the person necessarily believes they are seeking out black magic. 
Although, that said, sometimes the accuser can very well mean it to be taken literally. 
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made a niche as experts in particular technologies such as crane operations, jack-up barge 
construction. Fenog, for instance, had two such workers employed while I was there. 
Neither in quite as comfortable as fulltime employees at transnational corporations, nor 
as precarious as the Nigerian subcontract workers, they find themselves at a particular 
vantage point. While discussing the experience of working contracts in Nigeria one 
worker’s response was strange but insightful. Charly, crane operator from Morgan City 
proclaimed: “they say the oil is the devil’s shit, so then we’re like the plumbers, the 
goddamn devil plumbers!”  
The statement references Juan Pablo Alfonzo, former Venezuelan Minister of 
mines and OPEC founder’s, famous quote in which he compares the supposed “blessing” 
of oil to “the devil’s excrement” wherein, the state finds itself mired in debt, waste and 
corruption (Coronil, 1997). Oil is digested as an evil force. Here Charly interprets the 
quote in terms of engineering and facilitating its movement from the bowels of the earth, 
out across the surface of a transnational, networked, hydrocarbon society.  
And yet, given the origin of the reference, there remains a connection worth 
exploring in how this work of the “devil” connects to the ways the national oil industry 
was being re-ordered in the wake of the amnesty as increasing emphasis was placed on 
routing out practices that had exposed oil production networks to the corruption and 
violence that was said to exist outside its functional domain. It is this, for instance, this 
brood of diabolical plumbers, contract laborers, that JMJ puts special emphasis on 




Safety, Danger and the Future  
The EGTL safety induction sessions and IIF trainings coincided with one of the 
oil industry’s more infamous failures, the Deepwater Horizon. When the Macondo well 
blew in April 2010 resulting in eleven fatalities, workers at EGTL, many having 
experience in the offshore themselves, expressed sympathy for the men who had perished 
in the explosion. They lambasted, along with the rest of the world, the actions of BP. 
Some comments however, already harbored evidence of the impact IIF was making on 
the workforce. Among Nigerian and expatriate workers alike, the belief was that BP did 
not foster a strong safety culture for their workers and managers. Instead they favored 
what the IIF language derogatorily refer to as “investment-centered incentives,” ordered 
primarily around deadlines and profit lines. Workers seemed to believe that what took 
place on the rig was not accidental, but in some ways, inevitable. They insisted that such 
catastrophic neglect could never occur at Chevron. “Here they are very serious about 
safety and safety culture,” explained a Nigerian contract worker hired by Chevron, “they 
know what a good safety culture is.” A year and a half later Chevron’s North Apoi 
platform in Bayelsa State (not far from EGTL) burst in flames following an explosion 
that somewhat resembled the problems that led to the Deepwater catastrophe: a build-up 
of pressure with Chevron managers insisting worker ignore warning signs and continue 
with their drilling. It claimed the lives of two contract workers and took over 50 days to 
put out the fire. 
“Safety culture” is the cornerstone of Incident and Injury Free JMJ had offered 
Chevron. Renowned by analysts for being vague, “safety culture” is a term widely 
applied across the industry (Mearns and Flin, 1999; Lindoe, Baram and Renn, 2014). It 
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refers at once to a general code for reducing potential accidents in a hazardous 
environment and also to the particular social configurations and arrangements 
characterizing each individual production site. Now ubiquitous across most large-scale 
construction and industrial projects, ‘safety culture’ features large in Public Inquiries into 
major accidents, as a category for identifying and assessing causality and responsibility. 
More recently, it has been instrumental in the development of risk management modules, 
given the hefty task of both materially and ethically securing industrial sites.  
Safety culture, as a form of accident prevention, began as an evaluation of 
“culture,” writ large. European investigators evaluating the series of missteps leading to 
the 1986 Chernobyl disaster were the first to use the term when they claimed, rather than 
any technological failures, the accident was the result of Soviet engineers having an 
“inferior safety culture” to that of the West (OECD, 1987).207 Offering little empirical 
information in its conclusion, “inferior safety culture” here acts as label for classifying 
complex failures that had been compounded over time, but, ultimately whose cause rested 
in a the failings of a particular cultural context: the rough and irresponsible ways of 
Soviet industrial practices.  
Despite (or perhaps because of) the ambiguities that emerge when a complex 
catastrophic malfunction becomes attributable to an even more complex social world 
(becoming an acceptable explanation for operational disaster) the term was quickly 
picked up. It could, in some cases, operate as a means of dispersing blame, by applying 
“cultural explanation” to the confines of a worksite rather than a society at large. Safety 
culture, for instance, became a key focal point in the oil industry following 1988 Piper 
Alpha disaster when an explosion on a platform in the North Sea resulted in the death of 
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207 see OECD Nuclear Agency, 1987 write-up on the implications of the Chernobyl disaster 
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167 workers. The Cullens inquiry set up to evaluate the causes of the disaster concluded 
that the operator, Occidental, showed a poor record on safety procedures and 
maintenance work (Cullen Inquiry, 1988). However, seen as a broader, complex interplay 
of the rig’s culture, no criminal charges were filed against the company.208  
By the 1990’s safety culture had acquired a more salient role, as it was coupled to 
new theories and formulas that the behavioral sciences were using to develop risk 
management systems (Pidgeon, 1991). According to Mearns and Flin, risk management 
analysts, safety culture expanded from being a categorical technology to assign causality 
into an instrument of intervention. “Values, beliefs, attitude, social norms and rules, 
practices, competencies and behaviors” could now be studied, analyzed and re-
conditioned with a view towards contingency planning (Mearns and Flin, 1999, 5). Safety 
culture became more than explanation or a legal argument and became part of wider 
practices for calculating possible errors and developing instruments to manage them. 
Assembling data from various industrial accidents, safety culture proponents 
sought a means to build a community of shared meanings and, adopting the word from 
Polanyi, a kind of  “tacit knowledge” (Pidgeon, 1991). The goal was to establish a set of 
techniques that could guide and influence decision-making processes of workers on the 
job. In the oil industry, one of the greatest challenges with the implementation of new 
safety culture practices had been overcoming previous tendencies to cover-up accidents. 
Often attributed to traditions that encourage displays and performances of masculinity on 
rigs and at worksites, this sort of macho posturing has to also be understood as part and 
parcel of a system instituted by the management that rewarded workers for covering up 
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208 Following Piper Alpha, an analysis of safety culture can be found in most accident reports (and lawsuits) 
taking place in the oil fields. 
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accidents and incidents (Ely and Meyerson, 2010). During my fieldwork I heard 
countless such stories. From the less severe: a sandblaster scarring a cheek that was 
downgraded to a rash acquired in the muggy conditions of the field, to the fatal: workers 
seeking ineffective alternative medicine to treat mortal wounds in order to avoid having a 
hospital report. The impetus in all cases was to reduce the rates of recorded incidents on 
the job and therefore acquire larger completion bonuses. The less accidents recorded, the 
more a company will reward its workers. Although most managers knew workers were 
covering up accidents, tacit collaborations to obscure them occurred within worksites as 
well as boardrooms. 
Proponents of a ‘good’ safety culture, as it was presented in theory, sought to 
counter the long ingrained practices focused on statistical reports while at the same time 
reducing actual rates of incidents. It did so by establishing new sets of measurements and 
new mechanisms to manage them. Noting that “social and technical components interact 
with and overtime change each other in complex and unforeseen ways,” one the 
industry’s earliest proponents of safety culture explains, “as we shift our safety focus to 
analyze work activities associated with a particular person, task, and time, we will be 
making error precursors and triggers more visible. Once visible, errors can be predicted, 
managed, and prevented” (Pidgeon, 1991, 131). Adopted by platforms looking to tame 
the elements of chance and contingency, safety culture drew on popular emerging 
management science theories that sought “preparations for some degree of multiple 
futures” (Allen, 2006). It transformed worksites into a set of metrics working to identify 
“unpredictable risk factors” and set them within objective, flexible frameworks of 
possibility. It is, for instance, helpful to recall here that JMJ’s motto, “making the 
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impossible possible” could be read as: making the unknown into a constructive 
possibility among multiple foreseeable futures. It is, thus, important to understand how 
notions of safety culture are themselves part of a more fundamental re-evaluation of the 
contours of risk and notions of temporality.  
Multiplying, monetizing and securitizing risks has become a defining feature of 
structures governing oil markets and energy security at large. In the last chapter I pointed 
to how the liberalization of oil markets was refracted in the social worlds of Niger Delta 
residents faced with increasing uncertainty. However, it also greatly altered the 
conditions for oil workers. The commodification of contingency (i.e. not merely an 
instrument for factoring probability but making such factors into productive objects209) 
that began to enter the oil trade in the mid-1980’s as oil joined the ranks of asset classes, 
has been understood as a process through which the price and value of oil was delinked 
from the underlying commodity (Nitzan and Bichler, 2006). The oil glut and shareholders 
value activism at the beginning of the 1980’s pushed large transnationals, packaging their 
oil contracts into financial derivatives, to become traders in oil in addition to producers 
and vendors. As I pointed out in the previous chapter, the trade in oil as financial asset 
has far outstripped the trade as deliverable commodity and thus altered the set of 
priorities for oil companies.  
The increasing power of oil markets has therefore meant the restructuring of 
previous relationships between the productive process, circulation and value. Marx, in 
Capital: Volume 1 points to how the transposition of a commodity into money occurs 
when a commodity’s value is realized in exchange (Marx, 1968). This movement, 
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209 There are a number of studies that have argued this point: see Callon, 2004; Guyer, 2007; Lee and 
Lipuma, 2006 as a few examples. 
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however, accordingly requires a salto mortale, a leap of faith that completes the 
circulation process of M-C-M’ (Labban, 2010, Zizek, 2004). This process however must 
now additionally contend with speculation about oil’s future value as a commodity in 
financial markets. This means that as oil becomes a medium of speculation, there is, “a 
temporal displacement of the realization of value into the present” (Labban, 2010, 542). 
Within financial futures markets commodity value is now established (and circulated) 
“before it is produced by the labor process or realized in exchange” (Labban, 550). 
According to Mazan Labban, the production and financial realms are not fully divorced, 
but rather trapped in a “temporal parallex” (which concept he takes from Zizek’s (2004) 
discussion of Karatani (2003)). This transformation, he argues, allows an oscillation 
between two time-spaces, of physical and financial flows of oil, fundamentally 
transforming the nature of production itself. Interested primarily in the production of 
market volatility, Laban focuses on the interrelation between resource crisis and financial 
crisis. There is less attention given to how the encroaching logic of financial reform—the 
‘incessant’ displacement of two time-spaces of circulation—and the kinds of corporate 
restructuring that go into facilitating it, refract in the everyday world of production itself 
and on those whose labor remains (as he acknowledges) a central aspect to both spheres 
of accumulation.210  
Although not a financial product itself, safety culture, as an instrument for 
managing risks within the sphere of physical production (and circulation) of oil, grew 
more popular as the industry’s shifted its focus to financial markets. Oil companies joined 
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210 This has been a concern within anthropology in general, as capital becomes distanced from sites of 
production. In their article, Millennial Capital Jean and John Comaroff (2000) point to the continuing 
relevance of labor even as its value appears eclipsed in financial spheres. 
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financial markets later than others, in the late-80s and only began to flourish in the 1990’s 
following the Gulf war. Oil companies have increasingly turned towards financial 
markets for shorter returns on their investment, sometimes making money on crisis (See 
Johnson, 2012).  Meanwhile, it became necessary to continue maintaining internal 
stability to oil companies involved in production. Corporations are required to present 
shareholders and auditors with reports proving expanding reserves, increasing efficiency, 
lowered incident rates. Safety culture platforms like IIF, promising visibly lower lost 
incident and accident rates grew popular as they played on both the need for practical, 
immediate solutions to reduce problems on the ground, and the possibility of making 
these inventions compatible with the instruments of projection and speculation of future 
value that companies require for calculating future value of oil as well as that of the 
corporation itself.  
JMJ, started in 1994, has grown enormously vending re-configuration platforms 
that target a more holistic re-orientation of labor organizing and managing infrastructures 
(at a rather high cost) under the “safety culture” label. It has its main offices on four 
continents and operates out of 80 different countries. 211 Their rising popularity speak to a 
dissolving of what Jane Guyer (2007) has labeled the “near future,” a temporal gap where 
an imagination for planning and struggling towards specific goals has been replaced by 
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211 As may be apparent, I read far too many articles by business management PhDs and behavorial 
scientists. However, they proved to make-up the majority of recent fieldwork-based articles available on oil 
workers (although for the most part, offshore workers). What is interesting is that Michael and the many 
analysts who have contributed to industrial literature on labor management (Ely and Meyerson, 2008; 
Menn, etc.) emphasize that the need to counter risks have largely to do with curbing performances of 
masculinity, as Michael puts it, “the problem of not wanting to be a wuss.” Therefore, they claim that 
effective methods are those which teach and encourage workers to look for different “common 
denominators between them and their colleague, “such as shared value values and moral.” This is meant to 
foster a shared environment of support. However, it is notably absent in these analysis the fact that these 
new programs being put forward encourage solidarity only in certain ways. For instance, not one single 
article mentioned the well established fact that in many contracting and subcontracting arrangements 
companies often advocate against their employees joining union activities which might offer other forms of 
collectives, and sometimes punishing them if they do.  
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calendar dates. She contends that this has been reflected in forms of social and political 
reasoning that at times resemble secular versions of similarly (increasingly common) 
imaginaries of prophetic time. 
Programs like IIF are not market making instruments, but rather, are shaped by 
similar conceits about time and possibilities. Thus, while surpluses are skyrocketing in 
the financial sectors, the pipelines, shipping routes and those whose livelihood are linked 
to building and securing them become subjects which company’s strive, through the 
management of unforeseen contingencies, to produce new understandings of risk and 
work. A central feature of IIF, for example, is to change the workers perception of the 
relation between the space-time of the worksite and the challenges they face in the future 
of their lives at large. Towards the end of the IIF sessions, which last anywhere from one 
week to three, the emotions, stories and personal ethics that trainers have cajoled workers 
into voicing, become translated by the facilitator into “New Perceptions” which “allow 
breakthrough actions in the present.” According to Michael, “the key to IIF is 
understanding that there are two kinds of futures: The future as a probability and the 
future as a declaration.” The training is thus focused on moving workers beyond the 
present paradigm where the future is merely a probability, based on past experience, and 
into a view of the future as declarative. Here workers are encouraged to take more 
accountability for their actions are asked to understand safety as “causing something to 
happen,” no longer just preventing something from happening.  
Accordingly, workers are asked to labor “in a new tense.” The worker considers 
each action and decision he takes in the present as a step towards meeting a certain vision 
and commitment to a declared and decided future. As they explain, perceptions, actions 
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and results are to be understood as interrelated. Thus, realization of future possibilities is 
already determined by the present. By the same logic, the worker agrees to take on all the 
responsibility for the future in the present, but without any clear access or pathway of 
how to arrive at it. The new present/future, is meant to act as an instrument for equalizing 
the field between classes of workers, between workers and managers and towards a 
vision wherein securing the production infrastructure becomes tantamount to securing 
one’s future value. Given that the programs presented by JMJ were largely addressed to 
groups of Nigerian subcontractors the problems such logics give rise to become 
immediately apparently. In the case of subcontractors not only are workers not presented 
with many concrete options for achieving more secure futures, they are being actively 
denied them through bans on joining unions and the withholding of wages by employers. 
None of these potential perils are mentioned in the trainings, even though, as the JMJ 
trainer I spoke with divulged, workers had privately asked him to raise the matter during 
workshops. Such matters, however, do not fit under the task of JMJ trainers, which is to 
promote a sense of equality and trust between the corporation and its coterie of highly 
unequal laborers.  
It is worth noting that IIF was not the only such instrument being used by 
companies to mitigate risk. I have spoken already in chapter 2 of the ways in which oil 
host communities were subjected to various efforts to collectivize their interests with 
those of the oil companies. However, during my fieldwork, it seemed as if these various 
efforts were more than isolated endeavors implanted for generating immediate profits and 
results. Rather the Niger Delta region itself, in the wake of militarism had become an 
experimental frontier for developing and refining such tools themselves.  
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Alongside IIF a number of other vulnerabilities were being packaged into 
managerial equations as mechanisms for managing the safety and circulation of works 
expanded. Beyond the dangers of safety, managers also had to contend with increasing 
security threats. Beginning in the early 2000’s Niger Delta militants began abducting a 
number of expatriate workers. Rarely harmed,212 the abductees were kept in war camps 
and shrines until the company or government procured what was always quoted as a hefty 
ransom.213 Much like strategies of sabotage, kidnapping was a part of MEND’s effort to 
thwart producers in the hopes gaining leverage—as well as funds. Here the company was 
faced by the twinned problems of losing the ability to protect their workers and of also 
appearing to have lost it. Company’s like Shell, put millions of dollars towards reshaping 
their security efforts on the ground. According to OJ Agbarah, the outgoing VP of 
security for Shell in the Western Delta, such money (which he actually thought was too 
little) not only contributed to the safety of Shell’s operations, but also helped enhance a 
broader understanding of the kinds of possible risks that exist, and how to manage them.  
Unlike other executives I spoke with, Agbarah was oddly enthusiastic when I 
raised questions about the production shutdowns and kidnappings that Shell had endured 
over the past few years. Like Michael, the JMJ trainer, he pulled out his computer to take 
me through the safety and security PowerPoint presentations he used to demonstrate to 
executives and teams of industrial safety experts, detailing how Shell learned to adapt its 
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212 There are few instances of expatriates having been seriously injured or killed, but any instance I have 
heard or read of was the result of an accident or an exchange with the military gone wrong. No group ever 
took responsibility for intentionally physically harming abductees for any political or ideological purpose. 
That said, there is also not evidence that abductees were well treated either. Despite the rampant rumors in 
Lagos and Warri that expat workers who were kidnapped where lucky, that they stayed in air conditioned 
mansions, were well fed and spent their days drinking cognac with militants, most were stashed in crude 
conditions of war camps. 
 
213 Speaking with community liaison officers and those in charge of security like OJ Agbarah, it was often 
suggested that the final ransoms exchanged were negotiated down quite a bit. 
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security apparatus to manage the new threats.  He explained that with the use of new risk 
management formulas coupled to work by community liaison officers (see chapter 2), his 
department managed a 98% reduction in employee injuries and hostage-takings. Costs for 
ransoming foreigners and fulltime employees were high both monetarily and in terms of 
damage of the company’s image and safety record. Agbarah, who was promoted to the 
VP of security operations in 2002 (according to him, for his business background) had no 
problem taking credit for the company’s reversal of fortunes. Working with consultants 
from a global risk management company, Control Risks Group, which specialize in 
contingency planning, OJ acquired a formula: R=P x I x V that he found, as the 
PowerPoint slide details, “add[ed] value to decision-making process.” The formula, 
Risk= Probability times Impact times Vulnerability acts essentially as a “score sheet to 
rate risk,” and helps security managers understand not only which threats are more 
probably than others but which targets, if such threats were actualized, would be of most 
value to the company. The formula therefore, helped them decide which people and 
things require more safeguarding than others according to the impact of costs for the 
company to safeguard or repair them. He referred to this as, “turn[ing] threats into 
opportunities.”  
As he himself points out, this meant that counter-kidnapping security budgets 
went to safeguard upper management and their full time staff. Such efforts meant that 
Shell personnel became much more restricted in their movements. To complete work in 
the fields where kidnapping was a risk, the company preferred to use contract staff. The 
reasoning, according to Agbarah, was that such workers, not being affiliated directly with 
the company, were less desirable targets for militants. And yet, even he concedes that as 
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Shell’s staff kidnapping numbers dropped dramatically, the number of kidnappings for 
Nigerian subcontract workers in Nigeria rose significantly, from zero in 2006 to 156 by 
2008. Compared to the large retinue of military and police provided to Shell workers, 
subcontract workers could often only afford a soldier or two to protect their worksites. 
One subcontractor laughed when I asked him about the security situation during the 
militancy period and described how while working on a Shell project in Aboni creek, 
they received reports that militants were seen in the area. That night their military 
security detail, spooked at the sound of wind rustling through the trees, took off down 
river in their boat leaving workers to the mercy of the would-be attackers.214  
Both the IIF proponents and Agbarah, however, insist that their efforts are 
politically neutral. They see them as simply providing novel management schemes, 
formulas and contingency planning to better calibrate the efficiency of production as new 
threats emerge within the complex “socio-technical configurations” of oil (and in fact this 
phrase is used quite often in the academic safety culture literature). However, differences 
in instruments contributing to the production of certain outcomes, are often far from 
disinterested and should not only be seen to shape unequal relationships between classes 
of workers, but also can be seen to offer an analysis of power struggles (Callon, 2007; 
Caliskan and Callon 2010). They point to how networks of expertise expand and are 
reconfigured within new environments. Indeed, Agbarah was planning to spend his 
retirement selling his expertise to other corporations abroad, and had already built a hefty 
resume as he was invited to present at large industry events like the Offshore Technology 
Conference—the largest gathering of oil and gas companies and personnel in the world, 
and a place where many of these new services and their formulas are being hashed out, 
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214 Luckily, for the workers, it turned out only to be the wind. 
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circulated and posted for sale. Here we see a convergence between safety and security. 
IIF, oriented around managing internal worker safety mechanisms although different 
from the kind of formula’s Agbarah is using to manage security risks from without. Yet 
both work towards lowering registerable incident rates and both essentially operate as 
mechanisms to manage the gaps and holes that emerge through efforts to reduce the 
company’s exposure to risk. At the same time, the risks being managed also create a kind 
of feedback loop in which new future risks are continually produced, and the possibility 
to address them continually evaded.  
 
Wayo Wayo215:  
Given that events like the explosion at Apoi North field, with a resemblance to 
Deepwater Horizon, continue to take place despite a Chevron committed to “good safety 
culture,” it raises the question if whether it was safety and security of workers lives at 
stake in the adoption of these programs or whether it isn’t an attempt to safeguard the 
space of extraction from something else. Why, for instance, was IIF (which have been 
around since the late 1990’s) only introduced in the oil fields after 2009? Only after the 
ceasefire and amnesty deal between former militants and the government was in place? If 
the technologies objectifying risks for workers are part and parcel of a kind of “actuarial 
imaginary” (Berlant, 2007), they must also be seen to pivot on the particular historical 
predicament of labor in Nigeria, where the organization of workers around the oil 
infrastructure has also been part of different legacies of investing and planning for the 
future of the state.  
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215 Pidgin term, meaning tricky or trickish 
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As much as it might have dissolved the “near future,” risk management 
instruments also work to dispense with the historical. Rosalind Morris has pointed to the 
role played by various forms of risk management (and notions of contingency) in South 
Africa, to trouble triumphant claims of the posthistorical, reading such claims against 
themselves (Morris, 2010).216  Although it is generally assumed that the Nigerian 
government acts largely in compliance with the interests of transnational oil companies, a 
look at the history of the internal industrial disputes (particularly as regards labor) and 
maneuvering present a portrait of the deep tensions remaining between them. It is 
important to note, for instance, the choice to hire JMJ to train Nigerian and contract 
workers also coincides with the Nigerian government’s increasing pressure to implement 
a long delayed enforcement of the Local Content Laws, geared towards increasing the 
domestic share of oil and gas spending from 45% to 70%.  
Attempts to loosen foreign control of major multinational companies began in 
1969 following Biafra as the government mapped out ways to reintegrate the nation in the 
aftermath of civil war and to consolidate its central over oil field earnings. The decree in 
1969 required that within ten years, Nigerians must hold at least 75% of the total 
managerial, professional and supervisory positions. Meanwhile all semi-skilled and 
unskilled workers must, by that time, be Nigerians. It also sought to alter the previous 
arrangements (until 1967) of a 50-50 profit sharing agreement between the Nigerian 
government and transnationals (and in which the latter was often known to underreport 
profits) into one more favorable for them. Although conceived in 1971 (when the 
National Oil Company of Nigeria was first established), the indigenous decrees in 1977 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
216 In an earlier piece, Morris has provided a rich example of such a reading, as the mangled landscape of 
the veldt, the silica lodged in the soft tissue of the miner’s lung act as the trace of the displaced history of 
capitalism within South Africa’s national racialized narratives. See Morris, 2008. 
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when the national oil company became the National Nigerian Petroleum Company, that 
an agenda was actually set. Imagined by its soon to be director, Amu, as “a virile oil 
agency to optimize the scarce human infrastructural resources available to the 
government,” the Nigerian government laid out an extensive plan to reclaim control of its 
oil industry from large multinationals.  
One of the essential components of the plan was to “indigenize” the work force. 
Foreigner laborers, particularly skilled laborers, were to be replaced with newly trained 
Nigerians. Nationalizing the workforce was also meant to extend protective labor 
legislation to Nigerian workers to the same extent as their European counterparts.217 
However, as Julius Ihonvbere and Chibuike Uche in their separate studies of the 
indigenization process point out, the government was only able enact a partial 
nationalization of its resources. By 1979 only half of the management cadre were made 
of up Nigerians (few at uppermost levels) although Nigerians now made up a vast 
majority of professional grades (Ihonvbere, 1998, 42).218 
Much of this had to do with corporate efforts to intervene in the government’s 
decisions and stall the progress of any reforms. By the early 70’s national control of oil 
reserves in the former European colonial empires had become viewed as inevitable by 
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217 The first Indigenization decree was developed in 1972, however, it met with significant resistance and 
delay tactics by British companies hoping that in postponing its implementation at least five years, 
companies would be able to extract significant returns to hedge against expected future losses when it took 
effect. See Uche conference paper, for an examination of the correspondence between companies and the 
British government researched from the Public records office in London 
 
218 It is perhaps a testament to the efforts of corporations working to stall indigenization that the first 
Nigerian Director of Shell in Nigeria was 2004 and Chevron in Nigeria, 2005. However, within the oil 
servicing companies indigenization proceeded much more slowly, by 1979 there were only 35 Nigerians in 
managerial positions and a much smaller percentage of Nigerians in professional grades compared to 
foreigners. This is largely because, as I mention, the decrees did not cover the service companies and so 
major transnational companies began simply contracting more of their services to foreign oil service 
provides to avoid regulations. At EGTL, the legacy of such reliance was evident as Nigeria cracked down 
on Local content requirements, Chevron has an easier time meeting its compliance than its main contractor, 
KBR, who felt caught off guard by the seriousness of the government’s commitment.  
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European businesses. The British did not erect blockades nor the Americans organize 
coups as they had attempted at earlier moments when threatened with nationalizations in 
the Middle East during the 1950’s and 60’s. In the case of Nigeria, as Uche outlines, BP 
and Shell instead worked to limit and delay, from the outset of the process, the reach of 
the state in its production process.219 Sifting through memos, telegraphs and letters 
exchanged between the British government and British oil companies in the archives, 
Uche cobbles together a portrait of a British government who, believing there was no 
way to dissuade (or to be seen to dissuade) the Nigerian government, counseled British 
firms to find ways of seeking quick returns on their investment while explicitly 
encouraging them “to delay the transfer of management and technical skills to locals” 
(Uche, 2012, 748). According to Ihonvbere, “what most of the companies did was to 
redesign the flow of authority” (Ihonvbere, 1998, 64). They created new positions in the 
managerial and professional levels, hiring Nigerians who were content with fancy titles 
and salaries but who would not interfere with the company’s operations. It was also at 
this time that they began heavily contracting to the oil service industry, which, until the 
mid-1980s did not fall under the purview of the indigenization policies. Corporations 
would hire foreign workers as “consultants” and they came to rely increasingly on 
contracting to oil servicing companies that were less regulated. Using the crisis born of 
oil gluts, in the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s major multinational companies even began 
to significantly reduce the number of Nigerian employees they had trained and hired. In a 
series of retrenchment exercises, both Shell and Chevron have argued such measures 
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219 Although I have some objections to the conclusions he draws, Uche has published the only available 
pieces using the recently opened archival materials in London containing the correspondence passed 
between the British government and British oil companies during the indigenization period, so I rely 
greatly on the source materials he cites here. 
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have proven necessary to help balance the costs for their losses a move that corresponded 
with the increased the use of mixed systems of production with the rise of free-trade 
zones (Ihonvbere, 1998).  
Here, practices of contracting now became used in new ways, not to avoid 
employment of Nigerian workers, but to cut overhead costs and limit the power and reach 
of worker organizing that had started to form. In interviews with Nigerian workers some, 
like Ejiro, recounted incidents of the company terminating appointments to avoid 
providing their workers the status and benefits of full-time employees only to rehire them 
the next week for the exact same position as limited-contract workers. A number of cuts, 
however, were also strategically made to let go those workers who were connected to 
union activities (Ivhonbere, 1998, 137).  Even in those all-Nigerian service companies 
that did manage to get contracts, however, most followed the trends set earlier by 
transnational contractors and hired workers under the most limited terms possible. 
Struggles between workers and company managers was further exacerbated as, by the 
mid-1980’s the Nigerian state, after pushing for nationalization in the early 1970’s, was 
now working with transnational companies to suppress labor organizing in the oil fields 
set off by the massive cuts fearing threats by oil workers to shut down the national 
taplines. Through a series of national labor acts and decrees, the collective bargaining 
power of Nigerian oil unions (and all trade unions) was diminished as the military 
government amalgamated all trade unions under a federally funded and controlled labor 
organization which withdrew the right to strike (Watts, 1992).  
NUPENG (the Nigerian union for junior oil workers) and, to a lesser extent, 
PENGASSAN (the union for senior oil workers) have however, exerted their power in a 
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different series of strikes, to cripple the nations energy flows to varying effects.220 In 
1993 oil workers demonstrated their strategic and political importance during strikes over 
the annulled election. On July 4th NUPENG (and PENGASSAN 12 days later) disrupted 
fuel and electricity supplies, temporarily closing Nigeria’s oil refineries, and reducing 
Nigerian exports by half (something the Niger Deltan militants were never able to do) 
protesting the military government’s invalidate actions to annul June 12th election and 
joined with the rest of Nigerian civil society in a call for Babangida to resign, which he 
did in August.221  
The implementation of subcontracting also reified older tactics and structures 
through which labor in the oil fields has always worked by inscribing particular modes of 
difference. Reading the history of labor relations in the oil fields, Robert Vitalis points 
out the different subject positions that are delineated for Saudi workers and those that 
work as permanent employees for transnational companies. Following the ways in which 
Aramco reproduced American Jim Crow laws in its enclave in the Saudi oil fields. These 
hierarchies, he suggests, are more than simply about a division of labor. He points to the 
ways in which certain circulations and roles follow from and begin to inscribe other 
power relations, a hierarchy, with white workers on the top and, in the kingdom’s case, 
Saudis, “whom Americans imagined as ‘black’ and as ‘coolies’ on the bottom” (Vitalis, 
17). In Saudi Aramco, this entailed the building of two separate camps, with whites 
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220 Protests in 1988 and 2001 helped to fight privatization efforts and the removal of government subsidies. 
In 1988, Buhari’s government dissolved the executive committee of the Nigerian Labor Congress (Aremu, 
2001, 29).  
 
221 Timothy Mitchell suggests this has much to do with a more manifold history by which technologies of 
extraction and transportation of oil created an infrastructure less vulnerable to worker collaboration and 
communication, “the political strength that oil workers could acquire depended on the ways in which oil 
was used and the vulnerabilities its use created.” In other words, on flows. Thus the tanker drivers union is 
always on the vanguard. 
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generally favored and blacks left with few amenities or access to collective bargaining. 
While Jim Crow settlements disappear in the US mining towns in the 1920’s Vitalis’s 
argument is that they remain in various iterations as the US exports its mining 
technology, ideas and engineers to new mineral frontiers. 
 As regulations on Nigerian indigenization came to be enforced to a greater 
degree, companies like KBR, partnered with Nigerian companies to act as front men, like 
the Southern Gas Company. However, the question of nationality, still often, as is evident 
in the project manager’s language and that of Nigerian workers, is one that remains in an 
idiom of race, of black and white. Even in the late 1980’s, Nigerian senior staff (not to 
mention junior staff who weren’t allow in to the plush housing estates222) still lived in 
separated living quarters from expatriates who still held the most senior positions. 
Expatriate staff referred Nigerian workers in derogatory terms such as “rig-niggers, black 
dogs, black monkeys and ‘boy.’ Moreover, if at any time disputes occurred among 
Nigerian workers, Ihonvbere writes that police were often called in to repress Nigerian 
workers and protect European staff. Ihonvbere, based on fieldwork he conducted in Warri 
in the mid-80’s points out that mistreatment by the company, seen to be under the control 
of foreign nationals left workers only, what he calls, “covert forms of resistance.” Barred 
from legal forms of protest and strikes (although these still took place) he explains 
workers “express their discontent and preparedness for a showdown with management by 
inventing all forms of illnesses, stealing company materials, composing abusive songs 
about management and calling the expatriate staff all sorts of racial names.” Therefore, to 
the abuses the endured Nigerians coined names in retaliation like, “white dog, white 
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222 See Chapter one for a discussion on how this worked in Shell’s Warri camp 
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monkey, oyinbo canda223, ayanyan224” (Ihonvbere, 173). He even recounts the story of a 
temporary worker, frustrated at his treatment by the company, released his bowls in front 
of the manager’s office and in front of Shell’s company gate at Edjeba. There also 
seemed to be a Luddite streak to workers, who would damage new machines that might 
save labor for the company in order to prevent retrenchment, “we self de take style style 
show we power for oga back” (We also try to demonstrate our power behind the boss’s 
back) (Ihonvbere, 1998,167). 
During my fieldwork I heard no racial slurs exchanged between Nigerian and 
expatriate workers. However, it was common to hear them expressed by expatriate oil 
workers speaking of Nigerian workers among themselves. And, in general, white 
American and European managers were not well liked. A retired Nigerian welder 
explained how difficult it was for most workers to get the kind of training they needed to 
advance to higher skill levels. For him the barrier was “oyinbo man,” (white man) or as 
he put it, “oyinbo man too sabi wayo,”225 by which he implied that even if they hire you, 
expatriate workers will not allow you to learn and fully from the job. However, rather 
than a bygone holdover, in the oil fields these structures are still constantly reproducing 
such divisions, if no longer explicitly across racial or class lines, than in terms of 
worker’s status (in which class and race are fused and remain visible, but also remain 
below the surface of discussion), creating and seeding mistrust between staff employees, 
subcontract workers, and, also community workers. It is still possible to consider that in 
general, in the Nigerian oil fields, skill does not guarantee pay levels, but rather where 
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223 White skin (but the kind of useless skin you peel from a fruit or plant and throw away) 
 
224 To look at longingly, used to refer to someone who desires something they can’t have 
 
225 The white man is very tricky. 
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you fall on the racial-nationalist-contracting spectrum. It is a way of displacing earlier 
racial technologies into ones that are registered through the color of one’s badge 
indicating company/contractor/subcontractor ranking.226 
Relying on sub-contracting system, however, also instigates new fears on the part 
of the mostly American and European project managers who personally related theories 
in which they imagined the disappearance of equipment (which occurred on a number of 
occasions) and small scale protests (of which there were more) in which small collections 
of workers would protest their treatment by fellow workers or management, were simply 
part of a desire to delay extend the EGTL project’s completion to remain employed. 
These antics were almost always blamed on sub-contract Nigerian staff, mainly from the 
Niger Delta area, suggesting that these managers often collapsed their understanding of 
managing communities with they ways in which they managed their labor policies.  
Similar to the configurations Ihonvbere writes about, workers continued to 
instigate both overt and covert forms of protest. Workers smuggled alcohol and 
marijuana onto the rig where such substances are banned but in great demand. This was 
not always for making money, but often to help in making strategic connections and 
curry favor with supervisors, those in the ranks that had power, in order to get a few extra 
break or telephone minutes. Theft did occur according to managers, staff and subcontract 
workers alike. However, it was often felt as warranted given the transgressions of the 
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226 However, I wish to be clear race is still a factor. Indeed, the paranoid racial fantasies of the American 
workers makes that abundantly clear. Also, the first Nigerian MD of Shell was in 2004 and in Chevron 
2005. 
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companies towards those who work 12 hour shifts, seven days a week and see half their 
pay being pocketed by body shops.227  
The amassing groups of casual and sub-contract workers were left without any 
union protections at all. Much of this changed in the early 2000s as multinationals laid off 
hundreds of staff employees and hiring contract workers, caught up with them. Although 
much attention is given to MEND’s efforts to stop oil flows and the larger protests by oil 
unions to threaten a complete shutdown, contract workers have been behind some of the 
largest and most contested protests in recent years, shutting down platforms, occupying 
the Bonny Island Terminal. Nigeria’s Joint Task Forces in the delta have been repeatedly 
called on to break-up striking workers (Solidarity Center, 2010).228   
However, even though some subcontract workers were able to attain membership 
with Nigerian oil unions in 2006, very little, by 2011 had changed for those workers. 
Emphasizing incorporation into the system of the corporation, through programs like IIF, 
is a continuation of a long-standing practice by which oil companies seek to dissuade 
workers from taking part in union activities. This points on the one hand how these 
formulas conspire to render certain things invisible (poor subcontract positions) even 
while considerations of the effects of these exclusions become built into new official 
instruments for managing contingency. On the other, it show how control of the state 
over its infrastructure continues to loosen. New measures like the Local Content laws that 
Jonathan has tried to triumph do little to ameliorate conditions for the majority of 
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227 See Marx’s chapter on the “Working Day,” and its endless prolongation introducing the terms of 
overexploitation within the organization of productive forces. 
 
228 The exception here would be the Tanker Drivers Union as they are the main mode available within the 
country for transporting the oil. However, their protests only interrupt the oil being moved from national 
refineries to national fuel stations, it does not interrupt the majority of flows of oil for export. 
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Nigerian workers. Although like the indigenous decrees, they seek to target the grip of 
transnationals and repatriate more of the wealth, technology and benefits of oil, the 
emphasis here has overwhelming been on making sure Nigerian companies and 
entrepreneurs acquire a certain number of contracts. Where Local content laws have been 
successful, therefore, they simply add to more and more subcontracting (and community 
contracting, as I discuss below).  
This push for contracts takes place as an expansion of the private sector, rather 
than as an imagined skilled nationalized workforce capable of advocating for the own 
protections (something which had been part of the earlier indigenization decrees in the 
1970’s). Programs like IIF which seek to manage the confluence of variously protected, 
underpaid and overpaid workers on a single project, for the brief period of a job, thus 
makes no claims to altering the wider field of relations between worker, capital and state. 
And yet, such programs work to continually defer any structural changes to the uneven 
field of oil work and to forestall all efforts to politicize that work. In this way risk 
management systems, designed to contain contingencies continually introduces more risk 
into the lives of both oil workers, and the larger Nigerian public.  
 
Body no be Firewood229:  
The tension between expatriate and Nigerian workers here also existed largely 
between Nigerian workers coming from outside oil producing areas and those who were 
being hired from oil producing communities as part of agreements for companies to 
operate. The industry was now being flooded with community workers who earned their 
place through concessions that operators had to make to oil producing RDCs (chapter 2). 
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229 Don’t use me like a piece of firewood (fuel) 
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Here fears of community power and worker power often came into conflict, dividing 
workers and the community even while they found themselves with similar complaints.  
Tension was evident in daily clashes between workers in the two groups. One of 
the more bizarre but revealing occurred following the killing of a large boa at a work site. 
The community workers from Gbaramatu (where the project was based) were ecstatic 
that the snake met its end just before the lunch boat arrived with a pot of vegetable soup. 
Boa, a rare delicacy in Gbaramatu, however, was the sacred totem for a group of Urhobo 
villagers who protested that the killing and eating of the snake was an abomination. 
Ignoring the protestors concerns—and the fact that they were cooking lunch next to 
highly explosive materials—the community workers continued cooking. In response, the 
Urhobo workers collectively began a hunger strike. They appointed a leader to negotiate 
their demands with the safety officer, who, at the time, was the most senior officer on 
site. Cramming into every corner of the officer’s small bedroom at the guesthouse, the 
group insisted that they would neither work nor eat until the pot was properly destroyed 
and those responsible, whom they now referred to simply as “militants,” were punished. 
The punishment, they explained, was necessary as cooking on an open flame around 
highly flammable materials endangered not just the cultural sensitivities of the workers, 
but their lives and the progress of the job itself. They insisted he be both fined and 
benched from work for one week. 
This story reflects, in many ways, how everyday dilemmas intersect with and 
become connected to larger sets of grievances but at the same time create displacements. 
On the whole, community workers remained largely marginalized in the field and were 
looked down upon by fellow workers. Meanwhile Fenog workers from outside the area, 
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often expressed feelings of frustration at being restricted and policed by the community. 
Everyday the town crier would announce to “strangers” where and when they could 
move. Their lives on and off the job, were thus equally volatile. Clashes between workers 
and the community during my time there were surprisingly common. An inebriated 
Fenog worker was heavily fined after interrupting a cleansing ceremony for the Egbesu 
cult members. A fight between a welder and a community resident that resulted in the 
injuring of the latter’s blackberry led to months of negotiations between Fenog managers 
and the former-MEND leadership still in charge of law and order at Oporoza. Arguments 
over women were particularly common as workers were often suspected of plans “to steal 
wives” from the community, and the sex workers who came from Warri would often start 
relationships with former militants and oil workers alike, causing jealousies to flare. 
The Urhobo workers expressing outrage over the incident were older, more 
experienced, and had families left behind in Warri. Many had received degrees from the 
Petroleum Technical Institute and had grown frustrated at the need to jostle for 
subcontract work to keep up the life for their children and extended relatives. Even 
though I visited the area in a time of relative peace, some Nigerian workers also 
expressed fears over lingering threats of kidnapping or harm by the remaining former 
militant power holders. However, many more complained over the future of the oil 
industry as younger, less experienced and trained community workers were receiving 
what they felt was privileged treatment by the company. In fact, while discussing 
difficulties with falling wages and securing permanent work, the most florid 
condemnations erupted over the infringement of community demands in the everyday 
logics and operations of what they felt was meant for the well-trained and hard working. 
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These workers also noted that while the community provided a means for community 
workers to exert leverage over the companies, their own rights and securities as workers 
were being eroded by those very same measures. Tega, explained, how he believed 
subcontracting was a problem directly caused by the increasing community contracting, 
“watering down” available jobs, and requiring more experienced workers to move from 
site to site rather than find long-term employment with a company. 
The community workers involved in the snake killing, however, saw themselves 
in a very position. Referred to by the protestors as “militants” in derogatory tones, none 
of these particular community workers had participated in militancy and were interested 
in securing a different path to security and position.230 All were under thirty, unmarried, 
with a varying amount of training. For most this job with Fenog was the first time they’d 
held official employment with any oil servicing company. However, they too felt a great 
injustice in the way they were employed. First, they understood their positions as 
temporary, once the pipeline was finished and Fenog was no longer working in the area, 
they would surely not be carried along to another job. They felt they had very little value 
for the company, being employed for the purpose of fulfilling the terms of agreement 
with Fenog for the project. They surely would not be hired on for work at other sites. 
Moreover, to acquire these positions in the first place, some had to promise a percentage 
of their paychecks to labor brokers in charge of finding the community workers to 
provide to Fenog—or any other companies operating in their territories. In Gbaramatu, 
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230 It is important to note that the men who had joined with MEND during the period of fighting were, in 
general, now better connected to former militant leaders, traditional leaders, security forces and politicians 
(this is discussed a bit in the previous chapter in terms of how these connections translated into assets with 
black oil.) For those who chose not to get involved, or who remained at the lower rungs of the organization, 
getting work with oil companies returning to the communities was seen as the best available means to move 
beyond their position in the village. This was particularly acute for young men lacking means and status for 
marriage. Therefore competition for the small openings was strong. 
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the privilege of employment as a community worker was organized by clans and rotated 
between families. Therefore, those families whose sons or daughters received 
employment for one job would have to wait the full rotation before being offered a 
position again. As competition for these positions was large, community leaders as well 
as Fenog workers in higher positions took advantage of the situation, promising work to 
individuals out of the rotation or those not chosen as the representative by their family at 
a cost (and sometimes not even being able to deliver it).231  
In the community it was believed Nigerian workers from non-oil communities 
received better treatment from oil companies. These workers were then identified as part 
of a larger system of oppression. They were likened to an older generation whom, like the 
elder leaders in the community, were bent on holding onto their power by sacrificing the 
future of younger generations. Their retort to the workers calling them disrespectful, 
reckless militant youth, was therefore to plead with the safety officer that they should not 
be treated like “yeye (useless) people.” Complaining about the sour oil and measly lunch 
portions given out to workers, being forced to remain onsite for lunch, the leader of the 
snake-killing group felt justified in adding an extra, fresh cooked protein. “Body no be 
firewood!” explained the ringleader in charge of the incident. This phrase was repeated 
by each of his kinsmen who came in turn to the safety officer’s door begging, some even 
on their knees, that he be forgiven and not too severely punished, “the body no be 
firewood at all, the man is a human being.” Workers were paid per day, and the leader, if 
punished did not wish to miss out on portions of his salary. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
231 At the restaurant that became Fenog’s designated mess hall, negotiations over potential positions were 
sometimes held, often after the managers and current employees had left for site. 
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The generational gap between these workers was also a point of contention. 
Throughout the standoff around the now snake infected pot, the chimes about “militants” 
identified younger workers with the youth-based social movement of MEND and other 
organizations. Meanwhile, the younger community workers referred to the others as 
“baboons”—a term that is generally used in Nigeria to identify the foolishness of an older 
person in an established position. This language is highly indicative of the tensions that 
were growing around oil work. The older, more experienced workers feared that the 
changes taking place in the industry since the outbreak militarism threatened what little 
security they had left as subcontracting and labor contractors appeared to be proliferating. 
Meanwhile, the younger workers struggled to make a place for themselves in an industry 
that viewed them as incidental to larger security concerns. They were hoping to glean any 
kind of gains made during the struggle, when they and their communities suffered for the 
ambitions of resource control and where the premise of peace had itself been contingent 
on increased employment (see chapter 3).  
However, the question of generation is not incidental here. Nigerian media often 
overhyped the role of “youth” at the center of “crisis” in the Niger Delta. But it is not 
incorrect that much of the violence by militant groups was directed at a power 
characterized largely as geroncratic. Within oil producing communities the older chiefs 
and traditional rulers who had directly profited off private arrangements with oil 
companies were often targeted. Their homes were burnt to the ground and their families 
forced to flee.232 Moreover, this notion of a generational divide resonated with a larger 
Nigerian public where, in spite of a return to civilian rule, old military leaders and their 
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232 One of the more extreme cases I learned of, at Ogula, in 2004, a number of elder kingmakers were 
accused of witchcraft after a group of young, adolescent boys succumbed to violent fits. They were 
subjected to public humiliation and beatings and much of their property taken from them.  
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crony of politic elites still control much of the country’s power and wealth. As is evident 
during elections, much of this power is maintained by co-opting the force (and labor) of a 
large, unemployed population of young men to manipulate voting outcomes.  
Here, of course, the older workers like Ejiro and Moses, whom I mentioned 
earlier, and the Urhobo workers are not necessarily associated with large power holders. 
Rather, the reference to the generational gap and cultural belonging was entwined with 
the perceived divide, between those workers seen to enjoy higher status and privilege in 
the city, and the younger, community workers who felt they experienced greater precarity 
by virtue of their polluted surroundings and having endured decades of political violence 
and repression.  
As none of Fenog workers belong to unions and the protections they had earned 
during previous labor struggles appear to be eroding over time, it is not surprising that 
controversies over mistreatment or overwork often erupted as arguments over ‘culture.’ 
More particularly, these tensions must be seen as part and parcel of the 
institutionalization of difference around oil production sites. These eruptions around 
nationality, ethnicity and generation, seemed clearly linked to way structures in the oil 
field continue to operate by seizing on and producing divisions and differences between 
workers. These practices, moreover, have grown more acute as technologies of risk and 
agendas of security become admixed with labor policies.  
In the end the snake pot issue was resolved with an agreement to allow the 
Urhobo workers to destroy the pot, while the snake killers were made to apologize and 
forego one day’s work and pay. The hunger strike ended after losing a half a day’s work 
and everyone left for site. The cook for the catering company perhaps expressed the most 
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lingering resentment, complaining that the kitchen was already short of large cooking 
pots.233 
 Balancing differences and disharmonies between their work force, without the aid 
of outside mediators, the relationship between safety, accident and security here bears 
revealing similarities and differences with its corporate-sponsored counterparts. Much 
like workers being trained for projects by Chevron IIF programs, within Fenog, safety 
acted as the office for managing the socially sticky and technical dangers facing workers. 
Every morning before Fenog’s work force loads into fiberglass boats, its employees 
squeeze themselves into an open corridor of the company’s guesthouses. Here they hold a 
daily safety meeting, known in the industry as a pep talk. Attendance is mandatory and 
almost no one arrives late for fear of having their pay docked. The safety officer begins 
with a good morning, which is repeated back to him in unison, “good morning.” He 
reminds workers of the particular points of the project which will be focused on for that 
day. He then offers a five-minute lecture about how to avoid an accident. These “tips” are 
delivered in very general terms. They comprise three or four thoughts about pinch points 
and safety gear that the safety officer jotted down from pages he would browse on the 
internet the night before.   
While in theory, this marks the end of what should be the “safety meeting,” the 
safety officer’s speech is in fact, merely an opening act for the main event. Shortly after 
he finishes, the safety officer rejoins the group of workers and a preacher steps into the 
hallway asking everyone, even lurking bystanders (usually women from the community) 
to join in and make a circle around him. Plainly attired every morning in the same white, 
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233 He actually initially tried to hide the pot in the pantry, insisting that he had thrown it in the river. 
However it was discovered the next day 
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long-sleeved buttoned down shirt and black slacks, the preacher’s allotted time frame is 
thirty to forty minutes.  
The preacher himself was a stranger, having only arrived at Oporoza a few weeks 
after the company’s project began from Rivers State. He was in his early 30’s and 
suggested he was loosely linked to Soul Harvesters, one of Nigeria’s many mid-sized 
Pentecostal churches.234 His arrival was certainly no coincidence. Having heard of the 
company’s stay he came for the explicit purpose of offering himself as a spiritual 
provider to Fenog’s workforce. Those who had worked other sites over the years 
explained to me that having a preacher attached to a work sites was not at all uncommon 
and highly desirable. Initially brought on to offer a simple blessing to start the day the 
preacher’s service had, over time, evolved into a much more elaborate ceremony. By the 
end of the first month the pep talk start time was pushed back from 5 am to 4:30 in order 
to accommodate the expanding time frame of the popular service that now included 
collective singing of Christian songs and a lengthy sermon and was attended not only by 
those sent out to the field, but also the kitchen staff and neighbors living around the 
company’s guesthouse. The topic, however, was for the most part (much like that 
provided by the safety officer) oriented around potential harms and hazards to the body. 
“This is the temple of the Lord,” he would begin, “this is the temple of the lord!” then 
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234 It is not uncommon for charismatic churchgoers to form their own proselytizing wings (and sometimes 
even their own congregations), with or without official permission from a more established church. Since 
the amnesty, the oil producing communities had become a popular target for these preachers. I came across 
a number of young self-described pastors passing through the oil producing creeks during my fieldwork. 
Most were looking to set up small ministries and offered counsel to (mainly) young men and women on 
love marriage and faith. In Oporoza, alone, a community of not more than 2,000 permanent residents, two 
new churches were founded and set up in under a year (making the total number of churches in this tiny, 
cramped town, five). However, a number of other preachers were seeking out Nigerian service companies 
like Fenog now that a number of such companies were being sent to repair and rebuild the infrastructure. 
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repeated with a thump on his own chest, “your body is the temple of the lord, praise the 
lord.” 
“Hallelujah,” resounded loudly in the rather excellent acoustical environment of 
that hallway.  
“So my people, no joke with your body.” He explains pointing out the importance 
of keeping the soul safe through the body,  “No joke with your body by going to the 
herbalist. No joke with your body by drinking. Keep your body holy.” 
“Amen” 
Singing often begins early, starting with “father we are saved” as hands clap in 
unison, men begin to sway in their work boots, their helmets on the ground beside them. 
Sometime workers give testimony on how they were saved from potentially dangerous 
sparks and fumes or recall incidents known to all, such as attacks suffered when a hive of 
disturbed bees unleashed their fury on a company of workers building the pipeline. Such 
tales focused on reading such events as part of a spiritual test, journey or divine 
intervention. Towards the close of the service, prayers are given for forgiveness, that the 
Lord should recognize the need for his assistance in keeping the body whole and holy.  
“Father as we go out to our work father cover us in the name of Jesus” 
“Yes, amen” 
“Father any family that we have here or away, we ask you to cover them” 
“amen” 
“Heavenly father, think of the men working on the waterways and cover them 
with the blood of Jesus.” 
“Amen” 
“The food we are going to eat today, the drink we are going to drink today, we 
ask you to cover them with the blood of Jesus.” 
“Amen” 
 
To be “covered in the blood of Jesus” is perhaps the most common form of protection 
offered by preachers, ministers, and clergymen in Nigeria. Popularized by the waves of 
! 280!
American evangelical churches with an expanding presence in Nigeria, “the blood of 
Jesus” is most often metaphorically directed to sites of potential accident like roadways 
where travelers are subject to the dangers of massive potholes, overturned trucks, police 
checkpoints which try to extort money, and armed robbery. In other words, it makes 
reference to the world of risks created by decades of neglect: the lacking investment in 
infrastructure and general security for citizens as the state grew enmeshed in the oil 
industry. These risks, by contrast with the ones on the market, rest firmly outside the 
imagined control of Nigerians, following them both into and outside their workspaces. 
 At the end of the safety/service, the preacher then, without fail, takes it upon 
himself to repeat the points made by the safety office, as if revealing their deeper, 
spiritual meaning. In doing so he employs the same tone of his sermon, full of repetitions 
and building crescendos. By this time, the audience is energized and when the preacher 
emphasizes the danger of pinch points, it is followed by “amen” rather than polite 
clapping. Reiterating the point that workers should beware the threat of cable breaks 
sounds more like a holy commandment than something downloaded from the internet. 
When the services is over, workers are visibly energized. Smiling, they shake hands with 
their neighbor and exchange greetings of “god be with you” before heading off to the 
mess hall to take their breakfast, load the boats and disperse to their various ends of the 
pipeline for work.235  
In Warri, people likewise pack into churches praying for jobs that no longer exist, 
give testimonies recalling threats from armed robbers and, most commonly, retell stories 
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235 Mac as well mentioned that impromptu prayer meetings were held three times a week among Nigerian 
contract workers, trying to squeeze it into their packed schedule, although this was not something that 
would take place during official morning pep talks, but on the worker’s own time. Even in the US religion 
has recently flared up among oil workers during this new drilling boom as oil field preachers spread their 
ministries across the Midwest. 
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of accidents from faulty roads, open sewers and faulty and exposed NEPA wires. In a 
town that boomed during indigenization programs and now in a state of disrepair, work 
and oil and the threat of the devil mix together in daily church services. Trying to stir the 
hopes and dreams of his congregation, a preacher once instructed his congregation to 
trust to god’s care as if they were a multinational employed under a staff position: “just 
like Chevron or Shell pays salary to their [full-time] workers, so too does God pay his 
workers who work for him. Steady.”  
 In Nigeria, contract workers deal less in the strict corporate market rationalisms 
guiding the treatment of the salaried company worker with all his expensive equipment 
and training. And yet, there is still a veneer of it, by which I mean they know the rules 
and the safety protocols even though they are not followed. Thus accidents connected 
with notions of contingency, become screened through multiple (and indeed already 




Yet, community workers as much as Nigerian workers generally, all seemed to agree that 
what was promised on the horizon was a good future. In the video of the Bonga that I 
watched with Mac, the assembled crew of Nigerian workers, with their blue hardhats, 
orange coveralls, awaiting the arrival of the rig at the shoreline of the Atlantic appear in 
some ways to be dramatizing the arrival of a long awaited promise. Here, the shiny 
operating systems, bright colored steel façade evoke, as the young man watching with us 
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236 John Pemberton’s work on sugar plantations is instructive here as he points to the way, albeit in a much 
older sense of surveillance and mechanization, the technologies of capitalist modernity give way to 
enchantments of another kind, in which the notion of ‘contingency’ itself is shifted through other registers 
(Pemberton, 1996). 
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expressed, the ‘beauty’ of the good life. The well-trained workers ready to embrace the 
newly assembled rig are seen staring off into the distant offshore where the nation’s own 
determined future is said to reside. This scene in the video evokes the promises of 
technological sophistication and sophisticated Nigerian operators, harkening a new era of 
transparency, democracy and investment capital that will help reverse and repair previous 
wrongs.  
And yet, as oil workers have become the object of anxieties around the merger 
between oil market security and new instrumental formulas and models of risk 
management, their position in the projected future represented by the new oil 
infrastructure is instead often eclipsed. This chapter has focused on how the infrastructure 
is adjusted to reduce risks to production, it produces different mechanisms of volatility 
and safety—ones that recall the ways corporations have generated certain models of risk 
based around “community.” The great emphasis on safety rituals and security protocols—
many of them written on and enacted through the body—is co-extensive with an 
imaginary of oil markets and pricing mechanisms that favor narratives of contingency, 
chance and crisis. And yet, I have also tried to show that these practices don’t simply 
displace risk (and the histories of those risks), but in doing so establish strategic controls 
As subcontracting becomes a ever-remodeled strategy by corporations to offset changing 
threats to their control from early indigenization to recent Local Content policies, that 




































Exactly one year after the military attacked Oporoza, the main town of Gbaramatu 
kingdom (and former MEND headquarters) filled steadily with former freedom fighters, 
chiefs and paramount leaders arriving from various Ijaw clans and kingdoms to celebrate 
the completion of the Pereship ceremony meant to crown Gbaramatu’s next king, 
Godwin Bebeniminbo. Held on the anniversary of the JTF bombardments, in the wake of 
demobilization and amnesty agreements, as former militants began to leave for job 
trainings, the coronation was also a celebration of the new peace. This was spoken of in 
triumphant tones as attendees hoped the years of struggle since the first Warri crisis in 
1997 had finally come to an end and a new future would be possible for the community. 
And yet this coronation, championing the resilience of Gbaramatu’s people who 
weathered the violence was organized to coincide with a funeral,237 a burial for the wife 
of Fiowei, the town founder, killed centuries ago but only recently proclaimed a key 
maternal figure for the Gbaramatu Ijaw clans.  
The story told during the coronation was that she had been falsely accused of 
witchcraft and executed by senior men jealous of her power—her body wrapped and 
thrown in the river, as is the custom for witches. The proclamation was the result of a 
new divination following the attacks on Gbaramatu itself. Tompolo, the head of MEND’s 
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237 Although there is not space to elaborate fully on the activities taking place during the period of the 
coronation and funeral, much of it was organized along the lines of Gbaramatu’s annual Amaseikumo 
festival (May 11th to 15th 2010). While there are many fishing festivals that take place across the riverine 
from March to May, the five day long Amaseikumo is the most important, a “senior masquerade,” or 
(sometimes referred to as) the “king of the masquerades.” Held in the kingdom’s main town, Oporoza, it is 
famous for its regattas, for concerts given by prominent Ijaw musicians like King Robert and Barrister 
Smooth, and for its lengthy masquerades, lasting a full three days and nights. Since the late 18th century, 
Amaseikumo has been performed regularly by Gbaramatu kingdom237 to “sweep the town of menacing 




Western Delta and prominent militant outlaw figure (whose capture had been one of the 
targets of the 2009 raid) was said to have encountered the woman’s spirit as he fled from 
the soldier’s fire at the back of the community.238 She confessed to Tompolo that for 
centuries she had wreaked revenge for the injustice of her murder by dividing the Ijaw 
nation against each other, committing them to a life of war, infighting and piracy until 
finally, Tompolo and Ateke Tom (another MEND leader) found a way to unite the Ijaws 
during the struggle, banding them together against government soldiers.239 Now, she 
explained, she wished to see the community prosper. Tompolo, consulting with senior 
chiefs and the chief priest for Gbaramatu, determined that to ensure future peace in 
Ijawland, they would therefore have to bury the lady properly.240  
The burial, coupled with coronation is intended to mark a new era, both through 
the re-interpretation of the history of the community and the expressions of a different 
kind of future for those residents who had endured years of pollution, political violence 
and displacement. More than merely spiritual, this vision of a united and powerful Ijaw 
nation was underscored by the attendance of representatives from the government and the 
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238 Enhancing the legend, only a few months earlier, a group of youth filmed a re-enactment of events using 
the residents of Oporoza. The film was financed by Tompolo and edited at the deteriorating library and 
computer center in the community built by an NGO in 2002. 
 
239 Efforts to unite Ijaw groups who cover a large area of the Delta, often divided geographically by rivers, 
and state borders and speaking a range of dialects, however, occurred on a political level before MEND. 
The Ijaw National Congress in 1991 and Ijaw Youth Congress, formed during the Kaiama declaration in 
1998, both declared a united Ijaw national front. 
 
240 In a revised version of this dissertation, I plan to include a chapter that unpacks more fully the events, 
performances and stories taking place around the burial, the coronation and the Amaseikumo events and 
how they complicate such statements about the future and the past—particularly how the masquerade and 
burial reference conflicts between matrilineal and patrilineal descent lines as Egbesu war cults expanded. 
However, here, I include a sketch of the event for the purpose of drawing attention to how the wider shifts 
in the politics, institutions, and economies taking place in the wake of the amnesty are also being reconciled 
through collective, symbolic practices in oil producing communities. It thus, provides a point from which to 
review the larger themes the dissertation has itself explored and weave together some of the ideas I have 
put forward here.  
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oil industry. The LGA chairman as well as a liaison from the governor’s office (who had 
supported the attacks a year ago) arrived to recognize the installation of the paramount 
ruler.241 Shell and Chevron had donated foodstuffs and fuel for the community to enjoy 
the event. The chairmen from Nigerian oil service companies operating in the area, 
including Fenog, attended as well. Each provided cases of beer and tumblers of whisky 
and cognac. They were joined at the high table by leaders of the various branches of 
MEND and their retinue of former fighters. Even Fenog workers, normally restricted to a 
particular area of town, were welcomed to partake of the dancing and drinking, to watch 
the masquerades. Even more significant for Gbaramatu residents, this twinned celebration 
of the rebirth of the community coincided (by chance) with the death of President Umaru 
Musa Yar’Adua and the installation of his vice-president, Goodluck Jonathan242 (an Ijaw 
from the Niger Delta) as head of State just a few days before festivities began. Oporoza 
residents were overjoyed. Churches held special Thanksgiving services on Sunday to 
celebrate the county’s new leader who they hoped would restore Nigeria to true 
federalism where the Deltan communities would finally become the owners and 
managers of their oil resources.  
Yet even as the celebrations were taking place, the army was occupying former 
MEND outposts, the slick from a new bunkering spill was drifting its way down the 
Escravos river.  But perhaps one of the clear complications for any imaginaries of what a 
Delta could be as the pipelines, personnel, institutions and materials Nigerian oil industry 
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241 The coronation was not fully completed until the following year, 2011, when the Governor attended and 
handed over the staff. The 2010 visit merely signaled the government’s acceptance of his ascension. 
 
242 As Yar’Adua’s illness had greatly incapacitated him, Jonathan had already been acting President since 
the February 9th, 2010. However, being formally made the head of state conferred much greater powers. 
 
! 287!
were being reconfigured became evident during an interview that was re-played on NTA 
(the Nigerian Television Authority) that week to commemorate the recently deceased 
President. Here the former president is seen explaining to viewers that although the 
country struggles with its own energy supplies, large contracts have already sold the 
needed Nigerian gas reserves to power the nation’s turbines to foreign companies for a 
period of “at least the next twenty years.” Nigerians awaiting any radical changes, “will 
have to be a little patient,” he explains. One need only look a few miles downstream from 
Oporoza to Chevron’s EGTL project to see such policies in effect. Now that amnesty had 
set in, completion of the plant, built to process and sell gas products abroad was swiftly 
returning to full swing. And as I have suggested, managers at EGTL were busy 
celebrating their own triumphs.  
This event, which took place halfway through my fieldwork, illustrates much of 
what this dissertation has argued on the ways in which the state, the oil companies and oil 
producing communities are entangled in contemporary Nigeria. I have tried to relate a 
view of global oil networks and political violence that takes into account the multiple, 
stratified labor regimes, opaque management systems, corporate welfare programs, and 
illegal oil bunkering. At the same time, the dissertation has tried to plot these relations 
alongside the work to rebuild the technical and institutional infrastructures involved with 
producing and moving oil from remote extractive enclaves to cosmopolitan sites of 
consumption. To do so I have explored how the historical traces of successive colonial 
and postcolonial forms of governance in the delta region become entwined with the 
practices that construct and destroy pipelines. Forming a kind of active tableau, always 
reconfiguring around new events and interventions, I point to how these different 
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mechanisms, technologies and histories likewise become used to imagine, construct and 
objectify particular political futures. The convergence of actors and events taking place 
around the coronation point to ways in which these larger frameworks operating through 
policy initiatives, rights-based discourse, and forms of risk management are also part and 
part of everyday social worlds. 
While it is difficult to alight on a single, definitive point, in this conclusion, I wish 
to simply retrace some of the arguments I have made regarding the social and political 
worlds in the Niger Delta. And in particular, I consider what significance or potential 
there is for engaging a history of resource extraction through an approach anchored 
around the way its pipelines, flow lines, wellheads are not only part of an assemblage, but 
part of various and competing imaginaries of reassemblage. 
In this dissertation infrastructure building, breaking and repair forms both the 
central activity. I suggest such activities produce a network of relationships and practices 
outside of the official ones. As Nigeria’s political landscape is reshaped in the wake of 
the military regime it is confronted with new techniques, tactics and formulas connected 
with transnational regimes of energy securitization, informed by processes of 
financialization and neoliberal market rationalities. This is evident in attempts by the 
state to deregulate the petroleum sector, abolish fuel subsidies and foster 
entrepreneurialism over labor protections. At the same time, the state must reckon with 
the legacies of political divisions and systems of oil and oil rent distribution that have 
defined state power since the Biafran war.   
Focusing on the engagements with the oil infrastructure draws attention not only 
to intersections of the private and public, the national and transnational, but also to the 
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ways various practices are negotiated in the everyday social worlds around extraction. 
Viewing what takes place within the material and institutional bodies where reforms are 
implemented is more suggestive of what is at stake in Nigeria’s present political 
crossroads than an evaluation of the contest to control oil rents. While the violent clashes 
between the state/corporate apparatus and community demonstrate the extent to which 
efforts to access oil monies serves particular interests, this dissertation digs into the social 
logics and messier entanglements that undergirds them. Therefore, I am not only 
concerned with the way the Niger Delta is configured in security rubrics, but in the way 
the reforms being implemented also condition possibilities for different (and unintended) 
forms of engagement with instruments of securitization, the processes of capital 
accumulation and the structures that reproduce state power.  
Extraction enclaves and the pipelines running between wellheads, flow stations 
and export terminals are designed to create divisions between processes internal and 
external to production. Such spatial divisions are assumed to be merely the effect of a 
neutral, efficient technical circuit. Yet in the Niger Delta, this infrastructure organizes 
populations, territories and governance strategies (such as corporate welfare systems, 
security checkpoints and classes of workers), becoming inextricable from the local and 
national political worlds, practices connected with labor and cultural identity. At the same 
time, in practice, these efforts to build boundaries and pipeline thruways are often flawed, 
incomplete, and implemented in a fragmentary fashion. They therefore are caught up and 
implicated in competing projects to govern people and spaces in a historically particular 
place.  
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The pipelines and wellheads form the not just the material, but economic and 
symbolic sources of power, leverage and wealth accumulation. Practices of bunkering, 
demanding deve, the partnering of various security operatives, and the sabotaging of 
work spaces all suggest that rather than simply domination by some cohesive government 
or corporate structure, these relationships have to be made and constantly worked on, and 
therefore are always under threat (or part of aspirations) of being disassembled or 
reconfigured. The way such technologies are interacted and interfered with therefore 
draws attention to the way larger socio-political arrangements are made, but also 
diverted, taken up to other ends, where power formations not only expand but also 
malfunction and mutate.  
Throughout this inquiry into the building and rebuilding process around the 
infrastructure I have suggested that much of this work takes place through a slippage 
(rather than hardening) between various security apparatuses, forms of labor, exchange 
and participation across legal and illegal economies. As the activities of managers, 
fishermen, former militants, politicians, subcontract workers, and black oil dealers work 
to control the space around the oil infrastructure, the boundaries delineated between state, 
corporation and community grow increasingly muddled. This blurring points to how the 
disjunctions between government modalities and the new mechanisms structuring 
transnational capital investments becomes the province of a different kind of politics.  
While what has taken place in the Niger Delta is particular, I have tried to suggest 
that it is not simply an exceptional case, but demonstrative of inner workings and logics 
of the transnational oil industry. The oil industry relies on mechanisms of 
commensuration and translation embedded within technological projects to produce 
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particular effects, processing social and political worlds into an object, or a matter of 
concern that can itself be managed. This has entailed employing particular sets of metrics 
and relying on recycled discourses about violence and corruption in the oil state Rentier 
literature. However, I have pointed to how the oil industry also exploits the gaps, holes 
and inconsistencies that exist in processes such as dysfunctional metering systems, the 
disconnection of Deltan communities from the national infrastructure, the lack of 
oversight involved with subcontracting practices and the proliferation of bunkering rings.  
These engagements themselves are part and parcel of ongoing entanglements. 
Always flawed and incomplete, the slippages and misrecognitions distort intended 
outcomes or require unforeseen and unofficial work to represent them as operational. 
This dynamic is evident, for instance, in the effort made by corporations like Shell and 
Chevron to license successive cycles of corporate social responsibility programs that 
dump cash and services into communities. Symbolically supplementing the development 
and security promised but never delivered by the government, corporations engage and 
intensify those very destructive and volatile ethnic territorial instruments. Moreover, 
ostensibly give more powers, money and control to marginalized Deltan communities, 
these efforts have not led to improved conditions in the environment, the daily life of 
residents, workers or political structures, but simply introduce short-term possibilities for 
negotiation and accumulation when new infrastructural projects are put into effect. Given 
that the measures to develop and secure communities introduced ever more precarity, the 
rise of Niger Delta armed social movements, seeking to undermine hegemonic processes 
also pursued its agenda by exploiting those same ever-exacerbated gaps, holes and 
disconnections.  
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In this sense, activities and contestations connected with the laying of pipelines 
and the construction of the Gas-to-Liquid plant offers a critical reflection on the form 
extractive capital has acquired in the African postcolonial state as efforts are made to 
enclave production but expand investment and integrate market-centered logics into 
state/citizen body at large. My examination of black oil and the subcontracting system 
offer two different (but related) instances where such complexities and the contradictions 
can be viewed. The subcontracting system, which is both part of an industry-driven trend 
to expand profits and initiatives to secure the corporation’s license to operate by 
providing employment for Nigerian and Niger Deltan workers, has, rather than neatly 
knitting state institutions and citizens into the fabric of neoliberal capital production, 
generated a vast field of operators, confusing the categories of work and development 
that are central to both the state and the corporation’s stated agenda. Black oil business, 
by contrast, can be viewed as a form for negotiating the messy traces after decades of 
extraction, where quick returns have been increasingly incentivized, where cycles of 
violence, destruction and repair are understood as inevitable, and managing “risk” often 
means greater hazards for those who are not essential to the circuits and flows of oil.  
Here, entering into circuits provisioned for “community participation,” for 
example, can be seen not merely at the level of drafts of GMOUs and trainings, but 
among the welding of illegal taps, clearing bush for refineries and movement through 
native boats and GeePee tanks, as ever more interests, and actors, agendas orient 
themselves around the twinned perpetuation and eradication of bunkering practices. As 
much a component of order as disorder, black oil business intervenes within flows, it 
provides certain avenues of logistical agitation, but at the same time, rather than any 
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radical force, these practices speak to the fact that the oil state and oil markets, are in fact, 
composed of multiple, dynamic interwoven actors and components mired in uncertainty 
and relying on porosity of materials, institutions and relationships. Here the theories, 
expertise, literatures and mechanisms of security that travel with the technologies 
themselves do not over-determined processes, but become part and parcel of multiple 
economies, histories and understandings of value.  
Working to produce sets of controls for absorbing risk the employment of various 
metrics and privatization schemes leads to fragmentary and shortsighted projects. At the 
coronation it is possible to suggest there is more than the spirit of a falsely accused witch 
haunting these spaces of oil production in the Niger Delta. As these technologies become 
part of the inner workings of the state and local social and political worlds the 
employment of metrical instruments, material and discursive frameworks, they likewise 
remain vulnerable and plagued by the very slips and exclusions they facilitate. As 
contestation against the state and its transnational operators shifts between violent 
clashes, subversive pipeline break-ins and negotiations for increased development 
monies, it has also grown infinitely complex and entwined in the object of its dissent. The 
convergence of past and future in the present acts as a possible allegory for the dynamics 
of political and social life in Nigeria caught in crosshairs of extraction ventures 
themselves. They therefore also act not merely as assemblages, but re-assemblages, 
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